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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
Epistemic Authority, Autonomy, and Humility 
 
By 
 
Dylan Mirek Popowicz 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Professor Sven Bernecker, Chair 
 
 
 
As social creatures, we lean on the work of others to epistemically situate ourselves in our 
complex environments. A particularly important instance of our epistemic reliance on others is 
our dependence on epistemic authorities: those who hold some normative power over our epistemic 
behaviour. Often, accounts of such epistemic authority suggest that it is constituted by a 
connection to a certain set of true beliefs. I provide an alternative account that roots epistemic 
authority in an individual’s superior ability to participate in a certain kind of epistemic practice. 
Such a view better accounts for the variety of ways in which we engage with epistemic 
authorities: as sources of knowledge, as providers of understanding, as intellectual collaborators, 
and as pedagogues and guides. With this account in hand, I put it to work: first, in providing an 
account of what is required of an epistemic agent to remain epistemically autonomous, and 
epistemically responsible, when dealing with an epistemic authority; secondly, in establishing the 
role of epistemic humility in ensuring that relationships of epistemic authority function in an 
epistemically successful fashion.  
 
 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Epistemology and the Importance of  Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is now widely acknowledged that our epistemic success as individuals owes a 
considerable debt to the epistemic efforts of others. To be epistemically successful is not simply to 
rely on one’s own faculties. Here, the social epistemologist begins to sink in her teeth: by 
accounting for how we can know via testimony, and how knowledge can, more generally, pass 
from one individual (or group) to another. There is, however, far more complexity to the kinds of 
epistemic relationships that hold between various epistemic agents than a basic model of 
testimonial exchange accounts for. This dissertation has been motivated by consideration of two 
such points of complexity in particular. First, there are a diverse range of epistemic statuses that 
any individual involved in a social-epistemic relationship may hold, and, perhaps more 
importantly, there may be more or less of a relative discrepancy between the statuses of any two 
individuals involved in such relationships. Secondly, there are a plethora of epistemic goods that 
can be, and are, passed from one epistemic agent to another—many of which will require a far 
more nuanced and detailed theory than many accounts of testimony provide. On the condition 
that we wish for our epistemological accounts to track the facts of our social-epistemic lives, we 
will need to consider such complexities. My broader goal in writing this dissertation is to 
contribute to the project of making sense of the rich fabric of our social-epistemic lives. 
 
 
2 
One particularly interesting component to this epistemic tale is the role played by experts, 
or, to put it in broader terms, those that are in an epistemically superior position relative to 
others. There is a question of how the layman can come to gain knowledge from an expert, given 
that the means of justifying beliefs within a given domain of expertise are often opaque to those 
without the relevant expertise. In the case that we can make sense of this epistemic relationship, 
there are still further problems to consider, such as the issue of how a layman can handle 
disagreement between experts from her own limited vantage, or whether or not such a layman 
has any epistemic right to disagree with the expert herself. There is a question of whether or not 
one’s own reasons, as a layman, can have any force in the face of the expert’s supposedly 
authoritative reason.  
Though these issues are often discussed through the lens of specific problems regarding 
expertise and testimony, it has been less common to investigate the role of such epistemic 
superiors in the broader sense, pertaining to the wider scope of epistemic considerations that may 
be relevant to the relationship between such agents and their inferiors. We could ask: is there 
such a thing as epistemic authority, i.e. does it make sense to suggest that someone can tell you how 
to epistemically behave? If so, does such authority consist in being able to tell us what to believe, 
or are there other epistemic goods that such authority can furnish us with? Is it rational to 
completely defer to the reasons held by epistemically authoritative agents? What can we say 
about what makes an agent a better or worse candidate for such authority?  
I understand these questions to be of fundamental importance, both theoretically, but also 
practically. To leave them unanswered would be to leave our epistemic theories thoroughly 
incomplete, at best describing a perhaps ideal world in which individuals have no need to rely on 
others for their epistemic success, but failing to track the realities of our quotidian, epistemic 
customs. More notably, without answering these questions, epistemology misses an opportunity 
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to be practically significant: a central thesis of this dissertation is that a sufficiently detailed 
account of epistemic authority—one that can account for the wide variety of forms it can take—
can put us in a better position to evaluate real life cases of such social-epistemic relationships. 
Such evaluations can help us understand precisely what is problematic in certain cases, and, I 
think even more promisingly, can provide us with a means to establish guidelines for how such 
relationships should be conducted and regulated.  
My reader may initially wonder why the notion of epistemic authority ought to be 
seriously considered in the first place, especially given, as we shall see, the controversial nature of 
philosophical accounts of such authority. The first answer to this question is that there are a 
plethora of situations in which we epistemically interact with others that I think clearly fall under 
the explanatory scope of such a notion. Perhaps some of my readers are more cautious than the 
rest of us, but I think any empirical investigation into the epistemic practice of the average 
human subject, in normal, everyday circumstances, will reveal a multitude of ways in which we 
defer to those that my account classifies as epistemic authorities, and that we grant such authority 
a special dominion over our epistemic behaviour. As a philosophy PhD student, I grant my 
dissertation committee, comprised of exemplars of the philosophical tradition, a certain authority 
over me. As a teacher, I understand myself to have a similar kind of authority over the (domain-
specific) epistemic behaviour of my students: though the nature of the pedagogical relationship 
necessitates that I assist my students in adjusting their own epistemic behaviour on their own 
terms, it does not preclude the possibility of my authoritatively telling them to behave, or not 
behave, in a certain epistemic fashion. As a patient, my doctor has a somewhat different kind of 
authority over my epistemic states—but she has such authority nevertheless.1 Importantly, this 
                                                        
1 A caveat in all these cases: so long as I do not have an independent reason to doubt the authority, or epistemic 
credentials, of such agents. 
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kind of authority is not merely one bestowed upon such agents by social convention—there are 
deeply epistemic roots for such a status.2 If epistemology is to accurately account for the 
epistemic situation that we generally find ourselves in, then it ought to be able to make sense of 
these kinds of relationships. My claim is that a well-defined notion of epistemic authority can do 
just that. 
 My first goal, then, will be to motivate the view that there is a sense of epistemic authority 
that goes beyond that which is typically discussed in the epistemological literature on experts. In 
itself, this is not an original point. Linda Zagzebski has already argued for, and provided an 
account of, such authority, over and above the more basic sense expertise and epistemic 
authority often discussed by epistemologists: i.e. one merely concerning those that are ‘reliable 
sources of information in some domain’.3 I am in agreement with Zagzebski that it would be of 
philosophical benefit to consider and explore the possibility of there being a stronger sense of 
epistemic authority, one more akin to the kinds of authority more often discussed in the political 
domain. In exploring this possibility, I follow in Zagzebski’s footsteps, focusing primarily on the 
notion of Preemption, a condition of authority originally articulated by Joseph Raz in accounting 
for political authority, which Zagzebski has adopted and applied to the epistemic realm. This 
condition states that an epistemic authority can provide me with a preemptive reason to believe some 
proposition p, where a preemptive reason is understood to be one which overrides all my prior 
reasons pertaining to p. Thus, if an epistemic authority tells me that p is the case, Preemption 
states that I ought to believe that p, and I ought to believe it solely on the basis of the authoritative 
statement, disregarding all other previous reasons I have for believing, or not believing, that p. 
                                                        
2 Consider, for example, the possibility that I find myself in a society that for some reason gives an authoritative 
intellectual status to individuals with what we would think of as possessing a quite questionable epistemic status. In 
such a society, it would still make sense for me to recognise a non-socially recognised individual as having epistemic 
authority over me, given that they themselves do in fact have the right kind of epistemic standing.  
3 Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 5. 
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Preemption, Zagzebski suggests, is central to epistemic authority, in fact necessary for epistemic 
authority: it is the normative power that grounds such authority, and it is constitutive of such 
authority.4 
As we shall see, the Preemption thesis for epistemic authority, as stated by Zagzebski, has 
its problems. However, I nevertheless agree with Zagzebski on two points: first, in thinking that 
there is such a real-life phenomenon as that which her theory attempts to account for; secondly, 
that a successful theory of such a phenomenon must include a strong normative component, such 
as her Preemption thesis. Much of the first part of this dissertation will be dedicated to making 
sense of how exactly we can articulate the nature of this component, without being ensnared by 
counter-intuitive consequences. I disagree with Zagzebski, however, on two crucial points: first, 
we disagree on what provides the kinds of agents in question with the relevant epistemically 
normative (and authoritative) power over others; secondly, we disagree on precisely what the 
scope of such power is, as I think the relevant individuals have a role to play in normatively 
adjusting our epistemic behaviour in a variety of ways beyond merely altering what we come to 
believe about a given question—this is to say that an epistemic authority can authoritatively 
adjust my epistemic behaviour in other ways that merely telling me what to believe.  
Contra previous accounts of expertise and epistemic authority, my view is not limited to 
epistemic agents who have relatively more true beliefs—or a higher chance of success at 
acquiring more true beliefs—relative to a certain domain of inquiry than we. Roughly, I argue 
that an epistemic authority is someone who, other conditions being satisfied, has the requisite 
skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in a certain epistemic practice that is constitutive of 
inquiry in the domain in question. These individuals have authority over us precisely because we, 
                                                        
4 And, in being constitutive of epistemic authority, such authority is thus argued by Zagzebski to be continuous with 
other forms of authority: such as moral and political. 
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relative to them, have fewer of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how, or perhaps do not 
have them at all. Significantly, this status explains why an epistemic authority is someone that 
can provide me with reason to adjust my epistemic behaviour in other ways than merely 
changing what I do, or do not, believe. This allows me to argue that epistemic authorities are 
recognised as such because they traffick in a variety of epistemic goods, many of which are often 
overlooked in the philosophical literature on expert knowledge and testimony. Thus, I argue that 
epistemic authority is not grounded merely in considerations of possessing a sufficiently large set of 
true beliefs, or being a reliable source of such true beliefs, but in possessing the skills, ability, and 
know-how to partake in a certain kind of epistemic practice constitutive of inquiry in the domain in 
question.  
 These differences are substantial. My account has the advantage of being applicable to a 
broader range of cases, all of which I argue have the right to be considered under the scope of an 
account of epistemic authority. This includes cases in which an authority may not be able to 
provide us with true beliefs, perhaps even in principle, but can nevertheless improve our epistemic 
situations in some other fashion (here, I have in mind cases in which an agent may be 
authoritative relative to a domain of inquiry that some may not consider to deal in truths per se: 
possible examples being various aesthetic, religious, spiritual, and moral domains).5 More 
importantly, this includes cases in which a relative non-authority may be seeking something other 
than true belief in his engagement with an epistemic authority. As I will argue, particular 
instances of the epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship are far more complicated than 
described by accounts that focus on the mere transmission of true beliefs. These complexities 
include, but are not limited to: cases in which an epistemic authority furnish us with understanding 
                                                        
5 It should be noted, however, that my dissertation is not wedded to a particular view of truth, or to the assumption 
that there are no truths in certain domains of inquiry, such as the ones listed. Even if one accepts some pluralist 
account of truth, I argue that there is reason to think that we are better off accounting for epistemic authority in a 
manner that is not directly tied to the acquisition of true beliefs.  
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(as Christoph Jäger suggests), cases in which they guide us in our own epistemic endeavours, and 
cases in which we in fact collaborate with them in such endeavours.  
With the aim of establishing my own view, I begin in Chapter I by surveying a selection 
of prior definitions of epistemic authority. I take as my examples definitions by Zagzebski herself, 
Katherine Dormandy, Jan Constantin and Thomas Grundmann,6 and Christoph Jäger.7 As 
already mentioned, Zagzebski, modifying Raz’s account of political authority, provides an 
account of epistemic authority with the Preemption thesis at its centre. Dormandy and Jäger 
present a series of arguments against Zagzebski’s Preemption thesis, highlighting the 
counterintuitive consequences of the suggestion that an agent should disregard some of her 
reasons in the light of authoritative testimony. Dormandy presents an account of epistemic 
authority that is intended to avoid the issues that Zagzebski faces, while Jäger presents his own 
account of a certain kind of epistemic authority, which he refers to as Socratic Epistemic Authority. 
Constantin and Grundmann defend their own, more limited version of Preemption, which, 
though it avoids some of the pitfalls of Zagzebski’s account, is not sufficient to do justice to the 
stronger sense of authority that Zagzebski and myself wish to account for.8 Much in the same 
way, I argue that Dormandy and Jäger’s accounts don’t do justice to this stronger sense of 
authority either. Jäger’s account, does, however, correctly highlight the need to broaden our 
considerations regarding epistemic authority to consider epistemic goods other than the mere 
transmission of true beliefs when considering authorities in the epistemic realm. 
 In Chapter II I argue against the possibility of limiting the extension of the epistemic 
authority to that of agents with a more reliable sense of the truth than ourselves. I argue that for 
                                                        
6 Jan Constantin and Thomas Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority: Preemption Through Undercutting Defeat’, 
Synthese, forthcoming. 
7 Christoph Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding’, Episteme 13:2, 167-185. 
8 Not that Constantin and Grundmann would deny this point: in fact I think they emphatically accept it, for reasons 
that we shall see. 
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someone to be epistemically authoritative over another agent she is required to be more than a 
mere possessor of a sufficient amount of true beliefs. To merely be a more reliable gauge of truth 
does not grant one the necessary dominion over the epistemic actions of another agent that is 
required to be considered an authority. Epistemic authorities are exemplars of a certain epistemic 
practice, and possess other virtues than merely knowing truths. Furthermore, limiting our 
considerations to the acquisition of true beliefs as the epistemic good that we can acquire from 
epistemic authorities does not make sense of the wide variety and kinds of social-epistemic 
relationships that we are considering: there are a plethora of epistemic goods that we can get 
from our epistemic superiors, and some of these may have little to do with the kinds of true 
beliefs relevant to an epistemic authority’s domain of inquiry per se.9 One example of Jäger’s 
inclusion of understanding as an epistemic good trafficked by such authorities, which he suggests is 
an important component of Socratic Epistemic Authority. But there are further epistemic goods that 
epistemic authorities may provide, or at least can put us in a better position to acquire, and I 
argue that an account of epistemic authority must be able to make sense of all of these if it is to be 
an adequate theory in the first place. 
At bottom, I suggest that to be an epistemic authority, as Zagzebski is right to suggest, is 
to be an epistemic exemplar of sorts, one that can show an epistemically less well-off agent how 
to do better epistemically, and can do so in a variety of ways. I suggest that the aspect of such 
epistemic exemplars that grants them authority over others in the epistemic domain does involve a 
kind of Preemption, but not of the sort that either Zagzebski, or Constantin and Grundmann, 
have argued for.  Rather, I argue that epistemic authorities are able to pre-empt our higher-order 
beliefs and reasons—our beliefs about our reasons—and pre-emptively guide our epistemic 
                                                        
9 My account thus can make sense of how one can plausibly treat someone as an epistemic authority even when that 
authority’s domain of inquiry, or epistemic practice, does not necessarily provide us with true beliefs. 
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behaviour, on the basis that such reasons, and behaviour, are constitutive of a certain kind of 
epistemic practice that defines the domain of which they are authorities. I argue that to be an 
epistemic authority is to have the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to successfully partake 
in an epistemic practice that can provide us with epistemic goods. I argue that, in part, what it 
means to be an epistemic authority is to, via very the act of practicing a certain discipline, establish 
the very rules and norms that guide reasoning, and other epistemic processes, in that domain. 
When we engage with such epistemic authorities, we do so because we recognise that practice as 
epistemically valuable, and the authority as being better situated to practice it (either because we 
have none of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how, or because we have them to a lesser 
degree). In interacting with such authorities, then, we can be understood much as somewhat 
addled outsiders being welcomed in to an alien practice or epistemic behaviour—on the 
assumption that we wish to acquire the fruits of that practice, we have to defer some of our 
choices in acting, at least in part, to that established practice.  
Broadening the scope of normative power constitutive of epistemic authority, as my 
account does, however, presents an obvious problem: it threatens to multiply some of the 
problematic elements of Zagzebski’s view, and to conflict with what some may intuitively 
consider to be important components of our individual epistemic agency. If we are to take the 
existence of such authority seriously, we ought to consider and account for its affect and 
consequence on the individual epistemic status of the relative non-authority. I will tackle this 
question in Chapter III, which considers the issue of epistemic autonomy and responsibility, on 
the side of the non-authority, when engaging with epistemic authority. The first question to be 
answered here, is whether the notion of epistemic authority does harm to what some may 
consider a valuable element of being a fully-fledged, epistemic agent: our epistemic autonomy. 
To answer this question, I first identify key components central to our intuitive notion of 
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autonomy broadly, and evaluate how and why we may initially think that its epistemic 
counterpart is jeopardised by the idea of epistemic authority. I conclude from this that those who 
place value on such autonomy have nothing to fear, and articulate a series of condition that we, 
as non-authorities, must meet in order to be considered autonomous in our dealings with 
epistemic authority. By doing so I hope to take important steps towards a more urgent task: 
delineating where, when, and how an epistemic agent ought to be considered epistemically 
responsible for the instantiation and consequence of a relationship with an epistemic authority, 
which, in turn, will illuminate when an epistemic authority is alternatively responsible for any 
consequence. This theoretical delineation of the scope of epistemic responsibility plays an 
important task in improving our ability to make real-life changes: it allows us to properly focus 
our attempts to improve the enactment of various social-epistemic customs, by ensuring that we 
target our efforts to the appropriate individuals within the relevant relationships. Very broadly, 
this means that we ought to be able to do a better job of educating all members of society how to 
best identify and engage with those in epistemically superior positions, relative to a certain 
domain of inquiry, and to understand their own responsibility in doing so; furthermore, it allows 
us to get a better grasp of what an epistemic authority’s duties are in such a relationship.10 
To further understand the roles and responsibilities of all parties in such authoritative 
relationships, I turn in Chapter IV to the question of epistemic humility. My purpose here is to 
further elaborate on what is required of each party to make relationships of epistemic authority 
function correctly—or to their full potential. Though I focus on the role of such humility on the 
                                                        
10 Of course, it is open to question whether an authority has ‘duties’ at all in such a relationship, particularly given 
that my account of epistemic authority in no way requires that an authority herself recognises the relationship—the 
establishment of such a relationship is solely on the shoulders of the non-authority. This will have to be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter IV, but for now I will say this: a key component to my project here is the recognition that 
our success as epistemic agents is deeply rooted in the fact that we are social creatures. I am motivated by the 
thought that any honest articulation of such success, and that any truthful self-reflection on ourselves as epistemic 
agents, will place a serious weight on the fact that we are members of a broader social-epistemic community. Given 
such membership, it is not a far cry to suggest that we each have duties in respect to it. 
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side of the authority herself, I argue that such humility is required both on the part of the 
authority and the non-authority. First, I argue that consideration of this particular kind of social-
epistemic relationship supports a view of intellectual humility roughly akin to what Maura Priest 
has previously argued for: namely an interpersonal kind, one that places weight on the idea that to 
be intellectually humble is to hold a certain positive attitude towards the role that other epistemic 
agents play, even if they are in some sense epistemically inferior. Secondly, I illustrate why such 
an interpersonal attitude is required to make interactions with epistemic authorities, as a whole, 
successful. This will be shown to be particular relevant in the more complicated kinds of 
relationships that we can have with epistemic authorities that I have already alluded to, in which 
things are not as cut and dry as basic accounts of such authority, and testimony in general, make 
them out to be. By focusing on the role of such humility on the part of the authority, I aim to at 
least illustrate one key point: the best of epistemic authorities instantiate certain epistemic virtues. 
My hope is that my illustration of one such virtue will motivate further research into other such 
virtues, and lead to a fuller account of what could possibly constitute an ideal authority of this 
kind. This is an important task because the possession of such an account would allow us to do 
two things: first, it would allow us to better train, and provide guidelines for, those individuals 
who are likely to end up in a position of epistemic authority relative to others; second, it would 
also allow us to better educate the rest of us to identify if and when an individual, whom we may 
be considering as identifying as an epistemic authority, possesses the kinds of intellectual virtues we 
would like them to have. 
The issues I raise in Chapters III and IV are of timely consequence. If popular reports are 
to be believed, we live in a time in which much intellectual authority, and the general social 
status of cognitive expertise more broadly, has been undermined by the presence of various forms 
of acerbic, and especially corrosive, political criticism. Many of my readers may, for example, be 
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troubled by the current prevalence of climate change denial, and the anti-vaxxer movement.11 In 
place of those once thought of as our intellectual superiors, many have placed their trust in 
political and popular figures: authoritarian rather than authoritative figures, who’s claim to such 
status are often grounded on intuitive pull, the allure of the conspiracy theory, and the hook 
emotional appeal. Though I leave my reader to make their own judgements, I think it a boon 
that my account and related arguments show us precisely why such figures should not be identified 
or treated in such an authoritative manner: not only do they lack the epistemic credentials to be 
epistemic authorities, our engagement with such individuals qua authorities does damage to our 
epistemic autonomy, and places individuals who do not exhibit the right intellectual virtues in 
places of epistemic, political, and practical power.  
Even if one is not persuaded by my examples in themselves, they nevertheless illustrate 
my point: many of us no longer trust those that are supposedly our epistemic superiors (in some 
regard, or in some domain of inquiry), and this attitude of distrust can potentially have disastrous 
consequence. By better understanding the conditions in which we ought to identify someone as 
an epistemic authority, and how we, and the authorities themselves, ought to act, we can make 
steps to reverse this trend, and to better our overall social situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
11 Aptly enough, the last revisions to this dissertation were made on days in which I received what struck me as 
emails with anachronistically absurd contents: warnings of various cases of a recent measles outbreak in my 
community, my places of study, and place of work.  
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I. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY THUS FAR 
 
Problems with Preemptive Accounts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Much has been written on the epistemic status of experts, though philosophical inquiry 
into the question generally tends to deal with particular problems related to experts, such as the 
issue of what a layman ought to do when faced with expert disagreement. What such analyses 
boil down to, however, is a very basic problem: the epistemic status of the non-expert relative to 
an epistemic task in which he does not have the appropriate domain-specific skillset, background, 
or prior knowledge, to be able to reliably judge. Most discussions of this problem are focused on 
the question of how, we, as non-experts, can have justification in coming to some conclusion, and 
thus some belief, in a domain of inquiry that we lack sufficient access to—domains for which we 
do not have the appropriate epistemic tools for accessing alone, at least not without much more 
education, training, practice, etc. The expert, it is assumed, provides us with such access to these 
domains. Without testimony from such experts, and without our being able to gain knowledge 
via such testimony, most of us could not claim to have knowledge about such things as quantum 
mechanics, the inner workings of the economic process, a wide range of important historical 
facts, and so forth.  
Epistemologists have defined expertise in a variety of way. Typically, following Alvin 
Goldman, accounts have primarily focused on the idea that an expert is someone with more true 
beliefs (or propositional knowledge), and fewer false beliefs, in a domain of inquiry d, than a non-
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expert.12 Others have, still focused on the good of true belief, limited the account to the mere 
claim that experts are more likely to acquire true beliefs, relevant to questions pertinent to d, 
relative to the non-expert. Others have focused on the idea that experts are simply those who 
have engaged in a more sustained inquiry in d compared to the non-experts.13 
Though things could be said in favour of these definitions, and I think elements of these 
will play a role in any fully-fledged account of expertise and epistemic authority, I understand 
such theories of expertise to be limited. As will be argued in Chapter II, I think the focus on true 
beliefs is an unnecessary limitation in these accounts, and, in particular, hinder such accounts 
from being able to account for the full range of phenomenon that I argue they should. As I 
understand it, when we engage with experts qua epistemic authorities, we engage with them as a 
source of a wide variety of epistemic goods, and an account of experts that focuses too narrowly 
on the epistemic good of truth will fail to properly account for these other cases. Furthermore, I 
argue that an epistemic authority’s reliable connection to the truth cannot be the grounds for the 
kind of authority appropriate to their epistemic standing.  
The above discussion of ‘experts’ and ‘epistemic authorities’ is confusing. For reasons that 
will become clearer as we progress, I assume that there are in fact two distinct concepts at play in 
these discussions: expertise, and epistemic authority. What confuses matters, however, is that (or 
at least I argue) our everyday usage of the word ‘experts’ often equivocates between the two. 
Unfortunately, epistemologists themselves have made the mistake of equivocating in the same 
fashion.  
As a preview of the position I will defend in Chapter II, let me say the following: 
Expertise will be understood in non-relational terms, as a quality, or qualities, 
                                                        
12 Alvin I. Goldman, ‘Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?’, Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, ed. Alvin I 
Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109-133. 
13 John Hardwig, ‘Epistemic Dependence’, The Journal of Philosophy, 82:7 (July 1985), 338.  
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that an individual epistemic agent may have, by virtue of their training, skills, 
acquired knowledge, etc.  
 
Epistemic authority will be understood in relational terms, as a status that one 
epistemic agent may have against another: by virtue of having some epistemic 
status that others lack, by various degrees.  
 
Though my own reasons for keeping the two distinct will become clearer as we progress, a few 
things can be said for such a distinction at this stage:  
1. As Constantin and Grundmann have pointed out,14 one can be an expert in 
some epistemic domain while not being epistemically superior relative to 
another agent, who may, for instance, also be an expert within the same 
domain. This is a simple point that an account of expertise and epistemic 
authority ought to track.  
2. The literature on expertise tends to obfuscate the distinction between a 
properly descriptive notion of ‘expertise’, intended to identify what an expert is 
per se, and a more appropriately evaluative notion of ‘expertise’, intended to 
capture the properly normative considerations that determine the relation 
that non-experts can have with their epistemic superiors. I argue that an 
account that keeps these two concepts distinct has benefits over one that 
doesn’t. 
3. It is perfectly plausible for an epistemic agent to interact with, and to make 
use, of someone who is an expert in a given domain, and yet not treat them as 
authorities per se, in the stronger sense that I will be discussing. To treat an 
expert merely as a reliable gauge of truth, for instance, would be a case such 
as this: here, I simply refer to expert testimony much as I would any reading 
                                                        
14 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 6.  
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off of a well-calibrated measuring device. To treat someone as an epistemic 
authority, I will argue, is far more than this. If this is right, then the two 
concepts ought to be kept distinct. 
That all being said, the distinction between expertise and epistemic authority will not always be 
clear in my discussion of the various accounts of epistemic authority presented by other 
epistemologists: part of my task will be to clearly delineate the difference in my own account of 
expertise and epistemic authority, and to argue for the benefit in doing so.  
In I.1 I explain Zagzebski’s account of epistemic authority, focusing on the central notion 
of Preemption, which she considers to be constitutive of epistemic authority itself. In I.2 I discuss 
a series of arguments that Dormandy and Jäger have presented against the Preemption thesis. In 
I.3 I present Dormandy’s alternative account of epistemic authority, which she refers to as the 
‘Proper-Basing’ view. I.4 discusses Jäger’s alternative account of Socratic Epistemic Authority. 
Lastly, I.5 reviews Constantin and Grundmann’s own defence of Preemption, which they make 
sense of in terms of undercutting defeat.  
Those aware of the recent literature on epistemic authority will likely notice that I have 
not here mentioned Michel Croce’s account. This is due to the fact that, though our accounts 
differ in important ways, they also share important similarities. For this reason, I have chosen to 
discuss his account in contrast to mine. I refer my reader to Chapter II.4 for more detail.   
 
I.1 ZAGZEBSKI’S ACCOUNT 
 
Recent interest in the notion of epistemic authority is to be credited to Linda Zagzebski’s 
pioneering work in her Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. I 
understand Zagzebski to be motivated by the observation that it is somewhat peculiar that a 
strong, normative sense of authority, though prevalent in other domains of philosophical 
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discourse, is nowhere to be found in epistemology. As she sees it, there are likely two reasons that 
such authority is not considered in the literature, namely, that the existence of such authority 
arguably conflicts with two important epistemic values: epistemic autonomy, and epistemic 
egalitarianism. Epistemic egalitarianism is, roughly, the view that everyone has sufficiently similar 
epistemic powers; epistemic autonomy, on the other hand, which Zagzebski suggests is generally 
equated with epistemic self-reliance.15 
On the face of it, neither seems compatible with the notion of epistemic authority. To 
suggest that another agent be epistemically authoritative over one’s beliefs and reasons would 
plausibly be to insinuate that they have sufficiently different epistemic powers than oneself. 
Furthermore, if we understand autonomy as the ‘right or ideal of submitting to nothing but one’s 
own rational will’,16 then the suggestion that one in any way submit to the rational will of another 
epistemic agent can quite clearly be understood as undermining one’s autonomy. Though I 
won’t discuss her arguments here,17 Zagzebski’s nevertheless concludes that the wish to protect 
these values provides no real challenge to epistemic authority: properly understanding these 
values, and the nature of epistemic authority, reveals that they are perfectly consistent with one 
another.18  
These worries aside, Zagzebski argues that we have no good reason to ignore the task of 
providing an account of epistemic authority. Motivated to bring epistemic considerations closer 
to those of the ethical and political spheres, Zagzebski further suggests that we look at models of 
                                                        
15 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 7.  
16 Ibid., 19.  
17 I discuss epistemic autonomy in Chapter III, and argue that there is no necessary conflict between epistemic 
authority and such autonomy. I do not tackle epistemic egalitarianism in much detail in this dissertation. However, 
certain points of my disagreement with Zagzebski’s view, as my reader will see, will suggest that my own view of 
epistemic authority is not particularly wedded to the idea of saving epistemic egalitarianism, at least in the simple 
form suggested here. As I see it, it is perfectly plausible, and quite likely, that there are individuals amongst us who 
do in fact have greater epistemic powers than we.   
18 Those interested in the further details of Zagzebski’s arguments should look to Chapter 1 of her Epistemic Authority.  
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authority in those areas, and then see if they can be appropriately applied to their epistemic 
counterparts. Those less incentivised to unite these historically disparate branches of philosophy 
may wonder why we should follow Zagzebski in step, here. I think the strategy can be justified in 
a far more straightforward fashion: I would argue that if there is such a thing as authority in the 
epistemic realm, then it would be hardly surprising to find that it bears a resemblance to 
authority in other realms. This suggests that it would be prudent to begin with this assumption. 
In much the same way, I would think that an attempt to define epistemic authority that resulted 
in a theory that shared no common ground with other forms of authority would look very 
peculiar indeed, and would suggest that the phenomenon in question was not a kind of 
‘authority’ per se. 
Zagzebski thus takes as her model Joseph Raz’s conditions for political authority.19 She 
argues that the conditions Raz lays out for political authority can be applied to the epistemic 
realm. Though I will briefly discuss all such conditions, my primary concern is her Preemption 
condition, the condition that Zagzebski argues gives authority its properly normative force, and 
the one condition that is the most philosophically controversial (at least in its application to the 
epistemic realm).   
The conditions are as follows:  
Content-independence: ‘An authoritative utterance gives the subject a reason 
to follow the directive which is such that there is no direct connection between 
the reason and the action for which it is a reason’.20  
 
This is to say that the authority could have directed any wide range of actions, and this 
would still give the receiving subject reason to do that action. It is, in a sense, the fact that an 
authority has uttered that p that gives one a reason to behave a certain way, rather than the fact p 
                                                        
19 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.  
20 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 106.  
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has a certain content. Zagzebski thinks this condition applies in the case of epistemic authority: if 
I defer to the authority of a climate scientist, for example, I would still have reason to believe 
what she asserts, on authority, even if it had been the case that she believed and uttered 
something else. The subject’s reason for believing the authority’s utterance is completely 
independent of the content of said utterance—it is based on who the speaker is, not what she 
says.21  
If we are to take it that such authoritative utterances to give us good reason, or a strong 
enough reason, to act a certain way, then content-independence may strike some as prima facie 
implausible in some cases. We can certainly imagine many cases in which the content of an 
authority’s utterance stands opposed to a variety of other good reasons we may have. Content-
independence, however, only tells us that an authority’s uttering that p gives us a reason to take a 
certain course of action: but it does not say how we should weigh this reason against all other 
reasons that we may have. The burden of explaining that component of the epistemic 
relationship between an authority and a subject falls upon the Preemption Thesis.  
In the political domain, Raz has formulated it as such:  
Raz’s Preemption Thesis: ‘[T]he fact that an authority requires performance 
of an action is a reason for its performance that replaces other relevant reasons 
and is not simply added to them’.22  
 
Zagzebski thinks this thesis applies to the epistemic domain, and formulates the epistemic 
version as follows:  
Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis for epistemic authority: ‘The fact that 
the authority has a belief p is a reason for me to believe p that replaces my 
                                                        
21 Though Zagzebski does not directly state it in her discussion of this condition, I assume that her and I agree that 
content-independence is at least limited in one sense: the content does matter in that an epistemic authority must be 
speaking about some proposition that is the subject of inquiry in the domain of inquiry that she is an authority over. 
A climate scientist, for example, does not have authority over my beliefs in regard to God’s existence, my 
understanding of string theory, etc.  
22 Ibid., 107.  
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other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them.’23 
 
Zagzebski understands this to mean that the authority takes the subject’s place in 
determining that p. In coming to choose between whether to believe that p, or not-p, I disregard 
any of the various inferences I could make about the case, based on whatever prior evidence I 
have for either option. If I believe on authority, then my reason for believing that p is simply that 
the authority has stated that p.  
 It would be useful here to take a close look at why this is so. Part of believing on authority 
is working on the assumption that the epistemic authority has already done the epistemic work of 
coming to the conclusion that p. For Zagzebski, this is work that I would myself have done if I had been 
more conscientious, i.e. if I had spent the time honing the relevant epistemic skills, acquiring the 
appropriate domain specific knowledge, carefully surveying and analysing the evidence, etc. It is 
this fact (that the authority has done the work for me) that justifies my epistemic behaviour.24  
Note, however, that this reason for believing needn’t be a complicated and explicit 
inference on the part of the subject in every instance of accepting authoritative testimony, one 
based on the observation that the authority has done x, y, z in coming to her conclusion that p, 
with the decision to believe her utterance that p based on a calculated probability of her having 
gotten it right. Believing on authority is not to make one’s best judgement of an authority’s 
decision-making process on any particular occasion, because such a strategy would result in a 
range of contextually dependent credences—in one case an authority’s utterance will seem very 
likely to be true, in another less so—and this outcome, as will become clear soon, is completely 
antithetical to Zagzebski’s general defence of the Preemption thesis, and her account of epistemic 
                                                        
23 Ibid. 
24 This is why Zagzebski thinks that epistemic authority is perfectly compatible with epistemic egalitarianism: for her, 
the authoritative testimonial relationship is grounded in the recognition that the authority is sufficiently similar to 
oneself—the authority has simply had the time and resources to be more conscientious relative to a certain domain 
of inquiry. Again, as we shall see, I disagree with this assumption.    
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authority more broadly. To put it another way: once an epistemic authority has been recognised 
and accepted as such, such inferences and calculations are, according to Zagzebski’s framework, 
contrary to the relevant epistemic relationship.25 The subject’s believing that p is in fact based on 
no such evidence, but merely on the fact that she recognises another as an authority, and that the 
authority has uttered that p.26 The epistemic work, regarding p, is all the authority’s. The subject’s 
work is merely in recognising the authority as such. 
Clearly, this condition requires far more explanation, which I will return to below. As we 
shall see, the Preemption condition is also a highly controversial one: it suggests that, given the 
utterance of an authority, I should disregard any reason I have for believing p, or not believing p. 
This may have serious, unintuitive consequences, as Katherine Dormandy and Christoph Jäger 
have pointed out—these will be discussed in section I.3.  
Before tackling the Preemption thesis in more detail, however, a few words should be said 
about the other conditions and theses Zagzebski thinks relevant to epistemic authority, again, as 
modified forms of Raz’s own theses pertaining to political authority.  
Raz’s Dependency Thesis: ‘[A]l] authoritative directives should be based on 
reasons that already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and 
are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive’.27  
 
Zagzebski suggests the following epistemic articulation:  
Zagzebski’s Dependency Thesis for the authority of another’s belief: 
‘If the belief p of a putative epistemic authority is authoritative for me, it 
should be formed in a way that I would conscientiously believe is deserving of 
emulation’.28 
 
This should not be confused with what Raz and Zagzebski refer to as the No Difference 
Thesis, which states that an authority’s assertion should make no difference to what a subject 
                                                        
25 My own view suggests this same conclusion, as will be seen in Chapter II.  
26 We will have much more to say about the idea of recognising an authority as such later in this chapter.  
27 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 108. 
28 Ibid., 109.  
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ought to do, in the sense that the authority’s assertion should guide the subject to do what they 
ought to do in any event.29 Zagzebski thinks the No Difference Thesis is false in the epistemic 
domain (as Raz does in the political): if it were true, then the subject would have reason to believe 
that p without the authority’s assertion that p. As Zagzebski points out, this may not however be 
the case: the subject’s access to the relevant reasons for believing that p may be incredibly remote, 
thus leaving her with no reason to believe p at all.30  
Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis: ‘the normal way to establish that a 
person has authority of another person is to show that the alleged subject is 
likely better to comply with reasons that apply to him if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow 
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons that apply to him directly’.31  
 
Zagzebski provides two epistemic analogues for this thesis. First:  
Zagzebski’s Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Belief (JAB1): 
‘The authority of another person’s belief for me is justified by my 
conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a true belief and avoid a 
false belief if I believe what the authority believes than if I try to figure out 
what to believe myself’. 
 
 And, secondly:  
Zagzebski’s Justification Thesis 2 for the Authority of Belief (JAB2): 
‘The authority of another person’s belief for me is justified by my 
conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a belief that survives my 
conscientious self-reflection if I believe what the authority believes than if I try 
to figure out what to believe myself’.32  
 
What is it then that Zagzebski means by ‘epistemic conscientiousness’? She defines this 
quality as that of ‘using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get to the truth’,33 where 
                                                        
29 Ibid. 
30 Arnon Keren thinks that Zagzebski has not interpreted the No difference Thesis as Raz’s intended it to be 
understood, and argues that, if interpreted correctly, it is actually true in the epistemic domain, but not the political 
one. If correct, this suggests an important lack of symmetry between political and epistemic authority. Arnon Keren, 
‘Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief’, forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy of 
Religion.  
31 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 108. 
32 Ibid., 111.  
33 Ibid., 48.  
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a higher degree of conscientiousness goes hand-in-hand with a higher degree of critical self-
awareness and consciousness of one’s reasoning. Conscientiousness is the state or disposition to 
make use of one’s own epistemic powers in a self-reflective, careful, and fully-conscious manner. 
The basic idea behind JAB1 and JAB2, then, is that an authority’s belief is justified to the 
subject’s epistemically conscientious conclusion that she is more likely to get to the truth if she 
believes what the authority tells her. From the subject’s perspective, she is justified in believing on 
authority by recognising that the authority can do a better job than her at getting to the truth.   
On the face of it, there may not seem to be anything immediately problematic about 
Zagzebski’s suggestion. Given that I, as a subject, recognise, or at least have reason to believe, 
that some authority A has a better chance of getting to the truth in some relevant domain d, I 
seem to have a very good reason to believe that p, given A’s utterance that p, if I want to have the 
best chance of getting to the truth. Given that I conscientiously believe that I have less chance of 
getting to the truth of the matter on my own, what reason could I have not to do just as 
Zagzebski suggests I am rationally required to?  
To both understand why Zagzebski thinks the Preemption thesis is correct for epistemic 
authority, and why others think it is not, we ought to consider two distinct epistemic goods in 
play. One, quite clearly, is that of Truth, and here I mean this in the somewhat limited sense that 
we aim, in our epistemic pursuits, to have more true beliefs, and fewer false beliefs.  This is not to 
be confused with a broader goal of getting closer to, or grasping, ‘the truth’ in some form or 
another. To avoid any confusion in the following discussion, I will refer to this goal as Truth(B) 
throughout my discussion. 
Truth(B): The epistemic good of having more true beliefs, and fewer false beliefs.  
 When considering our epistemic standing more broadly, however, other goods and goals 
come to light. It is generally accepted that our beliefs ought to be responsive to the totality of our 
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evidence, or to the totality of our reasons. In the case that a subject has a variety of reasons for 
believing that p, and other reasons for believing that not-p, it is thought that she should conclude 
with a belief that appropriately responds to all such reasons, and the weight that each hold. If 
there are more, or at least weightier, reasons in favour of p, then she ought to believe that p; if 
there are more, or at least weightier reasons, in favour of not-p, the she ought to believe that not-p; 
if the reasons are not decisive in this regard, it may be that she ought to abstain from believing 
either that p or that not-p. Let us call this the value of Total Reasons.  
Total Reasons: The epistemic good of having doxastic states that are responsive 
to, and reflective of, the totality of my reasons and evidence.  
 
To preview what is to come: the controversial nature of Zagzebski’s Preemption thesis 
centres around its being in apparent conflict with Total Reasons.34 Consider the following: a 
subject S considers a certain proposition p, within some domain d, and tries to decide whether she 
should believe that p, or that not-p. Before coming across someone whom she considers an 
authority on the matter, she compiles a series of reasons for and against p, and, on the basis of 
those reasons, comes to the conclusion that not-p. Now, in a discussion with an authority A in d, 
she is told, by A, that p is actually the case. If the Preemption thesis is true, then S ought to 
believe that p, but not because A’s testimony outweighs all other reasons for and against p, but 
solely because A claims that p. The only reason that factors in to supporting S’s belief is that A has 
uttered that p is the case. This flies clearly in the face of Total Reasons: S has neglected to hold 
beliefs that are responsive to, and reflective of, all of her reasons. 
Now, I think that such disregard for Total Reasons is highly problematic, as do Christoph 
Jäger35 and Katherine Dormandy.36 I’ll return to considering such criticism, however, in later 
                                                        
34 For a detailed account of this conflict, and more on Truth and Total Reasons in general, see Katherine Dormandy’s 
‘Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper-Basing?’, Erkenntnis 83:4 (2017), 773-791. 
35 Christoph Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’. 
36 Dormandy, ‘Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper-Basing?’.  
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sections. Here I focus on Zagzebski’s approach to solving the conflict between Truth(B) and Total 
Reasons, and how she thinks that the Preemption thesis survives, and is in fact bolstered by, such 
conflict.  
Zagzebski’s initial defence of Preemption boils down, very simply, to the following: 
Truth(B) is more epistemically valuable than Total Reasons, and given that, in the case of epistemic 
authority, only one can prevail, we ought to choose Truth(B).37 To see why we cannot have both, 
Zagzebski invites us to consider the alternative, in which we do not follow Preemption, but we 
merely consider an authority’s utterance that p as a reason to believe that p that is added to all 
our other reasons for and against p. The problem, she claims, is that even if we weight the authoritative 
reason appropriately highly, there is still the risk that there will be cases in which such a reason is 
outweighed by the other reasons that S may have, resulting in S ending up believing that not-p 
when A believes that p. Given that, by definition, A is more likely to have a true belief, it follows 
that S has forsaken Truth(B) in favour of Total Reasons. One can easily think of problematic cases in 
which what Zagzebski envisages comes to pass: a medical surgeon suggests a course of action that 
a patient refuses due to a variety of information, from others suffering a similar condition, she has 
found online; a parent refuses to vaccinate her children in light of the overwhelming amount of 
testimony she has received from people she trusts, contrary to a medical scientist’s authoritative 
claims.38 39 Ultimately, if we refuse to abide by the Preemption thesis, then we run the risk of the 
                                                        
37 I will consider various other defences that Zagzebski has presented in answering her critics in later sections.  
38 It may be argued that, in such cases, the patient and parent are not in fact recognising the relevant agent as an 
authority per se. I don’t think this is the case, however. There is at least nothing incoherent in the thought that one 
can recognise someone as an authority in a certain domain, and even think of such an authority as being more likely, 
in general, at getting at the truth, and yet having (what one takes to be) an overwhelming large amount of evidence 
against their testimony in any one given circumstance. It would only be incoherent for such a subject to consider an 
authority an authority in the case that she consistently turns against the authority’s judgements.  
39 There is a further issue here pertaining to the difference between one’s having reasons that are properly within or 
without the domain d. One may have reasons that are not domain specific, for instance, such as evidence to the fact 
that authorities in d are under financial influence when it comes to the issue in question. On the other hand, one 
may be making use of reasons that are properly within the relevant d. This distinction is an important one: it will be 
discussed in more detail below (section I.5). 
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good of acquiring more true beliefs, and risk having more false beliefs, in favour of other, 
potentially less-truth-conducive, reasons.  
This is, of course, a simplified picture of the kinds of epistemic interactions we are 
considering. To better come to grips with the Preemptive thesis, and the nature of epistemic 
authority in general, I think we ought to take a look at the various criticisms it has faced, and the 
various modifications that other philosophers have suggested to Zagzebski’s account. This will be 
the task for the next three sections.  
Before I move on, however, I think it important to emphasise one key point. For 
Zagzebski, it is clear that being ‘a normative power that generates reasons for others to do or 
believe something preemptively’ is essential to the very notion of authority.40 It is this kind of reason 
that it gives me that makes it an authority, not that it can command me per se.41 I think there is 
something right about this intuition, though I have concerns about the way in which Zagzebski 
has fleshed out the notion of Preemption. Given that I think it central to the project that 
Zagzebski is pursuing that we capture this normative force at the centre of epistemic authority, 
any attempt to modify her view, or to present a contrary account of epistemic authority, will have 
to make sense of this normative power proper. Of course, one could also argue that there is no 
such thing as epistemic authority in this stronger sense, that all we have are normative reasons to 
believe experts, and to give special weight to the evidence that they provide—whether this is the 
correct conclusion to make, however, is yet to be seen.  
 
I.2 DORMANDY’S AND JÄGER’S CRITICISMS OF PREEMPTION  
 
Katherine Dormandy approaches the notion epistemic authority by directly tackling the 
                                                        
40 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 102 (emphasis my own).  
41 Ibid.  
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puzzle that Zagzebski has presented: either an account of epistemic authority must accept Truth(B) 
at the cost of Total Reasons, or it must accept Total Reasons at the cost of Truth(B). I think that the 
difficulties of Preemption are best understood, at least broadly speaking, through the lens of this 
supposed incompatibility of epistemic goals, and I thus follow Dormandy’s example in framing 
my discussion in this light. Jäger doesn’t frame his discussion of Preemption in quite the same 
way, but his arguments against it are such that I think they can be fruitfully discussed in tandem 
with Dormandy’s criticisms, and in light of the tension presented between Truth(B) and Total 
Reasons.  
Dormandy presents the apparent puzzle as such: ‘Either belief on expert authority (a) 
must promote Truth at the expense of Total Reasons, (b) must promote Total Reasons at the 
expense of Truth, or (c) is not epistemically appropriate, all things considered’.42 She defines 
‘Truth’ and ‘Total Reasons’ as follows:  
Truth: ‘It is epistemically good to form beliefs that are true.’ 
 
Total Reasons: ‘It is epistemically good for an agent’s beliefs to be based on all 
of the reasons which she has supporting them’.  
 
Though there are differences,43 my discussion in what follows assumes that Dormandy and I agree on 
what the goods of Truth(B) and Total Reasons are. 
For reasons that I have already mentioned, Dormandy’s option (c) is undesirable. This 
leaves us with having to choose between (a) and (b). That would be on the assumption that the 
puzzle is correct, and that all options have been exhausted. Dormandy’s own solution, which we 
will see in the next section, is to show that there is in fact another way, a way to save both Truth(B) 
                                                        
42 Katherine Dormandy, ‘Epistemic Authority: Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, unpublished draft, 3.  
43 Though these definitions capture the general gist of the kinds of epistemic concerns we are dealing with, I think 
they are too narrowly construed here. Truth(B), I take it, is not solely about having more true beliefs, but also about 
having fewer false beliefs: it is about avoiding error as much as it is about being right, which means that agnosticism 
can be an epistemic virtue. Total Reasons should also be thought of as being more than merely basing one’s beliefs on 
all the reasons for which one has supporting them: our beliefs should be reflective of all the evidence we have, which 
includes those that may speak against such a belief.  
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and Total Reasons. In this section, I’ll focus on the arguments that motivate the need to search for 
an alternative to Zagzebski’s account. Dormandy herself presents three such reasons, or 
arguments, suggesting that it would be a mistake to simply accept the manner in which the 
Preemption thesis, or at least Zagzebski’s defence of it, dismisses the good of Total Reasons in 
favour of the supposedly more important one of Truth(B).   
 
I.2.A. EPISTEMICALLY SUBSTANDARD ARGUMENT  
 
Why not simply reject Total Reasons? Because, Dormandy argues, there is something 
‘epistemically substandard’ about an agent who recognises that a certain reason that she has 
supports a certain conclusion or belief, and yet does not hold that belief on the basis of that 
reason. Appealing to Zagzebski’s notion of ‘fit’—the idea that our beliefs, desires, emotions, and 
other mental states should in some sense fit with reality, or with an appropriate object—she 
suggests that one’s beliefs being based on all of one’s reasons is simply another way for one’s 
epistemic state to ‘fit’ with reality: if ‘reality contains epistemic connections between the reasons 
which one has and the propositions which they support [ . . .] then surely beliefs which do not 
track these connections fit less well with reality than beliefs which do’.44 By analogy, Dormandy 
likens this epistemic quality to a certain lack of moral character: ‘there is something morally 
substandard about an agent who witnesses an outrageous crime, recognizes theoretically that it is 
outrageous, yet does not feel outrage’.45  
I must admit I am not completely sure how one should understand Dormandy’s claim 
here. It seems intuitively easy to make sense of the idea that one’s doxastic states should match 
reality, or ‘fit’ with it in some sense, but it isn’t as obvious that all of one’s reasons ought to ‘fit’ 
                                                        
44 Dormandy, ‘Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, 6-7.  
45 Ibid., 6. 
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with one’s doxastic states in the same sense. Though I think there is clearly something intuitively 
unappealing about an agent who fails to exhibit such cohesion, I don’t think such oddness can be 
merely reduced to claims about a relationship between epistemic states and reality as I take it that 
Dormandy is suggesting. I think a lot more would have to be said (particularly on the 
metaphysics of beliefs and reasons) to philosophically articulate and defend the intuitive 
discomfort one may have in the face of an agent that suffers from such a psychological 
discontinuity between her reasons and her belief. However, given that I think most 
epistemologists would generally accept the importance of Total Reasons, and would find much to 
agree with in Dormandy’s intuition about an agent who fails to recognise that her reasons 
support a certain belief, I will, for the time being, put the issue aside. My assumption is that Total 
Reasons is epistemically valuable, in any epistemic context, and thus think that we should at least 
try to preserve it in the case of epistemic authority, if at all possible. For now, then, I will continue 
on this assumption, which suggests that there is a prima facie, intuitive motivation to avoid 
accepting Preemption.  
 
I.2.B. META-REASON ARGUMENT 
 
Dormandy refers to her second criticism of Preemption as the ‘Meta-Reason 
Argument’.46 To illustrate, she considers what she refers to as ‘same belief’ cases: these are cases 
in which a subject, S, prior to finding out an authority A believes that p is the case, already has 
her own reasons, r, for believing that p. To put it another way: these are cases in which S begins 
in possession of her own reasons r for believing that p, is then told that p is the case by A, and thus 
continues to believe that p. In such a case Preemption does not suggest that S should change her 
                                                        
46 Dormandy, ‘Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, 7.  
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belief that p (clearly, since A states that p is the case), but it does suggest that S should disregard 
her prior reasons for believing that p in favour of the preemptive reason that A says that p is the 
case.47 Dormandy’s claim is that this goes against reason: if anything, she states, ‘discovering that 
the authority believes that p makes it [. . .] more likely that the agent is correct in taking [her prior 
reasons] to be a good reason to believe that p’.48  
Dormandy argues that if S has a reason, r, to believe to believe that p, then she will also 
rationally believe the following: 
rm: r is a good reason to believe that p.49  
Dormandy then reasons in the following way: given the assumption that A is quite likely 
aware of a wide variety of reasons one may have for believing that p, she is likely aware of r as 
being a possible reason for supporting p. A will thus be committed to either believing that r is a 
good reason for believing that p, or it is not. So, either A believes rm or A does not believe rm. 
Further, Dormandy assumes that if S were to find out what A’s position was in regard to rm, then 
this would rationally commit S to raising or lowering her own credence in rm. An authority, after 
all, is assumed to know what makes for a good reason, given a certain domain of inquiry. 
Dormandy thinks that S, when faced with A’s testimony that p, is faced with two possible options, 
either:  
i. A states that p, and A does not believe that rm.  
ii. A states that p, and A does believe that rm.  
If (i) is more likely, then S should lower her own credence in rm, if (ii) is more likely, then S 
should raise her credence in rm. Dormandy’s claim is quite simply that (ii) is more likely. Or, at 
least, from the perspective of S, and given the information available to her in such a situation, she 
                                                        
47 A potential motivation for this is that to continue to base one’s belief in p on r would be to put oneself in an 
epistemically weak position, as r may be far more sensitive to revision than the reasons that A actually has for p. 
48 Dormandy, ‘Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, 7. 
49 Ibid.  
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has reason to believe that (ii) is true, given that she herself takes rm to be true. Given that S 
discovers that A thinks p is true, Dormandy thinks this should raise S’s credence in rm. Again, she 
thinks that there is something ‘epistemically amiss’ about an agent believing that rm is true, and 
yet does not take A to also believe that rm is true. I take the intuition to be that one’s belief that r is 
a good reason for believing that p, is not compatible with the belief that someone who is better 
epistemically situated with regard to p does not think that it is: to believe that an epistemic 
authority thinks your reason is a bad one would be to no longer believe that one’s reason is a 
good one. 
This is all to show that, whereas the Preemptivist may want to suggest that a subject, 
faced with an authority’s utterance, ought to show a sort of epistemic caution about the strength 
of one’s own reasons, and that this better matches the epistemic connection between reasons and 
beliefs, Dormandy thinks an authority’s utterance should in fact support one’s belief that one has 
good reason for one’s belief, and thus bolster the connection between one’s total reasons and 
one’s beliefs, rather than hinder such connection.50 To follow Preemption, then, is to do damage 
to the coherence of our epistemic states, or, as Dormandy puts it: the ‘agent who pre-empts will 
therefore fail to match his noetic system with epistemic reality’.51  
 Dormandy considers a possible rejoinder: it is not that S ought to think that A thinks that 
r is a bad reason, but should rather assign equal possibilities to A’s either believing it is a good 
reason or a bad reason. Dormandy points out, however, that this would not make a difference: if 
this was the case, then S would be no less confident in rm than she was previously. In order for S 
to lower her credence in rm she would have to find out that A in fact thinks rm is false. I think it 
                                                        
50 Dormandy also considers a parallel argument in different belief cases, in which S starts out believing that p, but 
changes her belief to not-p after hearing that A believes that not-p. In this case, Dormandy thinks that A’s utterance 
ought to raise S’s credence in any of her previously outweighed beliefs that she had good reason for believing that 
not-p, and diminish any credence in the reasons she had for believing that p.  
51 Dormandy, ‘Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, 9.  
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should be pointed out, however, that the Preemptivist has an alternate means of response here: it 
is not that S should assign equal probabilities, or think that A believes that rm or not. Rather, 
given the situation S is in, faced with A’s epistemically superior position, he ought to simply 
refrain from assigning a credence to rm at all. Of course, one might still think that there seems to 
be something peculiar about the epistemic agent in this situation: they have changed their 
doxastic state, from believing that r is a good reason to believe that p, to being completely 
undecided about r, even though no new information about r has been revealed. However, I think 
it would be too quick to think that such a change could only rationally occur because of such 
directly targeted information, or evidence. As I will later argue, part of recognising someone as 
an epistemic authority is identifying them as being a more capable agent, relative to a certain 
epistemic practice, and thus better able to recognise good and bad reasons for belief in a specific 
domain of inquiry. The act of deferring to an epistemic authority, then, could quite feasibly 
involve a suspension of one’s previous convictions about all manner of reasons and beliefs—in 
fact, I will argue that this is precisely the case.  
 But this is to get ahead of ourselves. Since I think other objections to Preemption more 
clearly articulate its flaws in a less questionable fashion, I leave this issue aside for now.  
 
I.2.C. EPISTEMIC-SUPPORT ARGUMENT 
 
Dormandy refers to her third argument as ‘the epistemic-support argument’.52 Here she 
criticises the view that S ought to solely base her belief p on an authority’s testimony, a, and not a 
in conjunction with her own prior reason for believing that p, r. The Preemptivist would claim 
that to base one’s belief on the conjunction of a and r would be to double-count r, given that, in 
                                                        
52 Ibid.  
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taking A to be an authority on the matter, we assume that she is aware of r as being a (possible) 
reason for believing that p. Dormandy’s argument is that believing that p on the conjunction of a 
and r would provide more epistemic support than merely believing it on the grounds of a, and, 
thus, that if we were to follow Preemption, we would be choosing to have weaker epistemic 
support for our beliefs. I do not wish to tackle the full complexity of Dormandy’s argument here, 
but will merely attempt to sketch it in its outline.  
Let us take r to be a reason that a subject S has for believing that p prior to hearing an 
authority A’s testimony, where a is the reason for believing that p based on A’s saying that p is the 
case.  
1. Assume that both r and a, taken individually, support that p. Which is to say 
that S’s probability for r given p is higher than her old/prior probability for r 
(i.e. her probability for r being the case before she received it as a reason), and 
to say the same for a: Pr(r|p) > Prold(r), and Pr(a|p) > Prold(a).  
2. The conjunction of r and a supports p: Pr(a & r|p) > Pr(a & r).  
3. Before S receives either r or a, her probability for either is approximately the 
same as her probability for the other.  
4. S’s old probability for the conjunction of a and r is less than her old 
probability for a: Prold(a & r) < Prold(a).  
5. The conjunction of a and r makes p just as probable as does a by itself: Pr(a & 
r|p) = Pr(a|p).53  
This suffices to show that the conjunction of a and r provides more support for p then a does 
merely by itself: given that the prior probability for (a & r) is less than the prior probability for a 
(premise 4), but that the probability for both is equal given p (premise 5), there is a larger 
                                                        
53 Dormandy, ‘Preemptive Reasons or Total Reasons?’, 9-11.  
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difference between Pr(a & r|p) > Prold(a & r), than the difference between Pr(a|p) > Prold(a), and 
this larger difference means that (a & r) confers a greater degree of support to the belief that p 
than a does by itself. This means that to follow Preemption would be to choose the path of less 
epistemic support for one’s beliefs, it would be to choose to relinquish the full force of one’s 
reasons and evidential basis for a less robust epistemic stance.  
 
I.2.D. THE PROBLEM OF COMPETING AUTHORITIES  
  
 Christoph Jäger presents a further problem for Preemption in the context of the 
philosophically familiar issue of peer disagreement, specifically, disagreement between epistemic 
authorities.  
 The problem here is a simple one. Consider the following case: a subject S is unsure 
about a certain issue, and in weighing the various reasons for or against p, he comes to believe 
that p, but with only a small degree of confidence. To find better epistemic footing, he 
approaches someone that he determines to be an epistemic authority on the matter (relative to 
some domain d for which p is in its purview). This authority agrees with him that p. However, S 
then finds out that another person that he identifies as an authority in d holds the opposite belief 
that not-p.54 What is S to do?  
Preemption, it would seem, has very little to say here: it is formulated to handle one’s 
relationship with a single epistemic authority, not multiple. Zagzebski has suggested that the 
problem can be partially solved by assuming that such epistemic authorities would be aware of 
such disagreement, and that, therefore, one’s chosen epistemic authority’s conclusion should be 
                                                        
54 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 171-172.  
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accepted, meaning that S should not bother to seek out a second opinion.55 The problem, of 
course, is that this doesn’t seem to be empirically accurate.56 As Jäger points out, however, even if 
we accept the assumption, it isn’t clear how this can solve the problem: often, even if aware of 
such disagreement with another authority, an epistemic authority will simply continue to believe 
the same thing, and the disagreement will continue indefinitely.57 It is not as if being an epistemic 
authority disqualifies you from the plethora of complexities that plague peer disagreement—far 
from it, it would seem that the problem of peer disagreement becomes all the more troubling! 
Thus, we are still left with trying to understand what a subject ought to do, following Preemption: 
1. Ought she to preemptively believe in favour of the first epistemic authority’s 
position? 
2. Ought she to instead preemptively believe in favour of the second epistemic 
authority’s position? 
3. Or ought she to simply withhold judgment, and refuse to preemptively believe either 
authority?58  
As Jäger argues, all three options seem untenable for the Preemptivist, in that they all fail to stick 
to the spirit of Preemption in some form (by either refusing to pre-emptively believe on the basis 
of one, or both, of the authorities’ assertions), and that they seem to fly in the face of the kinds of 
rational considerations that generally motivate a Total Reasons approach.  
 In her reply to Jäger, Zagzebski has argued that there is no problem here, and that to 
think otherwise is to misunderstand the very point of appealing to an epistemic authority in the 
                                                        
55 This seems problematic in itself: even if I don’t seek out a second opinion, it doesn’t follow that I will never 
become aware of such disagreement, and the awareness in itself seems to be enough to suggest the intuitive 
peculiarity that Jäger is alluding to.  
56 Furthermore, if the suggestion is that this is a necessary condition for authority, then we are left with a definition of 
such authority with what is likely to be a very narrow extension indeed. After all, how many authorities are actually 
aware of all relevant disagreements in their field?  
57 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 172.  
58 Ibid. 
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first place. Zagzebski argues that the whole purpose of seeking an epistemic authority’s opinion is 
to gain the results of a more epistemically conscientious agent’s investigations: since I cannot do 
the research (I don't have the time to acquire the relevant skills and background knowledge, etc.) 
I appoint someone else to do the work for me, all while recognising that they are doing what I 
myself would do were I more epistemically conscientious.59 Zagzebski’s response then is that it does 
not matter, and should not matter, that there are other epistemic authorities that disagree with 
one’s chosen authority: one is relinquishing one’s say on the matter to the epistemic authority one 
chooses.  
 Zagzebski’s response is deeply unsatisfactory on at least two fronts. First, it flies in the face 
of what I assume are widely accepted epistemic intuitions regarding epistemically rational 
behaviour. The intuition that seems to drive the identification of expert disagreement as a 
significant problem for epistemology is precisely the thought that, when faced with disagreeing 
experts, I have reason to think that at least one of them, if not both, have made an error, and, 
possibly, that their very status as reliable testifiers, and experts per se, is in jeopardy (or, at least, 
their status as equally competent experts). This is to say that I have a reason that is external to the 
relevant domain of inquiry for thinking that one of the experts is unreliable (I assume that the 
nature of disagreement and its epistemic consequences are not domain specific, and thus 
considerations of such facts are external to the domain in the relevant sense). Secondly, I am 
suspicious of Zagzebski’s response in terms of it seeming to trade on certain facts of practical 
rationality, rather than epistemic. The thought would be that, though it is perhaps practically 
rational for me to relinquish some of my epistemic considerations, given that I do not have the 
time or resources available to me to accomplish certain epistemic tasks myself, this does not 
suggest that I have epistemic reasons to so completely relinquish my epistemic duty to consider the 
                                                        
59 Linda Zagzebski, ‘Replies to Christoph Jäger and Elizabeth Fricker’, Episteme 13:6 (2016), 188. 
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higher-order evidence of expert disagreement. Though it may sometimes be prudent to simply 
leave things in the hand of one’s chosen epistemic authority (Zagzebski uses the example of a 
financial advisor, for instance),60 it is difficult to make sense of how this necessarily provides one 
with any solid reason to do so across the board, to the same degree in each case.61 Now, clearly, 
there will be times when practical reasons motivate me, quite reasonably, to less rigidly stick to 
certain epistemic rules, consideration of which I will return to in Chapter II, but especially in 
Chapter III. However, even if this is the case, far too much is left unexplained by Zagzebski’s 
quick response. One particularly poignant question sticks out: even if I defer to a chosen 
epistemic authority for partly practical reasons, on what basis do I choose which authority of the 
two disagreeing ones to follow? Clearly, my knowledge of such disagreement greatly undermines 
my ability to make such a choice in a conscientious and confident fashion.  
 
I.2.E. THE SWITCHING PROBLEM 
 
To further drive home the issue, Jäger proposes a second problem for Preemption. 
Imagine the following case in which a subject S follows Preemption: S has her own prior reason, 
or reasons, r, for believing that p. She then meets an epistemic authority who tells you that p is in 
fact false, and that S should instead believe that not-p. Given Preemption, S disregards r, and 
starts to believe that not-p, on the basis of the reason that the authority has told her that not-p is 
the case (call this reason a). So far, so good. But now imagine that S later finds out that the 
                                                        
60 Ibid., 189.  
61 There is another response that Zagzebski alludes to: I trust my epistemic authority, and this trust is a reason to 
believe what she says. I assume the suggestion is that I will accept the testimony of the authority that I trust, even if I 
find out that another expert, within the same domain, disagrees. I do not wish to tackle the philosophical literature 
on epistemic trust, but I think it suffice to point out here that, if having this feeling of trust is part of what it is to 
recognise someone as an epistemic authority, then we simply have to stipulate that the kind of disagreement we are 
considering surfaces precisely when two such authorities, both of which you trust, disagree. There is, after all, no reason 
to think that one should necessarily be limited to one epistemic authority per domain. So, whereas disagreement 
between experts may not be a problem, disagreement between authorities will be.   
 
 
38 
authority herself has changed her mind, perhaps based on some new evidence, and now believes 
that p. Given Preemption, S should once again change her belief, and believe that p. Perhaps this 
still seems acceptable. However, Preemption requires a lot more than S’s changing her mind for 
a second time, she must now only believe that p on the basis of a, even though she previously believed 
that p on the basis of r. The reasons that she previously had in favour of p are not rationally allowed to 
provide additional support for p, even though the authority agrees. We can, of course, continue 
this pattern, with the authority switching between p and not-p over various spans of time.62  
This case simply highlights the similar kinds of problems we have been discussing above, 
driving home the counter-intuitive consequences of rejecting Total Reasons even if it is for the sake 
of adhering to Truth(B). We can make the case even worse, however, by stipulating that the 
authority, in switching to the belief that p, actually switches back upon re-consideration of the 
very reasons r that S originally based his prior belief that p! In this case, Jäger argues, to adhere to 
Preemption would be to still believe that p but without ‘reactivating’ r, even though S knows that 
the authority believes that p on the basis of, or at least partly on the basis of, p.63 For Zagzebski, 
as I understand it, to use one’s own reasons is just beside the point: the authority is meant to be 
doing the epistemic heavy lifting.  
I take this to highlight a far deeper problem with Preemption that has not yet been made 
explicitly apparent: Preemption rationally blocks an epistemic subject from the possibility of using 
her reasons even when she has very good reasons (objectively and subjectively) to do so. Not only does it 
strike against our more common intuitions about Total Reasons, it seems to paint a picture of 
epistemic rationality that severs the relationship between our reasons and rationally appropriate 
doxastic states that we simply take for granted as being fundamentally important to our epistemic 
                                                        
62 Though I think it would be reasonable to think that eventually the authority’s switching her mind would be a reason 
to think that she is not as reliable as one previously thought, and thus diminish her status as authoritative.  
63 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 173.  
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well-being.64 In Dormandy’s terms, Preemption does great violence to the fit between our noetic 
systems and epistemic reality.65  
In response to this particular problem, in the form that Jäger has formulated it, Zagzebski 
has argued—and I have to admit I am somewhat perplexed by her response—that sometimes 
one is simply better off following the trend of authoritative opinion (such as scientific consensus 
on medical issues), whereas in other cases one is better off suspending judgment (as in religious 
and philosophical cases), opting to wait for a time when you can conscientiously judge that the 
authority’s opinion is likely to provide you with a belief that will survive your future conscientious 
self-reflection (referring to JAB2, her second justification thesis for believing on authority).66  
Again, I find Zagzebski’s response here puzzling. It seems to suggest that I ought to 
believe on authority only in cases where I—given a an epistemic evaluation of this particular issue, 
and the particular response on the authority’s part—decide that I am more likely to have a true 
belief that will survive future conscientious reflection. But this seems problematic for Zagzebski’s 
view on two fronts:  
1. It goes against what she has said regarding the problem of disagreeing 
authorities, in which, given one’s recognition of someone as being an 
epistemic authority, and trusting them as such, I can simply accept their 
authoritative opinions even if the presence of disagreement may give me 
reason to think that such opinion will not survive my future conscientious self-
reflection. Why does an authority’s willingness to change opinion provide me 
with a better reason to suspend judgement in some cases than does the 
                                                        
64 I think there is a fundamental reason why Zagzebski’s account leads us to such a peculiar end: the first error was in 
shackling her account of epistemic authority to the idea that epistemic authorities provide us only with true beliefs, 
and nothing more. As I will argue in Chapter II, and as we will see Jäger similarly suggests, epistemic authorities can 
do a lot more than that. 
65 Dormandy, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 9. 
66 Zagzebski, ‘Response to’, 189. 
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presence of severe disagreement between experts? 
2. By applying her justification principle (JAB2) in this fashion, on a case-by-case 
basis, Zagzebski severely undermines the picture of epistemic authority that I 
assumed her to be arguing for. It was my impression that the justification 
principle was meant to justify why it would be epistemically proper to follow 
Preemption, broadly speaking. Rather than the justification principle doing all 
the work in a case-by-case fashion, it was the authority’s ability to provide me 
with a preemptive reason to believe p once I had recognised her as such an 
authority. Now the suggestion seems to be that (JAB2) does all the work.67  
 
I.2.F. THE PROBLEM OF UNHINGING PROPER BASES 
 
The last problem that Jäger presents against Preemption drives home many of the same 
points that Dormandy focuses on in her Meta-Reason Argument (I. 2. b.) and Epistemic-Support 
Argument (I. 2. c.). I only mention it here briefly to summarise the overall problem with 
Preemption.  
As Jäger puts it, the problem is basically this: ‘Preemption may require you to cancel 
adequate epistemic basing relations between [good] reasons and beliefs’.68 Jäger defines a belief 
as being properly based on a given grounds in the following way:  
Proper Basing: S’s (graded) belief B is properly based on a given ground (or set 
of grounds) G iff (i) G is the ground for which S holds B and (ii) S has a true 
and rational belief to the effect that G sufficiently supports B’.69  
 
                                                        
67 It is of course an open possibility that I have misinterpreted Zagzebski on this matter. But this is beside the point. I 
think it is clear that if we are to capture the strong sense of epistemic authority that I believe Zagzebski has tried to 
make sense of, then it cannot be the case that the normative power of such authorities is, in each case, derived from 
an epistemic principle that the non-authority simply applies to each case of authoritative testimony.  
68 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 174.  
69 Ibid., 8.  
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First, Jäger argues that it seems psychologically implausible, if not impossible, to suggest 
that in a case in which I believe that p based on my own good reasons, I could then somehow 
come to base my belief that p solely on authority, with my prior reasons somehow remaining a 
part of my cognitive economy, and yet not acting as a ground for my belief that p in any way 
whatsoever. If he were asked to do just this, Jäger says, he ‘would not know how to proceed’.70  
Most importantly, echoing Dormandy, Jäger argues that to unhinge one’s belief from its 
previous bases in such a way would be a kind of epistemic regress rather than progress. To unhinge 
one’s beliefs from one’s reasons would be to leave the belief less epistemically stable.  
 
I.3 DORMANDY’S PROPER-BASING VIEW 
  
 Of course, all of the above arguments are to suggest that there is a cost to following 
Preemption: it side-lines Total Reasons in favour of Truth(B). As we already know, however, 
Zagzebski has suggested that, since we cannot have both, we ought to choose Truth(B). Dormandy 
and Jäger’s criticisms have simply shown what the costs of such a move are. The important 
question is: do we have any other choice?  
 Dormandy thinks we do. She suggests the following view:  
The Proper-Basing View of Belief on Authority: ‘Believing that p on 
authority amounts to basing this belief on the authoritative reason and any 
other reason you may have, where (i) pro-reasons exert a force for p and (ii) 
contra-reasons do not exert any force against p’.71  
 
This view, she claims, does justice to both Truth(B) and Total Reasons. S supposedly continues to 
base her beliefs on all of her available reasons, but also avoids the problematic possibility of 
having her own reasons outweigh the authority’s, which would leave her with a less reliable 
                                                        
70 Ibid., 10. 
71 Dormandy, ‘Preemption or Proper Basing?’, 11.  
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connection to the truth.  
  I’ll begin by discussing the disjunctive manner in which Dormandy’s account deals with 
so-called ‘pro-reasons’ and ‘contra-reasons’. ‘Pro-reasons’ are reasons that an agent has in favour 
of p, prior to receiving an authority’s testimony that p, and are thus reasons in favour of what the 
authority asserts, independent of the authority’s testimony. ‘Contra-reasons’ are reasons that an 
agent has against p, prior to receiving an authority’s testimony that p, and are thus reasons 
opposed to what the authority asserts, independent of the authority’s testimony. The different 
treatment of pro- and contra-reasons can be seen to solve two problems:  
i. By allowing for pro-reasons to still exert a force in favour of believing that p, 
when an epistemic authority asserts that p, the Proper-Basing View solves the 
kinds of problems that Dormandy has argued that the Preemptive view falls 
foul to (such as the Meta-Reason Argument, and the Epistemic-Support 
Argument, in sections 1.2.b. and 1.2.c.). Dormandy’s account of belief based 
on authority allows for one to use the full force of one’s reasons in believing 
that p, when an authority asserts that p, rather than forfeiting one’s full 
doxastic justification, or giving up on Total Reasons.  
ii. By not allowing contra-reasons to continue to exert a force against one’s 
believing that p, when an epistemic authority asserts that p, the Proper-Basing 
View avoids the problem that Zagzebski thinks any attempt to avoid 
Preemption will: the view does not forfeit one’s more reliable access to the 
truth, as one will not face the possibility of having one’s contra-reasons swamp 
out the authoritative reason given in authoritative testimony. This means that 
one can follow the Proper-Basing View without giving up on Truth(B).  
As should be clear, these two considerations together entail that the Proper-Basing View suggests 
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an account of believing on the basis of epistemic authority that saves both Truth(B) and Total 
Reasons. I have my concerns about this disjunctive treatment, which I will return to shortly. For 
now, however, it is important to make sense of precisely what Dormandy is suggesting in arguing 
that one can base a belief in p on the totality of one’s reasons, while not having certain of those 
reasons actually exert force upon that belief.  
 Dormandy suggests that ‘the force of a reason is relative to background information’.72 
To use her example (following in Wilfrid Sellars’ steps): ‘a perceptual experience of a green 
necktie is a forceful reason for believing that the tie is green’ against a certain background of 
information, but, given another background of information—such as one in which you know that 
the necktie is in a room that is lit by green lighting, for example—‘this perceptual experience 
loses all force whatsoever’.73 In much the same way, Dormandy is suggesting that an authority’s 
assertion that p has the same ‘force-depleting effect’ on contra-reasons.74 This is because such an 
authority not only has more reasons for believing whether p or not-p is the case, but also is better 
at evaluating such reasons. We suppose that the authority has considered the kinds of reasons we 
have access to, and, given that they have still come to believe that p in spite of them, we can 
conclude that they aren’t good reasons, either in that they don’t support the conclusion that not-
p, or they are simply false.75 Dormandy suggests that such authoritative reasons are thus rebutting 
defeaters for one’s belief that not-p.76 77 
 Unlike a Preemptive view (even a limited Preemptive view that only preempts contra-
                                                        
72 Ibid., 12. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid.  
75 This isn’t to mean that the same will hold if we have reason to think that he authority has not considered the kinds 
of reasons we have access to (as will be discussed in more detail when we get to Constantin and Grundmann’s 
account in section I.3).  
76 Dormandy, ‘Preemption or Proper Basing?’, 13. 
77 I have to admit I am somewhat perplexed by why Dormandy thinks of these as rebutting defeaters rather than 
undercutting defeaters as Constantin and Grundmann discuss them: see section I.5) 
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reasons), Dormandy thinks that her view does not do damage to our psychology by simply 
removing these contra-reasons from play. She thinks that, instead, the Proper-Basing View 
achieves the goal of having such contra-reasons unable to swamp out the truth-conduciveness of 
authoritative reasons simply ‘by letting the natural interplay of reasons do its epistemic work’.78 
Though a Preemptive view and her own view may both explain why contra-reasons have no say 
in whether or not one believes that p, when an authority has told one that p is the case, her view, 
she alleges, does it without recourse to a psychologically and epistemically questionable 
procedure.  
 A first problem with Dormandy’s view, is that I have a hard time understanding how the 
different treatment it suggests for pro- and contra-reasons makes any sense, given how 
Dormandy herself seems to justify the way contra-reasons are discounted. Given that she assumes 
that it is central to one’s recognition of another as an epistemic authority that one thinks of the 
authority as having considered all the reasons that one has for believing (or not believing) that p, 
it would follow that to continue to count pro-reasons in one’s epistemic calculus would be to 
double-count reasons in favour of p, just as the Preemptivist would no doubt claim. In order for 
the different treatment of pro- and contra-reasons to hold, Dormandy would have to provide a 
more plausible account of how some of one’s reasons are to be treated differently than others. 
After all, though an epistemic authority’s assertion that p may speak against reasons we have for 
believe that not-p, this does not necessarily entail that these reasons are, in themselves, bad ones. 
Though it may be epistemically responsible to lower one’s credence in such reasons upon hearing 
an epistemic authority’s assertion, this in no way entails that they should not exert any force 
against p. Clearly, they could quite as well exert such force, and the epistemic authority may be quite 
aware of this fact herself, just as she is of any pro-reason. 
                                                        
78 Dormandy, ‘Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?’, 13. 
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 As it stands, Dormandy’s move strikes me as rather ad hoc on this front. As we shall see, I 
think Constantin and Grundmann do a better job of articulating a similar view in which pro- and 
contra-reasons are treated in a different fashion.  
More importantly, however, I think Dormandy’s view fails to account for the kind of 
phenomenon that I have in mind. First, her view is not an account of epistemic authority per se 
(though to be clear, she does not claim it is!); secondly, as will be explained in Chapter II, I think 
the kinds of relationships one can hold with epistemic authorities are far more varied than what 
has been discussed here. Even if Dormandy’s view, as a theory about the role of our reasons vis-à-
vis epistemic authority, is correct, it can only take us so far in defining epistemic authority itself. 
In order to make sense of the complexities that Dormandy has quite carefully captured with her 
criticisms of Zagzebski’s account, we need to make sense of how our reasons can play a variety of 
roles and exert a variety of different levels of force on responsible, epistemic behaviour, when 
interacting with epistemic authorities. As I will argue in Chapters II and III, the dynamics of our 
relationships with such authorities will vary, and the extent to which we can incorporate our own 
epistemic judgement throughout our interactions with epistemic authorities will depend on a 
variety of factors.  
 
I.4 JÄGER’S SOCRATIC EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY 
  
 As we have already seen, Christoph Jäger has presented a series of arguments against the 
plausibility of the Preemption thesis in the form presented by Zagzebski. I have yet, however, to 
discuss Jäger’s own account of what at least one kind of epistemic authority may look like. Given 
the problems he identifies with Preemption, Jäger suggests that an authority should instead be 
considered as someone who can actually improve the non-expert’s ability to navigate reasons 
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pertaining to the relevant (supposedly) true proposition provided by expert testimony. In brief, 
Jäger refers to a Socratic Epistemic Authority as someone who provides the subject with an 
understanding of why p is the case, or at least an understanding of why their reasons do or do not 
support a belief in p, rather than merely providing them with a true belief in p, and preempting 
all of their previous reasons for or against p.  
 Jäger defines this kind of epistemic authority in the following way:  
‘[A]n epistemic authority for a given subject is someone who not only succeeds 
more often in attaining the truth, but who also is able to foster the subject’s overall 
insight into the problem under consideration’.79  
 
Such an authority not only has more true than false beliefs in a given domain, but: 
‘[. . .] also displays superior methodological skills and insights which enable him 
properly to assess evidence, reasons, methods of thinking and investigation, and so 
on, and to communicate such insights to others. Engaging with a Socratic 
authority will thus typically not only (rationally) motivate an epistemic agent to 
adjust his beliefs if they did not match the authority’s beliefs; it will also enable 
him to see what was right and what was wrong with his own grounds and 
reasoning methods, and what is right about the grounds and methods favored by 
the authority. A Socratic authority, in other words, serves not only as a source of 
maximizing true beliefs at the object level, but also a source of understanding.’80 
 
I take Jäger to be suggesting that there are at least three necessary conditions for being such a 
Socratic Authority (SA):  
1. She is more likely to have a true belief relative to some domain d.  
2. She has superior methodological skills and insights into the epistemic workings 
of d, and these allow her to assess the relevant evidence, reasons, and methods 
of investigation relevant to d in a more reliable fashion.  
3. She is able to communicate such insights to others.  
 
(SA3) is clearly the most novel aspect of Jäger’s account. Built into the very definition of Socratic 
                                                        
79 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 179.  
80 Ibid.  
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epistemic authority is the means to provide a subject with the relevant epistemic standing to be 
able to both believe the relevant truths, relative to d, while also basing such belief in such truths on 
the totality of her evidence, specifically evidence afforded one by being communicated insight 
about the relevant methodology, skills, epistemic workings of d, etc. If the supposed authority 
cannot guide you towards an understanding of the relevant grounds of reasoning in d, then she 
simply is not a Socratic Authority. It seems, at first glance, Truth(B) and Total Reasons are thus 
meant to be respected, given the case that the authority is of the Socratic kind. Such authority 
ties or severs the connections between your reasons and the belief in p that you ought to hold, but 
does so in a way that seems internally consistent, psychologically plausible, and epistemically 
responsible. In a sense that will be cashed out in more detail in Chapter III, such an approach 
leaves the epistemic subject in such a position that she can actually form the resulting belief in p 
as ‘her own’—in respect of her own epistemic agency and autonomy.  
 One ought to be careful, however: Jäger’s writes that SA can typically provide you with the 
rational motivation to believe that p (where p is a relevant (apparent) truth in d) and the 
understanding of the relevant grounds for reasons in d. Though I cannot be sure of Jäger’s 
intentions, it seems that he is suggesting that the two come apart: I take this to mean that a 
Socratic Authority is thus someone who is in the epistemically appropriate position to provide 
you with understanding, along with her testimony that p, but that she can nonetheless provide you with a 
rational basis for believing that p even if you fail to gain that understanding. It thus isn’t entirely clear 
whether or not such a view escapes the issue of Preemption: given a situation a subject has been 
given the opportunity to understand the relevant reasons for believing that p, but for some reason 
fails to do so, it would seem that Jäger would still have to tell some story regarding how she is 
rationally motivated to believe that p. Does she do so simply by weighing the evidence she does 
have, in the same way that she usually does (lacking an understanding of how one should reason 
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about p, as per the Socratic Authority’s explanation, and thus possibly landing herself in an 
epistemically unfavourable situation)? Or ought she to preemptively believe that p, given her 
failure to adopt a more rationally motivated position via the authority’s explanation? 
 One possibility to keep in mind is the thought that Jäger’s additional condition (SA3) on 
epistemic authority provides some kind of insight into why an authority has the normative power 
she does over S. As we shall see, I certainly think there is something to the idea that the primary 
source of an epistemic authority’s normative power is not necessarily grounded in her relation to 
first-order issues in her domain, i.e. her having more true beliefs about the various subjects 
matters in her domains, but rather in her relationship to the higher-order issues that Jäger alludes 
to: the fact that she knows how to navigate the relevant reasons in d, that she can make sense of 
the methodology and discuss the principles that guide it, that she has the means to evaluate 
evidence based on certain criteria, etc. Jäger’s position, then, should be considered as a 
foreshadowing of what is to come in my own. The problem, however, is that Jäger’s account 
doesn’t give us a full picture of what kind of authority an epistemic authority can have for us in 
the case that we aren’t able to come specifically to an understanding of whether or not that p. 
Moreover, even in cases in which an authority can do just this, it isn’t entirely clear what 
normative power she has over us—a normative power that I agree with Zagzebski in thinking is 
constitutive of authority. This means that it isn’t exactly clear if Jäger has provided an account of 
epistemic authority at all.  
 To elaborate on Jäger’s view, I think it would be beneficial to say more about what Jäger 
takes the relevant kind of understanding to be. Jäger has in mind a kind of understanding that he 
refers to as the 
Weight-of-Reasons Principle of Understanding: ‘The degree to which S 
understands a subject matter is proportional to S’s awareness of the relative 
epistemic weight of the total available reasons relevant to propositions 
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belonging to that subject matter’.81  
 
This is, as Jäger points out, an account of only one type of understanding (which he considers to 
be in the vicinity of what Katherine Elgin refers to as an ‘understanding of a topic’ or ‘subject 
matter').82 Furthermore, Jäger requires two assumptions to hold in order for his account to make 
sense: first, that understanding can come in degrees, and, second, that understanding ‘involves 
something like grasping systematic connections among elements of a complex whole, or gaining 
insights into certain relations between items within a larger body of information’.83 The 
suggestion then, is that to understand a subject matter, or domain d,84 to degree n is to have some 
kind of proportional awareness of the relative epistemic weights of reasons within that subject 
matter, or d—i.e. to see how the reasons are related to, and are connected with, one another as 
well as with various doxastic attitudes (this is to grasp, to some extent, what Jäger refers to as a 
‘web of reasons’).85  
 Jäger suggests that, in interacting with such Socratic Authority, one of our main rational 
aims is to acquire such understanding.86 He claims that when we engage with epistemic 
authorities (of the Socratic bent), we generally do far more than merely adopt the authority’s 
belief.87 We typically re-evaluate our reasons, and try to align our reasons with the truth, given 
the authority’s guidance. This, I think, is certainly true in many cases. Nevertheless, given that 
                                                        
81 Ibid., 180.  
82 Which, I have to admit I find somewhat confusing: the kind understanding he describes seems to be more akin to 
the kind we refer to when we say that ‘S understands why p is the case’, given that Jäger talks about having insight 
into how reasons weight in favour, or relate to, p. 
83 Ibid., 179-180.  
84 I do not think it right to equate subject matter with domain, necessarily, given the context of epistemic authority. 
Assume that we will generally define expertise, and authority, relative to a given domain. It may be the case that 
such a domain can be broken down in to various subject matters and topics. An epistemic authority within a certain 
domain may be able to provide a subject with the relevant kind of understanding of one of those subject matters 
(which could be very narrow indeed!), without necessarily providing the same type of understanding of the domain. 
For this reason, I prefer to keep the two distinct, and thus use the term ‘domain’, rather than ‘subject’, or ‘topic’, as 
specifically reserved for the purpose of defining the relevant scope of expertise.  
85 Jäger, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 180.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid., 181.  
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Jäger’s account is presented in a rather limited form—first in that it only isolates a type of 
epistemic authority rather than epistemic authority per se, and, second, in that even this kind of 
authority only typically provides one with the ability to better meet Total Reasons—it only seems to 
suggest that, some of the time, given more ideal circumstances, we can do far better than 
Preemption suggests. Though even here one can imagine that Zagzebski will simply raise the 
same concerns she uses to motivate Preemption: if we give the non-expert or layman any room to 
weigh reasons for p in coming to believe, or not believe that p, we leave ourselves open to the 
possibility that she will come to a different conclusion than the epistemic authority (in this case, 
perhaps, because she has such a low degree of understanding), thus forfeiting our grip on Truth(B). 
This aside, however, I don’t see how Jäger’s view can take us very far in giving us a more 
satisfying account of epistemic authority as a whole, in that it is too narrowly concerned with one 
very particular kind of epistemic relationship between an epistemic authority and non-authority.  
As shall become clear, however, I do think that Jäger’s account puts us on the right path 
in an important way: it concerns itself with epistemic goods other than the acquisition of true 
beliefs.88 However, in order to get the kind of account of epistemic authority I am seeking, we 
will still have to supplement this consideration with further normative force. Again, what 
Zagzebski does seem to get right is the need for this normative power proper in accounting for 
epistemic authority.  
 A further problem with Jäger’s account is that I think the notion of understanding is far 
too strong to be made use of in this context. Understanding, as I see it, is (generally) a more 
difficult cognitive achievement, arguably more valuable and challenging to obtain than 
                                                        
88 Not that such consideration excludes the acquisition of true beliefs.  
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knowledge.89 To suggest that an epistemic authority can simply provide another with an 
understanding of a subject via an interaction with them seems contrary to the nature of what we 
are generally referring to when we talk about understanding. Furthermore, understanding seems 
to be intuitively something that one gets by means of one’s own cognitive actions, not something 
that is transferred or passed on to one. As Daniel Wilkenfeld has put it, to understand a subject is 
importantly constituted by my thinking about the subject—not another agent’s thinking.90 For 
this reason I think the kind of epistemic good that Jäger is discussing is not necessarily the one 
that he thinks he has identified. As we shall see, I think a part of the reason Jäger’s account is 
incomplete (as with the rest), is that it fails to account for the dynamic details of the epistemic 
relationship in question, focusing too much on the static notion of what an authority can provide 
for us. 
An epistemic good similar to that which Jäger discusses will be discussed in Chapter II. 
Rather than focus on understanding per se, I suggest that we would be better off to think of 
something that may be more accurately thought of as a component of such understanding. 
Roughly, one of the kinds of epistemic goods an epistemic authority can provide is the ability to 
‘make sense’ one’s own epistemic situation relative to a given domain, allowing one to gain a 
perspective on one’s own epistemic position regarding the relationship between one’s own 
reasons and the appropriate doxastic attitudes in that domain, measured by the standards and 
norms of that domain. This is not to understand a subject matter or domain in any broad sense, 
but rather to gain insight into certain relationships between reasons and conclusions, and, 
particularly, one’s own epistemic position in relation to these. ‘Understanding’ one’s own 
epistemic position in this sense can provide an agent with right kind of perspective to act in an 
                                                        
89 Duncan Pritchard, ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology 
and Philosophy of Science, edited by A. Fairweather, (New York: Springer, 2014), 322. 
90 Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, ‘Understanding as representation manipulability’, Synthese 190:6 (2013), 1002.  
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epistemically responsible way in relation to the relevant domain, and the epistemic authority with 
which she chooses to engage. More will be said about this phenomenon below. Again, however, 
this is a small point: the more crucial issue is that Jäger’s account only concerns itself with one 
small part of the broader phenomenon that I aim to account for.   
 
I.5 CONSTANTIN AND GRUNDMANN’S LIMITED PREEMPTION 
 
Constantin and Grundmann have suggested an alternative version of Preemption, or a 
Preemptive account of epistemic authority.91 The account varies from Zagzebski’s both in that it 
is derived from different epistemic considerations, and that it has a far more limited in its 
application. Generally, Constantin and Grundmann think that Zagzebski is right to suggest that, 
when following an epistemic authority, it is not permissible to make use of one’s own reasons in 
determining whether p is or is not the case, and argue that Preemption can be identified as ‘a 
special case of undercutting defeat’.92 However, though they think the preemptive view to be 
‘basically correct’, they do not think it to be correct ‘across the board’.93  
 As a preliminary, recall that, as I previously noted, Constantin and Grundmann take 
epistemic authority and expertise to be distinct concepts, a trend I follow in my own discussion.94 
As they understand it, the notion of expertise ignores the specifically relational aspect of epistemic 
authority: this is to say that expertise does not vary in relation to different persons in the way that 
authority does.95 An expert, on their account is someone that has a substantial body of evidence, 
                                                        
91 This is partly due to the kinds of criticisms that have been levelled against Zagzebski’s account (see I.3 and I.4), but 
also, as we shall see, due to other epistemological motivations having to do with the derivation of epistemic 
principles.   
92 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’. 
93 Ibid., 2.  
94 I in fact owe them both my gratitude for the clarity they brought to me on this issue, though I think I ultimately 
separate the two concepts even more so than they suggest (see Chapter II).  
95 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 6.  
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has the methods to reliably arrive at true beliefs and adequate credences from that evidence, and 
is able to use those methods. Such an expert may be an epistemic authority relative to someone 
who themselves has no expertise or knowledge of the relevant domain, but may not be an 
authority relative to another expert in the same domain, another expert with the same skills, 
evidence, etc. Thus, Constantin and Grundmann suggest the following account of epistemic 
authority:  
EA: A is an epistemic authority for S with respect to domain D iff S has 
justification to believe that 
i. A is an expert about D.96 
ii. A is to a significant degree an epistemic superior to S with respect to D.97  
The important point is that an epistemic authority is epistemically ‘superior’ to S. Constantin and 
Grundmann understand such superiority to be cashed out in terms of truth conduciveness, as 
well as in terms of being able to assign to right credences to the propositions relevant to D:  
ES: A is an epistemic superior to in relation to S on a given subject matter D iff A 
is more likely than S both to assign the right credences to propositions in D for a 
given pool of evidence and to be correct about matters in D.98  
 
Not only must such an agent be more likely than S to be right on these terms, but must also be 
sufficiently likely—in other words there is some kind of threshold to be decided that, on the one 
hand, demarcates who is sufficiently more likely in order to be considered an authority, and, on the 
other hand, decides who is merely only a little epistemically better than S, in D, but not good 
enough to be considered superior in any meaningful sense.99 Given this account of epistemic 
authority, we can now take a look at how Constantin and Grundmann attempt to rationally 
justify Preemption.  
                                                        
96 i.e. has a substantial evidence in D, has methods that reliably lead to true beliefs, and is able to apply those 
methods.  
97 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 7.  
98 Ibid., 6.  
99 Constantin and Grundmann suggest the example of some subject S1 who gets things right approximately 30% of 
the time in D, and a second subject S2 who gets things right approximately 35% of the time. They do not think that 
S2 is likely enough to get things right in order to be considered an epistemic superior, relative to S1.  
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 Constantin and Grundmann claim the following: the ‘distinction between undercutting 
and rebutting defeaters runs parallel to the distinction between authority beliefs and other 
evidence’.100 Following Michael Bergmann,101 they define undercutting and rebutting defeaters 
as follows:  
Rebutting defeater: d is a rebutting defeater for a subject S’s belief that p iff d is a 
prima facie reason to believe that not-p.  
 
Undercutting defeater: d is an undercutting defeater for a subject S’s belief that p 
iff d is a prima facie reason for S to believe that, under her present 
circumstances, it is irrational for her to believe that p. 
 
Rebutting defeaters can thus be added to one’s total evidence, and appropriately weighted and 
balanced with them (and would not necessarily mean that one would be rationally required to 
stop believing that p). An undercutting defeater, on the other hand, cannot be merely added to 
one’s previous reasons, as the undercutting defeater informs one that there is something wrong 
with the connection between one’s evidence and reasons, and the truth or falsity of p. An 
undercutting defeater thus ‘normatively screen[s] off’ the defeated evidence from playing the role 
of being an evidential basis of our beliefs.102  
 Constantin and Grundmann motivate their account by considering the plausibility of 
doing otherwise in the face of authoritative testimony. Consider the case that you find out that an 
epistemic authority believes that p with a credence of .75. You have two options: either, you 
follow Preemption and match your credence with theirs, solely on the basis of your believing that 
they are epistemic authorities, or, you weigh the authoritative reason along with the rest of your 
reasons. Similarly to  Zagzebski, Constantin and Grundmann point out that, given enough prior 
contra-reasons, you would end up with a lower credence in p than the authority, meaning that 
                                                        
100 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 11.  
101 Michael Bergmann, ‘Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements’, Philosophical Quarterly (July 2005) 55:220, 424.  
102 Constantin and Grundmann, ‘Epistemic Authority’, 13.  
 
 
55 
you may end up failing to track the truth; in the case that you have a lot of prior pro-reasons in 
favour of p, you would in-fact end up with a higher credence in p than the authority has. Why is 
this problematic? Because part of recognising that someone is an epistemic authority, on 
Constantin and Grundmann’s account, is believing that they have access to a wide range of 
evidence pertaining to their domain, D, and this evidence would supposedly include the kinds of 
reasons that one has access to. Now, given that another aspect of recognising someone as an 
epistemic authority is that we think of them as having a variety of methods at their disposal, that 
they do in fact apply to their reasons and evidence in order to reliably track the truth, it would 
follow that having any credence in p that is not the same as the authority’s credence in p would 
suggest that one takes oneself to be a better judge of the evidence on hand, and, even though one has i.) less 
evidence at one’s disposal, and is ii.) less able to reason from and evaluate such evidence. Unless 
one has reason to think that the authority has not considered the evidence you have, it would thus 
be irrational to have any other credence in p than the epistemic authority’s.  
 To repeat, it is not that the authority believes that p that acts as an undercutting defeat to 
one’s evidence, but rather that, in hearing that the authority believes that p with credence x, you 
acquire reason ‘to believe that someone who is much better than you in assessing the evidence 
and who has already taken into account all of your relevant evidence ends up with a credence of 
0.75 regarding p’.103 It is the fact that you recognise something about another agent, a necessary 
property of their being an epistemic authority, that you have reason to match your credence with 
theirs—this is what grounds the Preemption of your other reasons.  
 Constantin and Grundmann provide four explanations for why a subject’s deviating from 
the authority’s judgement, and instead aggregating her own reasons and evidence with the 
authoritative reason, is problematic:  
                                                        
103 Ibid., 14.  
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1. A subject may evaluate her own evidence in a less competent way than the authority, as 
she is likely to do, by definition of her epistemic status relative to the epistemic authority.  
2. A subject may have additional evidence or reasons (above the authoritative reasons) that 
are, unbeknownst to her, undercut by further evidence that the authority has—evidence 
that is opaque to the subject. This would be a case of an epistemic authority being in 
possession of an undercutting defeater.  
3. A subject may have additional evidence or reasons (above the authoritative reason) that 
are, unbeknownst to her, defeated by further evidence that the authority has. In this case 
the epistemic authority would be in possession of a reason-defeating defeater.  
4. A subject, in relying on her own evidence or reason, may in fact be double-counting such 
evidence, given that the epistemic authority’s own belief may be based upon the very 
same evidence or reason.104  
Importantly, as Constantin and Grundmann are well aware, their account of epistemic 
authority varies from Zagzebski in that they do not consider epistemic authority as defined by 
Preemption—i.e. they don’t take Preemption to be constitutive of such authority. They refer to 
the kind of authority that they account for as grounded authority, in the sense that their account is 
supposed to ‘identify epistemically relevant properties of persons or institutions in virtue of which 
we plausibly may have to treat them as “authorities”’.105 It is in virtue of these properties that they 
think a subject, in recognising that these are authorities as such, has preemptive reasons to 
believe that p when an authority tells them that p is the case. The kind of authority that Zagzebski 
takes herself to be accounting for is what Constantin and Grundmann refer to as role authority: 
accounts of such authority first identify ‘the normative force of preemptive reasons and then 
                                                        
104 Ibid., 16-17.  
105 Ibid., 8.  
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[define] authorities with respect to it’.106  
 Constantin and Grundmann suggest that the focus on grounded authority is a useful one 
when considering the debate between those that defend Total Reasons and those that defend 
Preemption, since they don’t think that the former are necessarily interested in denying that there 
is such a thing as epistemic authority. Given that my project is to try to make sense of the kind of 
epistemic authority that Zagzebski has in mind, a kind of authority that is constituted by a certain 
normative power, I take myself to be interested in role authority. That aside, however, Constantin 
and Grundmann’s dismissal of role authority is too quick. Those in the Total Reasons camp have a 
specific problem with Preemption in the form that Zagzebski has presented it, but it does not 
follow that we cannot provide an alternate account, either of Preemption, or of some other normative 
element that could possibly constitute such epistemic authority. Though it is clear that Constantin 
and Grundmann’s limited Preemption cannot play this role, it could yet be the case that 
something else could.  
 Furthermore, Constantin and Grundmann are also motivated by the thought that it 
would be odd to postulate a highly local principle that would make authoritative reasons behave 
in the way that Zagzebski describes—such a local principle would be, as they put it, ‘mysteriously 
special’.107 Grounding Preemption in the specific properties of an epistemic authority, and 
deriving it from broader epistemic principles, as they claim to have done, solves this peculiarity. 
However, I think we should be cautious: to suggest that Zagzebski’s notion of Preemption 
involves a purely local principle misses the broader point of her project. Zagzebski has not 
‘discovered’ Preemption merely by considering one type of epistemic phenomenon, or 
relationship, but rather by considering a phenomenon that can be found, though in slightly 
                                                        
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid., 11.  
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different forms, throughout a wide variety of contexts: epistemic, political, theological, moral, etc. 
Preemption is, following Raz’s account, central to the very concept of authority, not solely to the 
epistemic phenomenon in question. To forget this is to fail to grasp the nature of Zagzebski’s 
project, one that does not merely deal with the epistemic, but aims to show that there is a 
continuity between the epistemic realm, and others.  
 Again, I think there is room for an account of epistemic authority that captures the 
strongly normative component that Zagzebski is trying to capture, while also doing justice to the 
considerations that the above criticisms have raised. My task is to forge such an account: one that 
identifies the strongly normative power that Zagzebski and I think are constitutive of authority 
proper, but also one that makes sense of the wide variety of role such authority can play, the 
different goods such authority can provide us with, and, quite crucially, all while remaining 
faithful to the complexities of the dynamic and multifaceted relationships that we can have with 
epistemic authorities.  
 Ultimately, none of the accounts presented above capture the intricacies of the 
phenomenon I have in mind. As we shall see, I think there are a wide variety of issues that such 
discussions of expertise and epistemic authority generally fail to acknowledge. Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that all of the above accounts reveal something important about epistemic 
authority. My hope is that my own account can capture the best of all of the above views. This is 
the task I turn to in Chapter II.  
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II. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY  
 
More than Mere True Belief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I present my own account of epistemic authority. My account, following in 
Jäger’s footsteps, puts important weight on the idea that an epistemic authority can play other 
roles than merely providing us with the epistemic good of acquiring more true beliefs. In II.1 I 
focus on the suggestion that possession of (a sufficiently large amount of) true beliefs, or the 
possibility of acquiring such a body of beliefs, is neither necessary nor sufficient for grounding 
epistemic authority, and, more precisely, that it cannot appropriately explain the nature of 
epistemic authority given the wider range of roles that such authority can take. I ultimately 
suggest that what is central to being such an authority is having a certain kind of know-how, and 
that—one’s stance on the knowledge-that/knowledge-how debate notwithstanding—this cannot 
be reduced to a simple discussion about the kinds of true beliefs that an authority has possession 
of, and can transfer to us. This is important because, as I argue, such knowledge-how can explain 
the variety of roles such authorities have, and the variety of relationships and interactions we can 
have with them. These roles are explored in II.2, where I look to motivate the thought that the 
epistemic good of Truth(B)108 should not be considered the only epistemic good that one can 
receive from an epistemic authority—that, rather, the kinds of epistemic improvements that we 
seek in dealing with such authorities come in a variety of forms. If this is correct, then an account 
                                                        
108 As discussed in Chapter I, Truth(B) is the good of having more true beliefs, and fewer false beliefs. This is not the 
same as the goal of being closer to the ‘truth’ in a broader sense, though these goals, of course, often go together.  
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of epistemic authority ought to be able to make sense of these different goods, and how such 
authority provides us with access to such goods. In II.3, I give my account of expertise and 
epistemic authority, in an attempt to account for these various considerations. Lastly, as 
mentioned in Chapter I, I briefly discuss Michel Croce’s own account of epistemic authority, in 
contrast to my own, in II.4. 
 Before I proceed, I should clarify one point. I do not intend to argue here that any of the 
goods that an epistemic authority provides us with are necessarily completely removed from 
considerations of ‘truth’ per se. Though I am personally sympathetic to a pluralistic view about 
epistemic values, the account of epistemic authority I present here is intended to be entirely 
compatible with either the view that all epistemic goods are ultimately derived from the value of 
truth per se, or with any opposing view. My only claim is that there is a lot more to epistemic 
authority than a mere connection to the epistemic good of Truth(B), as described in Chapter I, in 
the sense that there is more to the epistemic status of being epistemically superior, in the 
authoritative mode, than possessing a large amount of true beliefs, or being a means for others to 
directly acquire more true beliefs. As a friendly reminder: where one reads ‘Truth(B)’, I am 
referring to this epistemic goal, not truth in a broader sense. Ultimately, for those who remain 
unconvinced of this point, my account of epistemic authority should remain attractive, as shall be 
seen in II.2: it can still make better sense of the wide variety of ways in which we interact with 
those that I would call epistemic authorities. This, ultimately, is the crucial point of my argument.   
 
II.1 MORE THAN MERE TRUE BELIEF 
  
As should be fairly clear from the above discussion, philosophers have generally discussed 
the notions of expertise and epistemic authority in relation to the epistemic good of Truth(B). This 
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is, of course, not surprising, considering that truth, broadly speaking, is often considered to be the 
primary epistemic good: that which our epistemic investigations aim to acquire. If there is such a 
thing as epistemic authority, with the strong sense of normative power that Zagzebski suggests, 
then it would make sense to account for it in terms of such a good. It is my contention, however, 
that other epistemic goods than the mere acquisition of true beliefs can play just as important a 
role in explaining and accounting for the kinds of epistemic relationships that hold between 
epistemic agents of diverging epistemic status, and can in turn make sense of how certain 
individual can behave as, and play the role of, epistemic authorities.109  
We have already seen that there is reason to be suspicious of Truth(B)’s ability to play the 
central role in ground epistemic authority—we saw this in the various criticisms levelled at 
Zagzebski’s account, in Chapter I: by justifying epistemic authority solely on grounds of our 
access to true beliefs, relative to a domain d, we are faced with a variety of epistemic problems 
that I presume we would wish to avoid if at all possible. Though I assume that we, as responsible 
epistemic agents, ought to aim at getting to the truth in the broader sense, I think we can at least 
say that our having the best possible epistemic standing does not merely entail acquiring any true 
beliefs, no matter the consequences: to be epistemically successful agents involves, at least, 
acquiring true beliefs, and not just any true beliefs, in the right way. As we saw in I.2, there are a 
variety of ways in which we can have access to true beliefs, and be more reliably connected to 
them via an epistemic authority’s testimony (or our knowledge of their own beliefs), and yet be in 
(what at least intuitively strike me as) epistemically unfavourable positions. My intuition is that in 
many of these unfavourable cases, seeking the acquisition of true beliefs alone, regardless of other 
epistemic considerations, is actually far too costly. 
                                                        
109 If I am right, I think such considerations can be applied to other epistemic relationships as well, those between 
authorities, or those involving no authority whatsoever. That is, however, a story for another time.  
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In this section, to further underline the need to ensure that our notion of epistemic 
authority is not necessarily wedded to this particular epistemic good, I specifically discuss my 
various motivations for thinking that the acquisition of true beliefs, potential or actual, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the establishment of epistemic authority. As I discuss in II.1.A., it is 
not necessary because it is completely plausible to think of an epistemic authority in a domain of 
inquiry that one may not consider to produce the relevant kinds of true beliefs at all (either for 
contingent reasons, or in principle).  In II.1.B., I argue that it is not sufficient for an individual to 
provide access to a larger body of true beliefs in order to be considered an epistemic authority. 
II.1.C., in turn, elaborates on a point that surfaces on multiple occasions in the II.1.A, and II.1.B: 
the idea that what all epistemic authorities share is not a relation to a body of true beliefs in a 
particular domain of inquiry but the knowledge-how, or ability, to engage in a certain kind of 
epistemic practice. This last point will be the focus of my account, in II.3. 
 
II.1.A. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY WHERE THERE ARE NO TRUTHS 
 
 There is a simple reason to avoid thinking of epistemic authorities merely as possessors, 
and conveyors, of true beliefs. I would like to defend the perhaps controversial view that there 
can be such a thing as an epistemic authority in a domain that does not strictly deal in truths at 
all: i.e. it does not furnish true beliefs as answers to the questions that it seeks out to answer. It 
follows that, if this is the case, then it would make no sense to talk of such authority as being 
constituted by the possession of, or acquisition of, true beliefs, relative to that domain.110 It 
should be noted that I here assume some sort of correspondence theory of truth, and that the 
                                                        
110 Or, specifically, true beliefs about the answers to the primary questions of import to be dealt with in that domain. 
There will obviously be true beliefs to be had with some questions. Refer to the examples below for further 
elaboration.  
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kind of true beliefs we are concerned with when discussing epistemic authorities are those that 
correspond to a certain way in which the world is. Those of my readers in favour of a pluralistic 
or pragmatic theory of truth may find much of the discussion less motivating. Even so, it should 
be here noted that if different domains of inquiry do in fact deal in different varieties of ‘truth’, as 
a pluralist may suggest, then an account of epistemic authority that nevertheless illuminates a 
core similarity between authorities across all such domains, without having to rely on a specific 
account of truth, ought to be considered more favourably than one that does not. I think my 
account does just that. I invite those readers who remain unconvinced by such considerations to 
appraise my argument in II.2 instead. 
 Here I have in mind domains such as those which deal with issues of aesthetics, for one, 
but possibly including (and this will of course depend on one’s own views on such issues) domains 
such as philosophy, and religion. There are at least certain domains of inquiry in which we can 
question whether the products of inquiry in such domain are ones which we would feel 
comfortable referring to as facts, or true statements, in the same way as we would in other 
domains. Note that I am not suggesting that these are domains that simply deal with difficult 
questions, and, as such, have so far failed to provide us with the true conclusions that they seek 
out to discover—if this were the case one could still quite plausibly argue that any so-called 
epistemic authority in such a domain would be at least more likely to discover such truths than the 
non-authority. My suggestion is that some of these domains may simply not, as their primary 
focus, deal with such statements of fact at all.   
 Now, I do not wish to get bogged down here with an intimate analysis of the truth-aptness 
of any of these suggested domains. My hope is that my reader can at least be convinced that it is 
plausible to think of there being such a domain that does not necessarily traffick in statements 
that we would refer to as being strictly true or false, and yet, that such domains may nevertheless 
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admit of their being an epistemic authority of their subject matter. Consider, for example, the 
literary interpreter, or film analyst111—someone whom you may refer to as an ‘expert of 
American Literature of the 20th century’, or an ‘authority on the films of David Lynch’.112 Being 
someone who has little experience with post-modern literature, and its interpretation, one might 
seek such an authority when trying to make sense of Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, for 
instance; being someone who has never strayed far from mainstream cinema, one may similarly 
seek guidance when trying to make sense of Inland Empire, or Lost Highway. What could such an 
authority provide us with? I would argue that they could, amongst other things, provide us with a 
kind of ‘understanding’ of the target piece of art, an interpretation of the pieces (and their 
components) that provide a coherent explanation of their ‘meaning’ and telos. The kind of 
understanding in question here could certainly be a ‘merely’ subjective kind—if one holds the 
view that understanding proper is factive. Nevertheless, such understanding certainly strikes me as 
a phenomenon that falls squarely within the scope of epistemological analysis: we here have two 
epistemic agents, interacting via the act of testimony, cognitively and intellectually engaged in 
adjusting their set of beliefs towards a certain topic. They certainly seem to be engaging in an 
intellectual inquiry!   
 Let us consider the rejoinder, however: if such domains do not deal with truths, in the 
way that other domains do, why should it be the case that we refer to the relevant practices in such 
domains as in any sense epistemic? I think this is a very good, and very difficult, question to 
answer: I certainly do not wish to claim here that I can answer, and provide an account of, what 
it means for something to be epistemic if not in some way connected to matters of truth. I would, 
                                                        
111 Another example, which may have more gravitas for some, is that of the interpreter of religious texts, on the 
condition that one does not believe that such texts are the direct word of God, but are rather ‘living documents’ or 
religious guides. 
112 I apologise to any of my readers who have strong views about the semantics of statements about literature—
again, my aim is only to clarify, by example, a possibility that I think most would find plausible in some domain or 
another. 
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however, like to suggest something a little more modest: that it is possible for there to be such 
things as epistemic practices—in that they provide us with beliefs, intricate views and 
perspectives on the world, possibly a certain kind of understanding, or even know-how, etc.—and 
that, even though such practices do not lead to true beliefs about the topics relevant to the 
domain in question, they nevertheless put us in an intellectually better and richer position. There 
are a few ways in which this could be the case.  
 I think it would be odd, first of all, to suggest that one could not have a better- or worse- 
formed belief on matters of art interpretation and analysis, even in the case that such beliefs 
could not be considered to be true or false. Beliefs about the manner in which a passage in 
Gravity’s Rainbow should be interpreted are not claims that one can make willy-nilly, in an 
epistemically non-responsible fashion: such beliefs ought to be formed on the basis of, and be 
responsive to, the evidence—such as the existence of other passages within the text, biographical 
facts about Thomas Pynchon,113 and so forth; such beliefs ought to be internally coherent and 
consistent; and such beliefs ought to fit well with other held beliefs about Gravity’s Rainbow, as well 
as higher-order beliefs about literary analysis, or art, as a whole. In short, they ought to be well-
formed and reasoned beliefs. 
 Secondly, it is not as if the beliefs we form about such matters hold no relationship to our 
broader views on the world of fact, or play no role in how we interpret such facts. My 
understanding of a piece of art, and its underlying political theme, for example, can greatly 
influence how I in-turn go on to analyse world events, and how I react to a political party’s 
policies. People reference fictional characters when making sense of real-life personalities. I 
would go so far as to argue that the kind of know-how that one can acquire from learning how to 
interpret various pieces of art can often be applied to the real-world directly, and that such 
                                                        
113 Not that there are many of these to be found, given his notoriously well-guarded privacy. 
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application can be epistemically beneficial. This is to suggest that it is possible for you to learn a 
certain kind of epistemic behaviour, practicing and honing it, in a domain that does not deal in 
true beliefs, or truth per se, that nevertheless improves your epistemic status more broadly 
speaking.  
For these reasons, it strikes me as implausible to disregard the above kinds of activities 
from consideration if we are to say that epistemology is in any way interested in making sense of 
which beliefs, or other cognitive states, are ‘good’ ones to have. And, if we include these 
considerations in the scope of epistemology, then I see no reason why we ought to find it in any 
way peculiar to consider the existence of an epistemic authority in such a domain.  
 Perhaps my reader is not particularly motivated by the literary example. An issue closer 
to home may do the trick: what of the epistemic authority of the philosopher? Clearly, one 
cannot claim that the philosopher deals in no truths at all: she at minimum holds true beliefs 
about which philosophers have held such-and-such a position, the status of the current literature 
on Gettier-style cases, etc., just as the literary scholar has access to similar true beliefs about the 
lives of authors, publication dates, editorial changes, etc. Again, however, these are not the 
primary intended product of philosophical investigation: the philosopher is instead tasked with 
answering the fundamental and difficult questions—metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, or 
otherwise. Arguably, many of these questions are not of the sort that can provide us with clear-
cut, ‘true’ answers, answers that correspond to an objective standard and reality. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that the well-trained philosopher, relative to those without such training, is in some 
sense an authority in relation to these questions. To suggest that the scope of the philosopher’s 
epistemic authority is instead merely limited to questions of publication history, or social facts 
about the current state of philosophical belief and research, strikes me as particularly odd. We 
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would, after all, think it highly peculiar if someone suggested the same thing about a physicist’s 
epistemic authority.  
Rather, I think the philosopher has authority over her domain. She is up to a certain task. 
When she provides us with a conceptual analysis of knowledge, one could argue that we are 
provided with an account that is intended to best accommodate for the evidence at hand, the 
relevant practices of the kinds of epistemic agents that we are, and most coherently deal with 
objections to previous epistemological theories. Such answers are often meant to prove 
themselves to be the most useful to us: a conception of what knowledge is that fails to 
accommodate for our quotidian intuitions and epistemic practices seems may be of very little use 
to us, and thus of little philosophical significance. These analyses are meant to be tools that best 
explain our activities, our common use of terms such as ‘knowledge’, ‘rationality’, ‘justice’, and 
‘good’. Perhaps there is no fact to the matter as to what knowledge is in the same sense that there 
is a fact to the matter as to how old the universe is—this does not change the fact that the 
philosopher can have authority over such inquiry.  
My suggestion is that an epistemic authority in such a domain as philosophy, that 
provides us access to such insights as the ones illustrated above, is not one because they hold 
more true beliefs about the topic at hand: they are considered thus because they have the 
philosophical skill, the intuitive insights and analytical expertise to best navigate the literature, to 
consider reasons, to articulate critiques, and garner evidence for or against a certain treatise. 
They are intellectually more capable than others, relative to a certain domain of inquiry. As we 
shall see, this is what I take to be the fundamental core of the kind of authority I have set out to 
account for. 
 My reader’s personal views on meta-philosophy aside: its shouldn’t matter whether the 
specific domains I have used as examples deal significantly in truths or not—my suggestion is that 
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whether they do or not, we can coherently conceive of them as admitting of epistemic authorities, 
precisely because what matters first and foremost is that there are individuals who have 
developed the relevant kinds of knowledge-how in order to be considered as such. We can 
remain undecided on the status of these disciplines as sources of true beliefs, and yet still 
acknowledge that they involve a certain kind of epistemic practice, and that they provide us with 
epistemic goods nonetheless. So long as this possibility remains, I think we have reason to prefer 
an account of epistemic authority that does not put its full weight on the possession of acquisition 
of true beliefs, or the epistemic good of Truth(B).  
 
II.1.B. KNOWING TRUTHS BUT LACKING AUTHORITY 
  
 My next point is this: merely possessing an abundance of true beliefs, or having a more 
reliable connection to such truths, cannot by itself ground the kind of authority we are 
considering. Now, I do not think this is by any means a surprising or controversial claim. Many 
accounts of expertise and epistemic authority directly or indirectly allude to other conditions 
required to establish such authority.114 Nevertheless, I think it is useful for present purposes to 
underline the point, and to illustrate it further. By showing that such considerations of truth-
acquisition cannot alone ground the kind of authority in question, in conjunction with my 
illuminating the fact that other facts can, I hope to give my reader further reason to accept my 
own account of epistemic authority. Furthermore, though other accounts of expertise/epistemic 
authority clearly do make reference to such considerations, it is my contention that their failure 
                                                        
114 Alvin Goldman refers to an expert having answers to various second-order questions, i.e. questions about the 
methodology, existence of evidence, weight of reasons, etc., of certain domain of inquiry, as well as a general 
cognitive ability to be able to answer knew and future questions in that domain. See Alvin Goldman, ‘Experts’, 114-
115. In the literature on epistemic authority, as we have seen, Jäger refers to ‘methodological skill and insight’, and 
Constantin and Grundmann refer to the ability to make use of a methodology, to give but two examples.  
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to ground authority on these other conditions is where their accounts go astray, or can at least be 
shown to be lacking in some regard. 
 To see that a possession of an adequately large body of true beliefs cannot be sufficient, in 
and of itself, to ground authority (at least the kind we have in mind), I think it suffices to consider 
the following illustration. Imagine an individual of the sort that we may refer to as a ‘trivia junky’ 
on some particular topic, or ‘book nerd’ in relation to a certain domain of inquiry. This Trivia 
Junky knows a lot, for example, about physics. In fact, to make the point more salient, let us 
assume that this individual, in some respects, knows a lot more than many actual practicing 
research physicists, particularly when it comes to what Goldman has referred to as the ‘primary 
questions’ of a domain of inquiry, i.e. the ‘principle questions of interest to the researchers or 
students of the subject matter’.115 He can recite a wide range of facts about what physicists 
believe, for example, from the common and well-agreed upon, to more obscure and contentious 
facts. He can regurgitate passages from a wide range of published research articles in physics, 
encompassing a broad range of topics. Perhaps he is even better than your average physicist at 
citing the right experimental evidence when supporting certain conclusions, thus answering 
questions such as ‘why do physicists believe that p?’ more successfully.116    
 Could this Trivia Junky play the role of epistemic authority for me, in the strong 
normative sense that I have in mind? I do not think so. This is because I think there is a 
fundamental difference between the mere ability to reliably transfer true beliefs (or perhaps even 
                                                        
115 Goldman, ‘Experts’, 115. These questions are in contrast to the secondary questions: those that concern evidence, 
reasons, and arguments for answers to the primary questions.  
116 Note that I do not think it makes a difference if we further stipulate that our Trivia Junky also possesses a wealth 
of knowledge about what Goldman calls secondary questions in a domain of inquiry: i.e. he has many true beliefs 
about the available evidence and arguments for certain answers to the primary questions. Such an agent still lacks 
the relevant authoritative standing: he is only a reporter of facts, and not appropriately situated as a participant in the 
relevant epistemic practice. I will return to this particular challenge to my argument, however, in II.1.C. 
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any other kind of epistemic good) and being in some sense a potential originator of such goods. 
Only the latter can provide an individual with the kind of authority that we have in mind.  
To understand why I think this the case, it would may be illuminating to take a brief 
detour here, and once again contrast epistemic authority with the kind of political authority that 
Zagzebski uses as a model of her own account. As briefly mentioned in Chapter I, Raz thinks 
that a political authority’s utterances provide me with a reason to act that hold independent of 
what the content of the utterance is. What gives the uttered words such power over me is not that 
they express a certain meaning, but simply that the authority has uttered them.117 Now, we may 
have good reason to think that this cannot quite be the case in the epistemic domain: if a belief is 
a good one to have, for instance, then surely the normative power acting upon me to hold such a 
belief is the fact that it is a good one, not that an ‘authority’ has uttered it! However, I think this 
is too fast: this would be true, if I had access to the relevant kinds of reasons, understanding, and 
evidence to come to such conclusions on my own. But the antecedent of this conditional is 
precisely what we are stipulating to not hold when considering epistemic authority: here our 
project is to make sense of our social-epistemic position on the assumption that we are often far 
removed from having such access. Yes, if we were some kind of (supposedly) ideal epistemic 
agents, with ideal access to the facts of the world, then it would make no sense to discuss our 
epistemic behaviour being in any sense normatively motivated by another agent. Given that this 
is not our situation, my argument is that it makes perfect sense to suggest that there are cases in 
which we epistemically behave in a certain fashion because of authority.  
 When a political authority makes an utterance, and this utterance gives me reason to act 
a certain way, the authority is in some sense a source of that action’s being proper, or fitting, to the 
                                                        
117 The idea that I am alluding to here involves what Raz and Zagzebski refer to as the Content-Independence 
Thesis and the No Difference Thesis. See Chapter I.1 for more detail. I choose to discuss the matter in less technical 
terms here, for clarity’s sake.  
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political situation. Much in the same way, I think that when an epistemic authority gives us 
reason to epistemically behave in a certain fashion, they are also in some sense the source of that 
behaviour being epistemically apt. In both cases, if we were to defiantly ask the authority why we 
should behave as such, it would not be a completely empty gesture for her to respond with 
‘Because I said so’—the point being that there is something about her agency that establishes her 
authority, and this is what an account of epistemic authority ought to aim to explain. This 
element is what the Trivia Junky lacks.  
I do not think, then, that the kind of relationship we are alluding to when discussing 
epistemic authority is merely an instantiation of a reliable signalling of, or reliable connection to, a 
body of facts, or epistemic goods more broadly. The Trivia Junky does not have such authority 
over us in any meaningful sense, and we cannot have a relationship with him of the sort that we 
do have with our epistemic superiors, such as teachers, doctors, scientists, religious authorities, 
etc. This is because such a person, though in possession of many true beliefs relative to d, does 
not possess certain qualities and characteristics that I take to be essential to the kinds of epistemic 
status we are trying to make sense of: he does not possess the skills, the abilities, or the know-how, 
to partake in the relevant kind of epistemic investigations that pertain to d (even if he may be able 
to state certain facts or beliefs about these processes). An agent who lacks this quality, no matter 
how reliable a connection to the truth they provide, does not have any kind of authority over our 
own epistemic practice: they would merely be a tool, much like a reliable thermometer, for us to 
use in our own epistemic investigations and calculations—not an epistemic agent completing 
some epistemic work on our behalf, and authoritatively modifying our own epistemic behaviour.  
 I will have more to say about this set of skills, abilities, and know-how, in II.3. Here I 
would like to briefly elaborate on what I said above about an authority being in some sense an 
‘originator’ of the epistemic goods she provides, not merely a mere reporter or bearer of such 
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goods. As will be seen, my account takes seriously the idea that an epistemic authority is someone 
who has the skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in a certain kind of epistemic practice, the 
one relevant to inquiry in a certain domain. It is this fact that grounds their authority, because it 
is this fact that establishes them as more than mere conveyors of true belief (or bearers of any 
other epistemic good). An epistemic authority is someone who can discover further truths, create 
new explanations and theories, improve on previous understanding, etc. In this sense they are—at 
least potentially, if not actually—‘originators’ of the existence of certain epistemic goods in our 
lives.118 What matters fundamentally is that there is an epistemic practice, one that I do not have 
the ability (or time, or resources) to participate in, and one that is a source of certain epistemic 
goods; an epistemic authority is someone who does partake in that practice, and in doing so 
instantiates that practice, and is a part of it.    
Epistemic authorities are not merely the tools of our own epistemic agency: they are in 
some sense important agencies in their own right, agencies with some sort of normative power 
over our own.  There is nothing in the Trivia Junky case that suggests how or why such a 
creature would have such a normative power. Even Zagzebski, though she defends the notion of 
Preemption in terms of our acquisition of true beliefs, would, I think, deny such status to such a 
person. Such agents do not exemplify the kinds of epistemic qualities that we would generally 
attribute to someone who deserves our epistemic respect: in Zagzebski’s terms, such a creature 
would not be an epistemic exemplar, someone to emulate, for such a creature would not exemplify 
the kind of epistemic behaviour that we ourselves would conduct if we were to be more 
conscientious, better trained, unconstrained by temporal, financial, cognitive, etc., limitations. 
The intuitive point, I think, is that the Trivia Junky is not in any meaningful sense a better 
                                                        
118 Of course, my language here is intended to be somewhat metaphorical: they do not literally create ‘truth’, in the 
broader sense. They can, however, play the role of creator when it comes to establishing the social fact that we, as 
individuals and as a society, believe that p, or understand that p, or hold a certain theory to be true.  
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epistemic agent than we are, no matter how many true beliefs he may hold. Again, how we get to 
the truth, and the way in which we have true beliefs seems to play an intuitively central role in 
measuring our epistemic success.   
 It is important to note that Zagzebski does herself refer to much more than the possession 
of true beliefs when discussing epistemic authorities: such an agent is ‘a person who has more of 
the qualities I trust in myself insofar as I am epistemically conscientious’;119 she appropriately 
weighs her evidence, tests hypotheses, conducts further research, considers alternatives, remains 
cautious, etc. It is for this reason that I find it somewhat puzzling that Zagzebski has decided to 
defend the notion of Preemption, as the constitutive component of such epistemic authority, 
merely on the grounds that such authorities can act as reliable sources of true beliefs: it is her 
behaviour, not the results of such behaviour, that provide her with her status (even if we may value 
the behaviour itself as a means to such results).  
 To reiterate, I take it that there is much more obvious candidate for a grounds for 
epistemic authority: the very fact that such agents are involved in a certain epistemic practice—
that they have the skills, access to evidence, and a knowledge of a certain kind of methodology 
constitutive of that practice. I think the strongest argument against thinking of Truth(B) as the 
grounds for epistemic authority is that there is this alternative account available, one that makes 
sense of our actual social-epistemic practice, and one that does not run afoul of the same counter-
intuitive consequences as Zagzebski’s account of epistemic authority does. In section II.3. I will 
present this alternate view.120 Before I do so, however, I return to an objection briefly alluded to 
above: the idea that the kind of know-how that I am suggesting is partly constitutive of epistemic 
                                                        
119 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 108-109. 
120 Again, it should be noted that I am not claiming that other accounts of expertise or epistemic authority have 
failed to note this. However, my point is that they put too little weight on such skills, abilities, and know-how, and do 
not identify this know-how as the locus of such authority—identifying instead the good of acquiring true beliefs.  
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authority can be made sense of in terms of true beliefs, thus falling under the scope of Truth(B). I 
turn to this response now. 
 
II.1.C. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY & KNOWLEDGE-HOW 
 
  There is an obvious objection the above argument: of course we don’t think of an 
epistemic authority as someone who can merely provide us with first-order, true beliefs about 
issues in a certain domain. As already noted for example, Goldman claims that a central 
component to being a (cognitive) expert is also possessing what he refers to as more true beliefs 
about the answers to ‘secondary questions’ in a domain:121 questions about the evidence, 
arguments, and strength thereof, in favour of answers to the primary questions. What I refer to as 
possession of a certain skill set, or know-how, one may object, could plausibly be made sense of 
by talk of such answers to these ‘secondary questions’. Why then, cannot we think of an epistemic 
authority as someone who has an abundance of true beliefs such as these, as well as answers to 
the kinds of questions that a certain epistemic practice aims to answer? Why complicate things, 
when Truth(B) really can make sense of such issues?  
 A first answer to this objection has roughly been given above, in the sense that I think 
there is a fundamental difference between being the kind of epistemic agent that can merely 
report, or transfer, certain epistemic goods, and one that is in position to be, in a meaningful sense, 
the originator of such goods. The latter requires having certain skills, abilities, and know-how, 
which the former lacks. This, however, requires more discussion. 
                                                        
121 Though Goldman also makes the claim that we would consider someone who has more knowledge of ‘secondary’ 
questions but less of ‘primary’ questions as less of an expert than one who has more knowledge of ‘primary’ questions 
than ‘secondary’. This strikes me as completely backwards, for reasons that, if not already clear, will become clearer 
in the following sections.  
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My intuition is that the kinds of skills, abilities, and know-how under discussion are in no 
way reducible to the mere propositional attitudes that such epistemic authorities have. I do not, 
however, wish for my account to require a commitment to either side of the knowledge-
how/knowledge-that debate, nor do I aim to argue here for why one can or cannot be reduced to 
the other. Here I aim to provide reasons to think that, whether or not knowledge-how really is 
ultimately some form of knowledge-that, we ought not to limit our notion of epistemic authorities 
in such a way that it only apply to agents that have conscious access to properly formed 
propositional attitudes on all relevant issues pertaining to a certain kind of epistemic practice, and 
that someone who behaves in the right epistemic fashion, even if they cannot provide us with as 
many true beliefs about this practice, may have more right to be considered an epistemic 
authority, than someone who can recite all the relevant facts. Let me elaborate.  
 When it comes to having a skill, or know-how, there is often going to be a vast difference 
between the stated beliefs such agents have about the practice that they are involved in, and the 
very way in which they participate in the practice itself. Someone who has the ability to perform 
a certain activity does not necessarily have to have the corresponding ability to express precisely 
what they are doing, nor explain how they are doing it. One may even state false things about 
one’s own know-how when considering such ability or dispositions122 consciously.123 This is quite 
evident outside the epistemic domain: ask a professional golfer, for example, how best to strike a 
golf ball, and not only may they fail to tell you, the very act of thinking about the swing in action 
may hinder them from being able to properly perform it (this phenomenon is sometimes referred 
                                                        
122 I don’t think it necessary to take a stance on whether knowledge-how is specifically an ability, or a disposition, in 
the context of this chapter. Nevertheless, I will admit a preference for the latter view of knowledge-how, and think 
that it better aligns with my general account of epistemic authority. For an illustration of this view, see Gilbert Ryle, 
The Concept of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 55. 
123 For a review of the relevant evidence in cognitive science, and other reasons to deny the intellectualist thesis 
about knowledge-how, see: Charles Wallis, ‘Consciousness, Context, and Know-How’, Synthese 160 (2008), 137. 
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to as ‘paralysis by analysis’).124 Whether or not there is some sense in which we can understand 
such knowledge-how in terms of unconscious or ineffable knowledge-that, the point remains that 
such skilled individuals are not in the position to express the relevant propositions. Even if you 
want to take the strongly intellectualist stance of claiming that they do have true beliefs about the 
rules and methods of a certain practice, in whichever sense can be made plausible, it is very 
difficult to understand how such beliefs could play a role the social-epistemic relationships that 
are relevant here. What matters to the fact of recognising someone as an epistemic authority is 
not that they possess some ‘beliefs' about the matter in some convoluted philosophical sense, 
especially when they are not able to express these to you, but rather that they behave a certain 
way, that they are skilled and well-practiced, that they act with a certain know-how. I would 
argue that we recognise agents as epistemic authorities when we in some way attribute to them 
these skills and abilities—even if this is just through looking at their credentials, resumé, etc. It 
certainly is not the case that we recognise them in terms of their possessing knowledge-that in a 
way completely opaque to their own first-personal perspective, never mind our own, far more 
removed, point of view. In fact, I would argue that the act of recognising someone as holding a 
series of true beliefs about an epistemic practice is a different question entirely. The latter kind of 
inquiry is one often relegated to a different kind of individual altogether: the expert-expert, 
perhaps, the individual whose field of study is precisely the epistemic behaviour of those in other 
domains (the philosopher or sociologist of science would fall under this category, for instance).   
 Perhaps we ought to be suspicious here, however: could we really treat someone (and be 
epistemically responsible in doing so) as an epistemic authority if they were not able to 
consciously access, and clearly articulate the ‘rules of the game’, as it were? Here I think we 
                                                        
124 Readers interested in a particularly interesting case should consider the American golfer Ralph J. Guldahl. 
Guldahl was considered to be one greatest golfers of the 1930s, but, when commissioned to write a book on how to 
golf, abruptly found himself no longer playing his best. (Or at least some have argued as much.) 
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should be careful to avoid thinking that such a question could have clear answer that would cut 
across all cases. I think it certainly the case that we would, at least in most standard cases, be in a 
bad position to engage with someone qua epistemic authority if they were unable to articulate any 
such propositions pertaining to the epistemic practice that they were participants of. That being 
said, there is a large difference between someone who can say nothing about the skills, ability, and 
know-how they possess, and someone who can say something, but not everything. My suggestion 
is only that it is implausible to think that an epistemic authority be someone who only trafficks in 
true beliefs about so-called ‘secondary’ issues within a certain domain. We have to make room 
for the idea that it is knowledge-how more broadly, effable and ineffable, that is of central 
importance when it comes to considering those whom we wish to interact with as epistemic 
authorities. Furthermore, I will go so far as to defend the plausibility of there being an epistemic 
authority such that they can see very little indeed about the very practice with which they 
engage: certain epistemic practitioners may engage with such activities on a more intuitive and 
non-propositional level. Though such an epistemic authority may not be in a position to provide 
as much for the non-authority, in terms of epistemic goods, she will nonetheless classify as an 
epistemic authority under the account I present in II.3—and I think rightly so.  
 At risk of belabouring the point, consider the difference between the scientist herself, and 
the philosopher of science. Arguably there are ways in which the scientist could be argued to not 
fully ‘know’ precisely what she is doing when she goes about her work: the philosopher of science 
steps in, attempting to properly articulate and make sense of the scientific methodology, and to 
analyse the actual behaviour of those that partake in it. There is a clear sense, however, in which 
the philosopher of science (in most cases) does not have the appropriate kind of knowledge about 
scientific practice, however, and this is the kind of knowledge I am alluding to: knowledge-how in 
the strictest sense. There is quite the gap between having a theoretical understanding of a certain 
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practice, expressed propositionally, and having the actual kind of skill, ability, and general know-
how required to partake in that practice. To underline the point: I wager that most would agree 
that when it comes to matters of science, we are right to treat the scientist as our epistemic 
authority, not the philosopher of science, though this point will be made clearer in II.3.125  
 
II.2. BEYOND TRUE BELIEF: A VARIETY OF EPISTEMIC GOODS 
 
 If my reader remains unconvinced by the considerations of the previous section, this 
section’s argument is intended as motivating a stand-alone reason to adopt the account of 
epistemic authority I provide in II.3, and should not be considered as relying on the arguments of 
II.1. Whether or not we consider all epistemic authorities as having such status due to some 
relationship to a possession or acquisition of more true beliefs (and fewer false ones), my 
argument here is that we are still better served by an account that focuses on different facets of 
the authority’s character, given that these facets can better explain the wide plethora of goods the 
such agents can provide us with, including the relevant true beliefs.   
 Something should be made very clear from the outset, however: my ultimate goal in 
discussing the range of epistemic goods that we may seek and acquire from an epistemic 
authority is not to show that they cannot be understood, whatsoever, in terms of truth—this may 
certainly be possible. My point in doing so, rather, is to illustrate the fact that it makes far more 
sense to ground these wide-ranging epistemic goods in the practice from which they are a result, 
a practice that an authority’s know-how allows us to access. If epistemic authorities can provide, 
                                                        
125 This is not to say that the latter has no role to play—in fact, I think philosophy has a fundamentally important 
role to play, precisely in its ability to elucidate matters of methodology and practice to both the authority and the 
non-authority. Here, however, the point is that, when it comes to engaging with that practice itself, the scientist holds 
authority, unless we are perhaps asking specific questions about how to model the rational process of the scientific 
method, for instance, in which case I think it is fairly easy to ascertain that we are dealing with a different domain of 
inquiry, and should turn to the philosopher for guidance.  
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and be the source of, as diverse a range of epistemic goods as I suggest, then accounts focused on 
an epistemic authority’s relation to true beliefs have a lot of explanatory work to do in answering 
how and why such a relation can also furnish other, often more complicated, epistemic goods. As 
shall be shown, I will argue that my own account does not have this explanatory problem.  
 Thus, I return to elaborate on a point previously made: not only is Truth(B) (the good of 
possessing more true beliefs, and fewer false beliefs) not the basis for epistemic authority, it is not 
the sole good that we seek when dealing with epistemic authorities. This is, I take it, one of the 
key insights of Jäger’s discussion of Socratic epistemic authority.  
 Zagzebski’s suggestion that we accept the Preemption thesis on the grounds that Truth(B) is 
of more importance than Total Reasons fails to account for the fact that we may seek other 
epistemic goods in our interactions with epistemic authorities, and that we do well epistemically 
for doing so. My suggestion is that we do not limit our account of epistemic authority such that it 
can only make sense of our epistemic relationships with such agents in terms of our desire for one 
epistemic good: rather, we should seek an account of epistemic authority that can make sense of 
how we interact with our epistemic superiors in seeking out any sort of epistemic good. I would 
argue that it would be a limitation of, and a strike against, any account of epistemic authority 
that failed to account for how we can acquire these other goods via our relationships with such 
individuals. Zagzebski’s account, as should now be clear, cannot adequately make sense of this, as 
her view sees epistemic authority as constituted by Preemption, a power narrowly described as 
concerning our beliefs, and reasons for them, and, furthermore, a power justified by its providing 
us with a source of more true beliefs, potentially at the cost of consideration of other important 
epistemic goods.  
 The criticisms levelled at Zagzebski’s account have shown that such social-epistemic 
relations, if based solely on the goal of acquiring truths, can in fact leave us with a highly 
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undesirable epistemic standing. True belief or not, the agent who preemptively believes may find 
herself alienated from her belief, her reasons cut off from the supposedly epistemically desirable 
doxastic state that Zagzebski prescribes for her. Now, this point is clearly open to competing 
intuitions: perhaps some will simply accept this outcome on the grounds that, all things being 
equal, truth is the final good of our epistemic inquiries, and thus is the only epistemic good of 
relevance to the kinds social-epistemic relations we are considering. Before those readers who are 
attracted to such a solution settle for it, however, allow me to motivate an alternative view that I 
think can, again, make better sense of our actual social-epistemic practices. Let me do this by 
illustrating a variety of alternate ways in which we do in fact interact with epistemic authorities—
interactions that I think a theory of epistemic authority ought to be able to account for, for failure 
to do so would reveal any such account as empirically inadequate.   
 I think that it is more broadly the case that we interact with epistemic authorities so as to 
generally improve our own epistemic positions. Whether the final value of such improvement is an 
increased ability to reach the truth, inside and outside of the domain in question, it is certainly 
not always the case that the immediate desired product of such epistemic behaviour is true belief. 
In the previous section I discussed the possibility of interacting with an epistemic authority for the 
sake of acquiring a certain interpretive perspective on a piece of art, or for a certain analysis of a 
philosophical concept. I suggested that these could be epistemically beneficial for us towards a 
broader epistemic standing towards the actual, real, world, but that they could also be 
epistemically evaluated without recourse to this broader application: as simply being better or 
worse beliefs to have given a responsiveness to evidence and coherence with other beliefs. My 
suggestion is that these are epistemically good beliefs to have, even if we hold the view that they 
are not ‘true’ in the usual meaning.  
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 Let us look at further examples. Consider the plausible claim that we sometimes we 
interact with epistemic authorities not to acquire a basic, true belief in some relevant proposition 
p, but rather to acquire the less tangible and more complicated good of making sense of our own 
epistemic experiences and situation in light of some domain of inquiry. As an epistemic being, I 
experience myself as having certain kinds of reasons, and think of these reasons as having a 
certain connection with what I think I ought to believe. Common sense suggests that the way I 
experience things recommends that I make certain conclusions about how the world is, and my 
place within it. To simply trust myself as an epistemic agent would likely result in accepting these 
intuitive conclusions. However, I am also aware of the fact that others, trained in certain 
epistemic practices, have very different views about how things are. The physicist tells me that 
objects are not solid ‘all the way through’ as I may experience them, but are composed of vast 
amounts of space; the mathematician tells me that, contrary to my intuitive grasp of the infinite, 
there are in fact multiple sizes of infinity; the religious mystic tells me that what I experience of 
the world, and myself in it, is an illusion, and that there is a deeper reality beyond that of 
appearance . . . In recognising these agents as my epistemic superiors, as being in some sense 
epistemic authorities over certain areas of my epistemic behaviour, I wish to recognise something 
about myself as an epistemic agent. In interacting with these different epistemic practices, I 
sometimes want to better understand my own epistemic position in relation to these practices, 
because understanding my own epistemic standing is itself an epistemic good for which I desire: it 
strikes me as an essential component to my epistemic autonomy and rationality to have this 
understanding. This reflective awareness of my own epistemic standing—whether or not it is 
required to acquire the true beliefs relevant to the domain in question, etc.—strikes me as an 
obvious epistemic good, one desirable in itself, and one that can be attained via our social-
epistemic relations with the kind of agents we are here considering as epistemic authorities. This 
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is the kind of good that may be classified under what Jonathan Kvanvig has more broadly 
referred to as ‘viewpoints that make sense of the course of experience’,126 or ‘sense-making’,127 
and a key component of what Stephen Grimm refers to as subjective understanding.128 129 I think 
it is this kind of epistemic good that Jäger is alluding to in his own account of Socratic epistemic 
authority—though I think it is a mistake to refer to it as understanding per se, as I have noted 
above. 
 I may also, for example, desire to partake in a certain kind of epistemic practice, and this 
requires training, education, and guidance from the relevant kind of epistemic authority. An 
epistemic authority can provide me with insight into how to behave in order to succeed in a 
certain kind of epistemic practice—she can train me to be able to come to the relevant kinds of 
conclusions in a certain domain on my own terms; she can present me with new means for 
acquiring and evaluating evidence. This is to say that an epistemic authority can provide me not 
with new reasons and beliefs, but with new ways of making use of reasons to come to beliefs—she 
can provide me with higher-order reasons, tools, a range of methodologies, etc. Not only do 
epistemic authorities traffick in true beliefs, or other doxastic states and propositional attitudes, 
but also in know-how, or a certain kind of epistemic behaviour. I think this is a particularly 
illuminating kind of situation to consider: here the very component that I will argue is central to 
epistemic authority, is in fact the epistemic good being sought. 
Sometimes we interact with epistemic authorities not only in an attempt to become better 
epistemic agents ourselves individually, but also to collaborate with them in some epistemic project. 
More importantly (and this is a point I will return to throughout the following chapters): it is 
                                                        
126 Jonathan Kvanvig, ‘Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by 
Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2016), 286. 
127 Ibid., 287. 
128 Stephen Grimm, ‘The Value of Understanding’, Philosophy Compass 7, 108.  
129 Note that I say a component of such a phenomenon—I do not claim that what I am discussing here is subjective 
understanding, as Grimm means it, per se.  
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often a necessary condition of successful inquiry in certain domains that an authority and non-
authority do collaborate in the relevant investigation. Prior accounts of expertise and epistemic 
authority, being all too focused on the transmission of true beliefs, have failed to recognise that 
there are such cases. Pedagogy is a clear example: in interacting with a teacher I defer to their 
authority on a particular subject matter, but I also wish to remain epistemically autonomous in 
the sense that I am attempting to learn how to be a responsible epistemic agent myself. The 
teacher-student relationship involves a certain kind of epistemically guided process: epistemic 
authorities can help us reach our own epistemic conclusions, but under their guidance and 
correction. Here is another way to put this point: one can place oneself under the supervision of 
an epistemic authority. This kind of relationship is sufficiently complex, and it involves a 
complexity that is greatly obfuscated by a simple reduction of expertise and epistemic authority 
to the role of reliably providing true beliefs.130  
 Importantly, I may also seek certain kinds of propositional attitudes that fall short of 
belief, or justified belief, when interacting with an epistemic authority: I may seek rational 
presuppositions, justified assumptions, a useful conceptual toolkit, an epistemically good working 
hypothesis by which to pursue further inquiry, etc. I am sure that one could argue that all such 
goods are in some way tied to the truth, in the broadest sense, even if a true belief is not the 
immediate product of acquiring such goods. Again, however, my argument does not rest on the 
plausibility of suggesting that any of these goods fail to relate to the truth, or do not in any way 
derive their value from a relationship to the truth. Rather, I am simply aiming to show that we 
                                                        
130 Nor do I think this kind of relationship can only be found in the pedagogical context. There will be cases in which 
experts of different fields interact and collaborate with each other, and each will have to act as an epistemic guide to 
the other, given certain limitations in each others’ expertise; there will also be cases in which a mere layman may 
have some kind of special role to play in an epistemic investigation, such as when a patient and medical practitioner 
interact in order to come to some conclusion about the appropriate course of action to take—here, again, it will not 
suffice to simply reduce the relationship to one in which the doctor supplies the patient with true beliefs: the two are 
more intricately involved in an epistemically collaborative project. I will say more about these cases in future 
chapters.  
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do an injustice to the complexity of the phenomenon in question if we merely reduce the role of 
the epistemic authority to that of a source of true beliefs simpliciter, and that the role of such 
individuals is especially complex in such a way that grounding such individuals’ normative power 
on considerations of true belief seems explanatorily deficient. 
 I do not wish to belabour the point. The kinds of relationships that I have briefly 
illustrated above will be a recurring theme throughout the following sections and chapters. Here 
it suffices to have shown two things: one, that there are a plethora of epistemic goods that we can 
at least plausibly consider epistemic authorities as providing us with, some of which at least are 
arguably not immediately reducible to considerations of mere true belief;131 and, two, to have 
highlighted the way in which a certain epistemic practice, and an agent’s being involved in that 
practice, plays a very important role in our discussions of epistemic authority. As will soon 
become clear, this role is to play a central role in my own accounts of expertise and epistemic 
authority. I turn to these now.  
  
II.3. EXPERTISE AND EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY DEFINED 
  
 In my discussion above, I have discussed the role of truth both in terms of the grounds for 
epistemic authority, and as a good acquired through epistemic authority. I have tried to be careful 
in keeping these two distinct, as I think that those who defend the accounts of epistemic authority 
presented in Chapter I often fail to do just that: they make the mistake of thinking that the 
grounds of epistemic authority simply are the goods that we can acquire from such agents, or, in 
other terms, the fact of that an agent is a reliable source of such goods. 
                                                        
131 Kvanvig, at least, thinks that some of these cannot be so easily reduced to considerations of truth more broadly. 
See: Kvanvig, ‘Truth is not the Primary’, 294.  
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 I think this is a mistake. As it turns out, what I understand to ground epistemic authority is 
not (at least in most cases) the same thing as the epistemic good that one seeks to acquire through 
interaction with such authority.132 By keeping these issues clearly distinct in our discussion, I 
think we are afforded with a much more detailed and accurate account of expertise and 
epistemic authority, as we shall see. By not limiting the defining quality of epistemic authority to 
the mere acquisition of true beliefs, we open up the concept of epistemic authority in such a way 
as to make sense of the wide variety of epistemic roles that such agents can play, and the kinds of 
epistemic goods that they can provide.  
 
II.3.A. DEFINITION OF EXPERTISE 
  
 On my account, what makes someone a ‘cognitive’ expert of some domain d, in the 
relevant sense, is that they have the relevant skills, abilities, and know-how, to successfully 
partake in the epistemic practice that defines that domain of inquiry. The degree to which 
someone is a ‘cognitive’ expert in d is proportional to the degree to which they are able to 
successfully partake in the relevant epistemic practices that those involved in d involve themselves 
in.   
‘Cognitive’ Expert: An agent S is a ‘cognitive’ expert in a domain of inquiry d 
iff she has the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to successfully partake in 
the relevant kind of epistemic practice, EP, that is used, in d, to answer the 
kinds of questions that are pertinent in d. 
 
 Note that my account is, given that we are focused on epistemic cases, limited to experts 
of the ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’ variety (as Goldman has referred to them). It should be noted, 
however, that this definition can easily be modified to include other kinds of expertise: one simply 
                                                        
132 This is not, however, to say such epistemic goods do not play a role in defining the appropriate kind of social-
epistemic relationship as one of epistemic authority per se. 
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has to drop ‘epistemic’ from ‘epistemic practice’ and replace ‘answer the kinds of questions’ with 
the relevant kind of task for that kind of expertise. Given that I think the relevant weight of 
epistemic considerations can be generally accounted for by looking at the notion epistemic 
authority, rather than ‘expertise’ in this sense, I think that it is a boon that my definition of 
cognitive expertise is not far alienated from the more general notion of expertise. This allows us 
to easily recognise that ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual expertise’ is a sub-class of ‘expertise’. 
 As should be clear, on my account, expertise is not defined in relational terms, as it is in 
many other accounts. More strikingly, my account does not directly mention an expert’s relation 
to the truth, or her acquisition of true beliefs (or avoidance of false beliefs), or any other specific 
epistemic good. This is because I think that to include such a component would be to confuse 
two distinct epistemic components: the component that makes someone an expert per se, and the 
reasons we have for interacting with such agents (i.e. what we wish to gain from such 
interactions), and why we hold certain kinds of social-epistemic relationships with them. As 
already stated, I think it has been a mistake in previous epistemic accounts of expertise to try 
combine these two issues.  
 To illustrate this point further, it seems to me that there is: 
i. A way in which we refer to experts in the descriptive sense, i.e. as being 
experts in their field simpliciter. This is merely a descriptive claim about what 
someone is in non-relational terms: an expert is an expert, whether I care 
about their expertise, or not. 
ii. A way in which we refer to experts in the evaluative sense, i.e. as being the kinds 
of agents that we can rely on to provide us with a variety of epistemic goods 
etc. This not a merely descriptive claim, but a normatively loaded one. 
Furthermore, this refers to someone in relational terms.  
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By distinguishing between a basic sense of cognitive expertise, and epistemic authority proper, 
my intention is to keep these two ways of referring to other agents distinct. Many accounts of 
expertise, by being limited to questions of truth and the possession of true beliefs, immediately 
disqualify ‘experts’ in domains of inquiry that fail to produce a sufficient amount of true beliefs or 
any other epistemic good. I think it would go against our common language use to disqualify 
from our definition experts who do not possess the appropriate, relative to us, epistemic success. I 
think the advantage of my account of expertise is that it leaves room for considering such agents 
as experts, and (in conjunction with my account of epistemic authority) still leaves us with the 
possibility of interacting with them as the source of certain epistemic goods, even if the 
acquisition of true beliefs in the relevant domain isn’t one of them. If the concerns of II.1.c. are in 
any way motivating, then this should be a considerable reason in favour of my account.  
 Of course, my definition of expertise is not completely without its connection to the 
normative. To be an expert, one must in some sense be successful in one’s participation in a 
certain practice. I do not, however, suggest that such success necessarily entail one’s acquisition 
of epistemic goods, and it certainly does not entail that such success puts one in a position to have 
a sufficiently greater success at attaining epistemic goods, such that one could be considered 
intellectually superior to others in the ways that other accounts of expertise entail. This success is 
merely one pertaining to one’s ability to partake in an established practice—it remains an 
entirely open question whether that practice itself is successful in the relevant epistemic sense. 
What I mean to pry apart here are the senses in which someone can be an expert, of, for 
example, astrology, and yet (assuming that astrology is not a successful epistemic practice) fails to 
attain any epistemic standing from doing so. As will be discussed in further detail below, and 
particularly in Chapter III, I argue that it is crucial to distinguish between these two elements: it 
matters that I can recognise someone as an expert in a certain field, and yet not engage with 
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them as my epistemic superior, and certainly not as an epistemic authority, due to the fact that I 
do not recognise their practice as epistemically desirable. 
 Besides clarifying what it is not, what is there to say about the sense of ‘success’ that I am 
using? Unfortunately, the answer may not be as clean as one would hope. I think the measure of 
success will vary between different practices, and will be coloured by strictly social considerations, 
such as the dynamics of intra-disciplinary recognition and accolade, or criticism and rejection. It 
will also depend on how broadly practiced it is: it is completely possible to think of such a 
practice as being only instantiated in the actions of one individual, at which point it may be very 
difficult to verify the ‘success’ of such an individual’s ability to participate in that practice, given 
that the individual’s behaviour would, in a very direct and immediate sense, constitute the 
practice in question. In more general cases, to recognise someone as successfully engaging in a 
certain epistemic practice—on the assumption that I do not have the relevant skills to engage 
with it myself—will generally require that I rely on other experts in the domain to either directly 
or indirectly identify someone as successfully engaging with it. Credentials are intended as such 
identification.  
 Nevertheless, I think there is a way in which we can make sense of the broader idea of 
success I have in mind: I merely mean that such individuals are successful relative the very 
standards and rules of the practice in question. Such rules may not always be explicitly provided, 
but, nevertheless, we can generally make sense of them with a proper and careful analysis of such 
practice.133 To be an expert then is to simply have the skills, abilities, and know-how to 
(generally) follow those rules of the game when attempting to answer the questions pertinent to 
that practice. A ‘good’ astrologer would be one who had the skills, abilities, and know-how to 
                                                        
133 In the case that the rules really do seem to be difficult to pin down in any form whatsoever, we may have to 
conclude that we are not dealing with a practice of the relevant sort at all.  
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follow the practice correctly, as per the rules of practice, whether or not such practices leads to 
any ‘good’ product; a ‘bad’ astrologer would be one who does not have the requisite skills, 
abilities, and know-how to properly follow the rules of practice (someone who merely pretends to 
provide answers to the relevant questions, for example, without the proper training or practice). 
The ‘bad’ astrologer would fail to be an expert of astrology in the relevant sense, even if they 
were, arguable, no worse off epistemically speaking.134  
 Now, it may be objected that such a distinction leaves my account of what it is to be an 
expert too thin, in the very plausible sense that the ability to partake in a certain kind of epistemic 
practice does in no way guarantee that such an agent has the epistemic standing to be recognised or 
appraised as an epistemic expert in the sense that we usually mean when we call someone an 
expert. As many would point out, it is usually the case that when we call someone an expert, we 
are using the term in an epistemically evaluative sense: by referring to them as such, we are 
saying that they ‘know what they are talking about’, that when they say p (where p is a 
proposition about something relevant to d) p is probably something that we should believe to be 
true (at least more likely that our own judgement on the matter), etc. This is, I assume, true. My 
contention, however, is that this evaluative component is an element of our recognition of, and 
our acting towards someone as, an epistemic authority—an epistemic exemplar that has the 
ability to furnish us with certain kinds of epistemic goods that we seek. My point is that when we 
use the word ‘expert’ we do not always use this evaluatively loaded sense of the word: we 
sometimes refer to someone as an expert without identifying them as an authority of this ilk. This 
is to say that to be an ‘expert’ in one sense, is completely independent of the kinds of epistemic 
goods and epistemic relationships that we are concerned with when we choose to interact with 
                                                        
134 At least in some sense—whether it is valuable to us or not, we would have to recognise that the ‘good’ astrologer 
had a certain kind of know-how that the ‘bad’ astrologer did not.  
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‘experts’ in the sense of being epistemic authorities.  I do not, however, intend to do damage to 
our common, everyday language use of the term ‘expert’—I suspect that what I have in mind 
when identifying the concept of epistemic authority is simply something that we certainly do 
identify with the word ‘expert’, in one sense. My point is simply that there are these two different 
concepts in play, and that clarifying the distinction can help us better understand how and when 
we are engaging with others in a specific social-epistemic relationship.135 Again, I hope the 
advantages of keeping these points distinct will become clearer as we progress. 
 To reiterate ideas already stated above, I think the account here presented clarifies an 
important social-epistemological fact: many of the truths that such experts allow us to access are 
not truths that were discovered, in particular, by that individual expert’s investigations, but rather 
by the much broader epistemic project and epistemic practice of which that expert partakes. The 
beliefs that such individuals possess are not generally important to us because that specific 
individual holds them, but rather because they represent the results of a certain epistemic practice 
that we have identified as epistemically beneficial. I value the assertion of a scientist’s conviction, 
for example, because I have identified scientific practice as an epistemically apt method for 
inquiring about certain aspects of the world. What an account of expertise focused on true beliefs 
fails to properly illuminate is that the source of the expert’s supposed success is their ability to 
involve themselves with that practice, not the fact that they merely have the right beliefs at hand. 
Again, this is what I thought the Trivia Junky lacked, no matter how good he is as a source of 
true beliefs: he is not grounded in the very practice that affords humanity such epistemic success. 
My account of expertise is designed to take into consideration, and to capture that basic point. As 
we shall see, it is this component that can also make such an expert someone that we would wish 
                                                        
135 I take this to be another advantage of my account: it suggests that, though the idea of an ‘epistemic authority’ 
may be somewhat alien to our everyday language use, the concept identified is in fact one that we generally make 
use of, even if we may not have a clear, analytic grasp of its conditions.  
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to engage with as an epistemic authority, so long as other conditions are met—not the results of 
such practice. A last illustration to underline the importance of this point: notice that we, as non-
experts, can be in possession of the results of a valuable epistemic practice, and this in no way 
makes us experts!  
 
II.3.B DEFINITION OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY 
 
 On my account, to be an epistemic authority is relational: one is only an epistemic 
authority in relation to another agent. An epistemic authority is, first, much as a cognitive expert, 
someone who has the skills, abilities, and know-how, to partake in a certain kind of epistemic 
practice. Additionally, however, an epistemic authority is considered an authority relative to 
another agent who either does not have these requisite skills, abilities, and know-how, or at least 
has them to a sufficiently lesser extent. An epistemic authority is, furthermore, by means of her 
partaking in the relevant kind of epistemic practice, a source of some epistemic good that the 
non-authority would be epistemically better off in having. Lastly, an epistemic authority, by virtue 
of her skills, abilities, and know-how required to partake in the epistemic practice, has the power to 
Preemptively amend the non-authority’s epistemic behaviour in relation to the relevant domain 
of inquiry and epistemic practice (this can come in the form of providing reasons to behave a 
certain way, but I will also argue that it can simply take the form of commanding someone to 
behave a certain way when conducting the relevant kind of inquiry).  
Epistemic Authority: An agent S is an epistemic authority relative to another 
agent S* iff: 
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1. S has the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to successfully partake in 
a certain kind of epistemic practice, EP, relevant to some domain of 
inquiry d. 
2. S has sufficient access to the evidence and resources required for her to 
properly partake in the EP relevant to d. 
3. S* does not have the skills, abilities, and know-how required to partake in 
the EP relevant to d, or at least has them to a (significantly) lesser extent 
than S.  
4. S* recognises that d and the relevant EP is epistemically valuable for S*, 
i.e. it pertains to questions that would be epistemically valuable to have 
answers to. 
5. S* recognises S as having a sufficient level of the requisite skills, abilities, 
and know-how to successfully partake in EP. 
6. (From 4 and 5:) S* recognises that S is, by virtue of her ability to partake in 
the relevant EP, a potential source of some kind of epistemic good that 
S* would be epistemically better off in having.  
7. S has the power to give S* a preemptive reason to behave in a certain 
epistemic fashion, perhaps by providing higher-order reasons and 
beliefs about methodological issues relevant to the kind of EP that is 
pertinent to d, or alternatively by commanding S* to behave in a 
certain sort of epistemic fashion. In short, S is able to authoritatively 
tell S* how she, S*, should epistemically behave in order to partake in 
the EP relevant to d.  
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(7) will obviously require some defence and will be discussed shortly. First, I would like to say 
more about the other components of epistemic authority.  
 Part (2) of the definition is included simply because there will be cases in which someone 
is an expert in d, but due to not having access to the necessary resources and evidence, will not be 
able to make sufficient use of her skills, abilities, or know-how, and thus not able to properly 
produce the kinds of epistemic goods that such practice would generally furnish. Other accounts 
of expertise simply discount such agents as experts at all. This, however, strikes me as rather 
peculiar, given that it is merely a matter of luck that such agents’ skills are left without use, and 
that they are not provided with the opportunity to produce the appropriate fruits of their labour. 
Again, I think this shows a fault in confusing of the descriptive sense of expertise, on the one 
hand, and the evaluative on the other. Under my account, one can succeed in being an ‘expert’ 
in the first descriptive sense (since condition 2 is not part of my definition of expertise), but 
nevertheless fail to be an epistemic authority.   
 Part (3) of the definition is simply there to capture the properly relational component of 
epistemic authority. I think it is simply an intuitive truth that such authority has to be considered 
in relational terms: to be authoritative, is to be an authority over someone else in the relevant 
sense. To be an expert is at least distinct from being an epistemic authority merely on this 
relational level: two experts may not be authorities in relation to each other, for example.136  
 Parts (4), (5), and (6) of the definition are intended to capture the fact that it is the very 
domain of inquiry, and the kind of epistemic practice of which the authority has the requisite 
ability to partake in, that both endows an authority with the relevant kind of epistemic privilege 
that the non-authority may lack, thus making them epistemically superior, and captures the 
                                                        
136 Again, this point is not a new one: Constantin and Grundmann have already pointed out the same, as I have 
previously noted. 
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motivation for, and the value of, any other epistemic agent as recognising them as such, and 
interacting with them qua authorities.  
 There are two points to be made here:  
i. Whereas other definitions here leave it up to the epistemic goal of acquiring 
true beliefs (in d) to do the work, I have here left the definition open to a 
variety of options: i.e. anything that could be considered as an epistemic good. 
The reasons for this should already be clear, as laid out in sections II.1 and 
II.2: I think it is quite obvious from empirical observation that the kinds of 
epistemic goods that we aim to acquire by interacting with our epistemic 
superiors, especially qua epistemic authorities, goes far beyond the mere 
acquisition of true beliefs, and, arguably, may sometimes not even include a 
concern for truth per se. Whether we value such goods ultimately for their 
bringing us closer to the truth, more broadly speaking, is a separate question: 
what I am concerned with here is making sense of what it is specifically that an 
epistemic authority herself possesses, and that a non-authority may recognise 
and seek, that provides her with her normative status. 
ii. I think that it makes far more sense to identify an epistemic authority’s 
involvement in an epistemic practice, one that is part of a shared collaborative 
project with a variety of other suitably skilled individuals, as the source of the 
epistemic goods with which they can provide us with, rather that limiting the 
account to a discussion of what epistemic goods the epistemic authority 
possesses. After all, I take it that a crucial element of what it is that makes such 
an epistemic authority’s testimony, for example, of such value, is that it gives 
us access to this domain of inquiry—a domain and practice that we find far 
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more valuable than any one individual’s epistemic position. The fact that the 
authority has access to these epistemic goods in the first place is simply 
reducible to the fact that they have the skills, ability, and know how to partake 
in the relevant kind of epistemic practice. This does not, of course, limit the 
authority’s role to a mere intermediary: the very fact that she practices and 
involves herself in that domain means that she is responsible for the 
proliferation of that epistemic practice, and the production of its results, and 
all the epistemic goods with which it is furnished. In a very real sense, even if 
only at a small level, her epistemic behaviour in tackling the questions relevant 
to that domain in part constitutes the very practice itself, in so much as the practice, 
as a social whole, is composed of the actions and behaviours of all those that 
are involved in it. Even if such a practice can be reduced to a series of 
propositional statements outlining a certain methodology for practice, it is still 
the fact of the matter that it is the individuals partaking in the practice, by 
following those rules, that define the practice and constitute it in their actions. 
Furthermore, it is the epistemic behaviour of such individuals that can change 
the ‘rules of the game’, so to speak: if a practice is a shared one, the individuals 
concerned can adjust their behaviour, even without explicit recognition of 
such a change, and in-turn modify the very practice that they are participants 
of.  
Parts (4), (5), and (6) of my definition also disqualify from consideration as epistemic authority 
any experts in domains of inquiry that furnish no epistemic good whatsoever. As I noted before, I 
think it important to leave open the possibility of there being epistemic authorities in domains 
where there are not a sufficient amount of truths produced to generally count such agents as 
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experts under other definitions of expertise, but it cannot be the case, under my definition, that 
there be epistemic authorities in domains that produce no epistemic good, i.e. that do not 
improve our epistemic situations in any way whatsoever.  
One may wonder whether it matters as to whether the non-authority can recognise certain 
fact about the epistemic authority in order for the latter to be an epistemic authority, or whether 
she has access to the sorts of facts that make the authority what she is. One may think that there 
is a difference between what makes someone an epistemic authority per se, recognised as so or not, 
and what makes one an epistemic authority for someone in a recognised sense. I, however, am 
fundamentally interested in this latter sense: the notion of epistemic authority I am discussing is 
intended to clarify the kinds of social-epistemic relationships we have with authorities, and these 
relationships are going to be ones in which the non-authority recognises the authority for what 
she is, and interacts with her accordingly. It is a relational notion, pregnant with normative 
significance: it would be odd to suggest that such a relationship could hold when both relata are 
completely ignorant of the facts that constitute the foundation of such relationships—namely: the 
asymmetry of their epistemic standings. Though it certainly makes sense to say that there are 
individuals that hold the right epistemic standing to be considering ‘epistemic authorities’ in the 
sense that they would have such normative power over us if we recognised them as such, this 
conditional element only underlines my point.  
 All that being said, however, it is clear that part (7) of my definition is cut out to do a lot 
of the important work, given that I have stated my goal as being to capture a sense of what it is to 
be an epistemic authority that involves the kind of normative power proper that Zagzebski has 
suggested constitutes authority. I would here like to first explain what I mean by suggesting that 
an epistemic authority has the power to preemptively amend the non-authority’s epistemic 
behaviour in relation to a certain epistemic practice, and then to say a few words about why I 
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think such an element of epistemic authority is not as difficult to swallow as Zagzebski’s 
Preemption thesis, particularly in that it avoids the undesirable consequences of that thesis, and 
that it actually aligns with how we generally behave in other aspects of our lives when faced with 
authorities.  
 As I have been discussing it, I understand a domain of inquiry to be governed by a certain 
kind of epistemic practice, whether or not such practice is explicitly codified, or simply implicitly 
assumed in various individuals’ behaviour. What this means is that there are certain normative 
structures in place when it comes to how one ought to inquire into the questions that pertain to d. 
A scientist follows the scientific method, a medical practitioner may follow guidelines of the 
Evidence Based Medicine movement, etc. Furthermore, I have claimed that epistemic authorities 
in such domains, by embodying certain kinds of epistemic behaviour, partly constitute the very 
practice itself. By being such authorities of a particular epistemic practice, their behaviour 
constitutes a part of the whole that is the epistemic practice itself, to put the point rather crudely.  
 Now, my claim is that, if one has the skills, abilities, and, specifically, the know-how to 
partake in a certain practice, then one has the standing to tell others how to behave in order to 
partake in that practice. This will involve telling others how to behave when engaged in that 
practice, telling them what are good or bad reasons for taking any individual action in that 
practice (i.e. providing them with higher-order reasons relevant to engagement with that 
practice), telling others what the rules of that practice are (if explicitly available), telling others to 
mimic one’s own behaviour (to act and think like oneself), etc.  Sometimes, however, (and I 
assume this is the most controversial component of my claim) it will simply involve chastising or 
encouraging a certain kind of epistemic behaviour, without providing an external reason to the 
non-authority besides the authority’s own reaction to the non-authority’s behaviour. 
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 Before I defend this condition, let me make one thing clear: just because an epistemic 
authority has such power, it is not in any way meant to follow that such an authority would be 
behaving appropriately in using such power in any given situation, whatsoever. The task of 
Chapters III and IV will be to outline the conditions for an epistemically responsible manner in 
which both epistemic authority and non-authority can interact given their particular social-
epistemic relationship. I will defend the view that, depending on a variety of conditions (some 
targeting the authority, some the non-authority, and some both) the specific kind of epistemic 
relationship such individuals can have will vary. In some more mundane cases, the authority will 
be required to withhold demanding the non-authority to behave a certain way, and will merely be 
in a position to explain the correct or incorrect manner in which the non-authority is behaving. 
In far more richer forms of the relationship between authority and non-authority, such as in a 
pedagogical context, the authority can rightly engage in the practice of exerting her normative 
power on a more regular basis (though this will always be limited by certain other 
considerations).137 The broader point here is that the relationship that holds between an 
epistemic authority and relative non-authority is always going to be dynamic: the needs of a non-
authority will change, the subject of inquiry will become more or less complex, etc. The point, 
however, is that, throughout all such dynamic change and difference in circumstance, it remains 
the case that an authority has the relevant kind of normative power no matter in what form it is 
exercised, or if it is not exercised at all.  
 This disclaimer aside, let me continue: as a first pass, I think the claim that an authority 
has such power is intuitively plausible when it considering wide variety of analogous, non-
epistemic practices. Consider a basic example in which S teaches S* to ride a bicycle, where S* 
                                                        
137 As the King in Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s Le Petit Prince would point out: an authoritative command must 
reasonable, if it is to be obeyed!  
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does not yet have the relevant skills, abilities, and know-how required to ride a bicycle, and 
where S is proficient in doing so, i.e. has a high-degree of the skills, abilities, and know-how 
required to ride a bicycle. Here, I do not think we would be fazed by the claim that S has the 
power to amend S*’s behaviour in a certain manner, in order to have S* successfully engage with 
the practice of riding a bicycle. Told to move her foot in such-and-such a way, S* will do so, even 
if she may have had prior thoughts, tendencies, inclinations, or intuitions about how to go about 
the act of riding a bicycle. In fact, if she is being rational, and recognises S as an authority on the 
matter, she will (at least attempt to) disregard all of these prior thoughts, tendencies, inclinations, 
etc., given that they are not part of the very practice that she is attempting to partake in. One is, 
after all, in trying to learn how to do something from one who can, engaging in an attempt emulate 
the latter’s behaviour.  
 Secondly, I find no reason to think that the very same process should not apply in the 
epistemic realm as well. In fact, to argue that there is a fundamental difference in the epistemic 
case would be problematic, given that I think there are clear cases of epistemic relationships 
much like the ones in the bicycle example above. To teach a student how to think logically, 
scientifically, philosophically, spiritually, etc., is just to teach a skill set—the fact that these are 
cognitive skills rather than physical ones makes no great difference. If S* wishes to learn how to 
perform in a certain cognitive practice from S, and S has the requisite skills, abilities, and know-
how, then it seems intuitively plausible to say that S has the standing to tell S* precisely how to 
behave. This is, I would argue, precisely how we all learn new cognitive skills in the first place. 
 Here I think it important to consider the plausibility of learning how to engage with a 
certain epistemic practice without going through the process of emulating the appropriate 
behaviour. It should be noted that I agree with Gilbert Ryle that there is a vast difference 
between being good at doing a certain thing, and simply knowing all the rules for how to do that 
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thing. I do not mention this to suggest that knowledge-how cannot in any sense be understood as 
a species of knowledge-that (as noted above, I wish my account to be somewhat neutral relative 
to this debate). However, I am assuming that it is necessary, at least with a majority of sufficiently 
complicated practices (and the ones we are considering here are just that) that one do more than 
simply learn the rules of such practices in order to be able to properly practice them. Explicit 
instructions and guidelines provided in propositional form are clearly a fundamentally important 
component to learning how to properly epistemically behave (relative to some practice and 
domain of inquiry), but it is nevertheless the case that we also have to practice that behaviour, to 
impersonate and emulate it, before we can be said to properly know-how to do so. Engaging in a 
certain epistemic practice is not merely a pattern of following certain rules, applying guidelines to 
certain problems, etc. If all problems were so easily solved, then we wouldn’t need anything like 
an epistemic authority, or epistemic exemplar, in our lives.  
 Given that participating in such a practice, in the appropriate sense, requires this learning 
of new behaviour beyond merely learning a set of rules and methods in propositional form, it 
isn’t at all surprising to realise that such practice would require guidance, and the overriding 
hand of one who knows how. I furthermore see no reason to think there is something 
problematic about such a preemptive power, either. 
 Now, I ought to point out here that though I am defending the preemptive component of 
my account by reference to a more pedagogical kind of relationship between epistemic authority 
and non-authority, I am not suggesting that all such relationships of the kind take this form. 
What I am trying to show is that for a non-authority to be in some sense partake with the relevant 
kind of epistemic practice, then he needs to at least be in some sense behaving appropriately. 
Does a non-authority have to have the desire to partake in such a fashion? No, of course not. But 
my argument is that if the non-authority does not do so, then he is not treating the epistemic 
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authority as an epistemic authority at all. Rather, in this case, he may be treating her merely as a 
reliable tool for accessing certain conclusions and results in the domain in question. However, as 
I’ve already noted, I think that Jäger’s insight is particularly on point here: this is not generally 
how we engage with epistemic authorities. Generally, we seek some access to the practice itself—
we do not merely seek propositional utterances detached from the relevant contexts of method, 
or approach such figures with the very specific aim of being simply told what to believe. I ask my 
reader to forgive me for putting the point so metaphorically, but it seems to me that we seek out 
epistemic authorities as means to be ‘invited in’ to partake in the richness of their epistemic 
practice: we are not mere passive observers, but actively engaged listeners. Where I think Jäger 
makes a mistake is simply in suggesting that this element has to come in the form of a full-blown 
understanding—which is clearly not what we all seek, in all cases.  
 Of course, there is a very pressing worry here: if I am suggesting that an epistemic 
authority does have some preemptive power, how does it manage to avoid the problems that are 
levelled at Zagzebski’s account, as discussed in Chapter I? If an epistemic authority can 
preemptively give me a reason to behave a certain way, to tell me that the appropriate way to 
behave in a certain epistemic practice is such-and-such, or to even go so far as to command that I 
behave in such-and-such a way, can this not conflict with other reasons I have to do otherwise? 
And, if so, can I not be left in the same epistemically defective position that we have seen 
Zagzebski’s account to lead us to?  
 Perhaps surprisingly, my initial response to this may seem somewhat similar to 
Zagzebski’s own to her critics. However, I think the answer can actually be better defended on 
the grounds of my account, precisely because it locates the epistemic authority’s normative power 
in her skills, abilities, and know-how that allow her to participate in the relevant epistemic 
practice. My general answer is that it is completely inconsistent with treating someone as an 
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epistemic authority, in the way that I have laid out, that I could believe that I ought to behave 
differently, or that the methodology is incorrect, etc. In recognising someone as an epistemic 
authority, I am recognising her as someone who knows how to engage with a certain practice: 
more than that, she is part and parcel of that practice. To suggest that I have a reason to behave 
differently in the sense of acting as part of that epistemic practice, strikes me as incoherent if I am in the 
position of the non-authority as defined.  
 Of course, I may disagree with the practice itself, I may even engage with a certain 
epistemic practice in a less-than-completely serious fashion. I could, for instance, think there is a 
better practice for answering the kinds of questions I have in mind, but, nevertheless, still engage 
with an epistemic authority of a different practice to try and make sense of that alternate 
perspective. This does not, however, provide me with a reason to do otherwise, so long as we are 
talking within the limits of that specific practice. We should only be concerned when an authority 
speaks beyond the limits of the very practice which we identify them as authorities of—but 
nothing about my account of epistemic authority suggests that they have dominion over such 
things! 
 That all being said, there is a particular criticism of Jäger’s that I think does cause a 
certain problem for my view—or, I should say, it highlights the complexity of the phenomenon I 
have in question. Here I have in mind two kinds of disagreement, where the disagreement is 
centred on issues of epistemic practice, pertaining how one ought to epistemically behave, or what 
Goldman has referred to as ‘secondary questions’:  
i. A disagreement between two purported epistemic authorities of the same 
epistemic practice, in which a non-authority is interested in adjudicating 
between the opposing views. 
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ii. A disagreement between two individuals, where one has less, and one who has 
more, of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in the epistemic 
practice in question.  
 Let me consider case (ii.) first, as I think my answer here is rather straightforward, though 
my reader may find it unsatisfactory prior to venturing into Chapter III. For case (ii.) I simply 
state that the epistemic authority in this case (of which there is only one, given that we are talking 
about the relationship between the two individuals, not between the two individuals and a further 
third party) does indeed have the relevant normative power. She can give the (relative) non-
authority in this case a preemptive reason to believe such-and-such about the relevant 
methodology and practice—she is in a position to amend and command the other’s behaviour. 
However, as we will see in the next two chapters, I think there are clear ways in which one can do 
epistemic harm by exercising such power when not appropriate. To give a rough preview: I will 
suggest that an epistemic authority who exercises her authority while not being properly sensitive 
to the epistemic capabilities of the relevant non-authority does her an epistemic harm. This 
would be a case in which the non-authority’s epistemic autonomy was indeed undermined.  
 I think case (i.) is far more complicated. Unlike Zagzebski, I think that disagreement 
between authorities (if I recognise both as such) can cause serious problems, and we should not 
be so hasty to simply disregard this issue. My suggestion is that such cases can tell us at least one 
of three things about the supposed authorities, or the epistemic practice, involved in this case. 
a. Hearing of such disagreement, I have reason to believe that, given that both 
authorities are supposedly partaking in the same epistemic practice, there is 
something wrong with that practice, given that two individuals, partaking in such a 
practice, can disagree on what the very rules of that practice are.  
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b. Hearing of such disagreement, I have reason to believe that the two 
authorities are, in fact, not partaking in the same epistemic practice, leaving me in a 
position to decide which of their respective epistemic practices is the most 
desirable to emulate.  
c. Hearing of such disagreement, I have reason to believe that though there is 
only one epistemic practice in question, one of the two individuals I have 
identified as an authority is in fact not an authority (or at least significantly less 
so, relative to the non-authority). 
How do we, as non-authorities, decide which of these is most appropriate response in any given 
situation? Unfortunately, I do not think there is a straightforward answer to this, as specific 
instances of this problems will vary widely in significant ways. I think this is simply an 
unfortunate consequence of living in the social-epistemic contexts that we do: there are simply 
times when we are at the mercy of our own ignorance, and lack of epistemic capabilities.138  
 That being said, there are certain things that can ameliorate the situation. I may be able 
to identify reasons to think that one supposed authority or the other has more of the requisite 
skills, abilities, and know-how, than the other: other individuals involved in the same practice 
may identify them as such, they may have received more accolades, whereas the other may have 
received certain criticism that signifies a lesser standing. One of the two supposed authorities may 
be able to explain to me the nature of the disagreement about epistemic practice, and confer to 
me an understanding of the disagreement that gives me reason to go one way or another. And, to 
echo Zagzebski, it may be the case that I simply trust one of the two supposed authorities more 
                                                        
138 Goldman has analysed a variety of ways in which we might go about adjudicating between disagreeing experts, 
all of which are quite unsatisfactory. However, these may simply be the best that we have. See Goldman, ‘Experts: 
Which Ones’. Also see David Matheson, ‘Conflicting Experts and Dialectical Performance: Adjudicating Heuristics 
or the Layperson’, Argumentation 19 (2005), 145-158, for a further defence of some of Goldman’s suggested methods.  
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than the other.139 Of course, I don’t expect any of this to be entirely satisfying—as I have already 
suggested, I simply think this is simply a consequence of such disagreement that we have to 
accept. What is certainly clear is that it would be beneficial to discover further ways in which we 
could identify conditions in which one epistemic authority should be trusted over another: this is 
a task I begin to look at in Chapter IV.  
 All the above considerations aside, on may still find it difficult to accept the possibility that 
one could be given a preemptive reason for what could be thought of as thinking a certain way, or 
to be told to go about one’s epistemic inquiry in a specific manner. To suggest that we could 
seems to fly in the face of our own epistemic autonomy—assuming that such autonomy in some 
sense requires that I own my epistemic behaviour, that the reasons that motive me or mine in some 
sense—and may seem psychologically implausible to some. But it is here again important that we 
note (and I am repeating myself) the limitation of this kind of normative force: it only pertains to a 
certain kind of epistemic practice, the one relevant to the domain in question. Furthermore, 
given the definition of epistemic authority, the normative force only applies in the case that S* has 
recognised d, and thus the relevant epistemic practice, as worthy of epistemic emulation. Again, I think this 
makes sense of everyday practice: we tend to think of certain kinds of inquiry as ones worth in 
some sense partaking in, and we reach out to the epistemic authorities of those domains to help 
us do so. We have already accepted a certain way of thinking as epistemically appropriate: if we 
come to think otherwise, then we cease to engage with the individuals in question as epistemic 
authorities.  
                                                        
139 Though there are many who have argued otherwise (Paul Faulkner and Katherine Hawley, for example), I am 
personally rather pessimistic about the possibility of identifying a properly epistemic reason at the locus of such trust. 
Nonetheless, we clearly have practical reasons to trust individuals in such circumstances—and, as will become 
clearer in later chapters, I think these practical elements are crucial to understanding the epistemic relationship 
between epistemic authorities and non-authorities.  
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 None of this in any way entails that an epistemic authority can tell you what the best way 
to think is, tout court. We have to remember that, by definition, we are always dealing with 
epistemic authorities as practitioners of a certain epistemic practice, within the limits of a certain 
domain of inquiry. For those offended by the possibility of having one’s epistemic autonomy 
undermined by the authoritative declaration of a practitioner of the scientific method, for 
example, one must remember that such a practitioner only has authority relative to the scientific 
domain (or whichever specific category within). The non-authority remains epistemically free to 
determine which kind of epistemic inquiry, or which domain of inquiry, he thinks is worthy of 
their epistemic endeavours. It is precisely because S* has already valued EP that she can be 
preemptively instructed to behave a certain way. The question of evaluating these domains, and 
methods of epistemic inquiry overall, is of course a difficult one, and one that I will not be able to 
answer here.140 
 Nevertheless, I do think that all the above still leaves us with needing to make better sense 
of how our relationship with someone such as an epistemic authority can properly coexist with 
our epistemic autonomy. Is it not epistemically irresponsible to put ourselves in such a relationship? 
Do we give up our autonomy when we do so? My answer to both of these questions is ‘no’, given 
that the parties involved appropriately recognise the relationship for what it is, and the 
appropriate limits of each relata’s epistemic role in such a relationship. Of course, these 
relationships can go awry, and often do. Understanding how such a relationship can take on a 
better or worse form will be the topic of Chapters III and IV. By looking at the relationship 
between epistemic authority and epistemic autonomy, and epistemic authority and epistemic 
humility, I will further elaborate on the various roles that such epistemic authorities can play. As 
                                                        
140 Of course, S* may recognise S’s domain d, and the relevant kind of epistemic practice, EP, as the best form of 
epistemic inquiry. In this case it may be the case that S can tell S* what the ‘best’ way to think is, and give 
preemptive reasons to behave in a certain way. But note, this is again first a result of S*’s own recognition of d and 
EP as worthy of epistemic consideration and emulation.  
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we will see, an epistemic authority can fail to appropriately engage with an non-authority, in such 
a way as to do the latter epistemic harm; it is also the case that a non-authority can fail to 
recognise his own epistemic duties in such a relationship, and thus fail to act epistemically 
responsible.  
 
II.4 IN CONTRAST: MICHEL CROCE’S ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY 
 
 Now that I have presented my own account of epistemic authority, we are in a better 
position to take a brief look at Michel Croce’s view. I have chosen to do so here, and not in 
Chapter I, as there are some similarities between Croce’s view and my own (at least in 
motivation, if not in result), and thus I think it is easier to understand points of differentiation 
between our views in a more direct contrast. Perhaps most importantly, Croce and I agree upon 
a thesis that I have, in the preceding pages, spent much ink in defending: ‘the role of epistemic 
authority can go far beyond the mere transmission of true beliefs to the novice’.141  
 Much as in my own case, Croce seems to be motivated by consideration of Jäger’s 
response to Zagzebski. We agree in thinking there is no reason to limit a view of epistemic 
authority to one only concerned with what he refers to as the ‘authority of belief’, i.e. the idea 
that we can believe on authority.142 Looking to make sense of our relationships with epistemic 
authority in the variety of forms that they can take, Croce suggests a multi-tiered account of such 
authority.   
He states his view in terms of the following three definitions:  
Expert: A subject A is an expert in domain D (for a subject S) iff:  
(1) A has more accurate information than the majority of people do in D;  
(2) A possess expert-oriented abilities. 
                                                        
141 Michel Croce, ‘Expert-Oriented Abilities vs. Novice-Oriented Abilities: An Alternative Account of Epistemic 
Authority’, Episteme 15:4 (2017), 479. 
142 Ibid., 484. 
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Authority of belief (AofB): A subject A is an AofB in domain D for a subject S 
iff: 
(1) A is more conscientious than S—who considers her to be an EA—in D;  
(2) A possesses and makes use of sensitivity to S’s needs.  
 
Authority of understanding (AofU): A subject A is an AofU in domain D for 
a subject S iff:  
(1) A is more conscientious than S—who considers her to be an EA—in D;  
(2) A possesses and makes extensive use of novice-oriented abilities.143  
 
By ‘expert-’ and ‘novice-oriented abilities’, Croce means the following:  
Expert-oriented abilities: virtues that allow an expert or authority to exploit 
their fund of knowledge to find and face new problems in their field of 
expertise (e.g. intellectual curiosity, intellectual creativity, open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, firmness, autonomy, etc.) 
 
Novice-oriented abilities: virtues that allow an expert or authority to properly 
address a layperson’s epistemic dependency on them (e.g. sensitivity to S’s 
needs, intellectual generosity, intellectual empathy, sensitive to S’s 
resources . . . maieutic ability).144  
 
Though we discuss these abilities in somewhat different terms, it is clear that there are 
some similarities between Croce’s view and my own. Though I deny his first condition for being 
an expert, his second condition aligns with my own view: an expert is someone who has the 
relevant skills, abilities, and know-how, to partake in a certain form of epistemic practice. I’ll 
leave it to my reader to decide whether it makes a crucial difference that Croce’s account is 
directly formulated in terms of intellectual virtues, where mine is not, but, for now, I assume that 
our conditions generally refer roughly to the same set of facts.  
What matters here, however, is Croce’s views on epistemic authority, not expertise. Here 
I think there are important differences. Two differences in particular are crucial: i.) Croce thinks 
that what he refers to as expert-oriented abilities are not necessary for epistemic authority (of both 
sorts: belief and understanding), whereas I do; and, ii.) novice-oriented abilities are necessary for 
                                                        
143 Ibid., 495. 
144 Ibid., 494. 
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epistemic authority, where I think they are not. However, it should be noted that, as we will see 
in Chapters III and IV, I think that various considerations that fall under the scope what Croce 
refers to as novice-oriented abilities certainly do play an important role in defining how we do 
choose our authorities, and how we go about interacting with them.  
The most important difference between our accounts, I think, is the first. On the 
condition that we think of Croce’s ‘expert-oriented abilities’ as akin to my own discussion an 
expert and authority’s relevant know-how, we disagree on whether or not such know-how is 
necessary for authority. As I have suggested, I think this element is crucial—Croce seems to think 
otherwise.  
To understand why Croce might think this is the case, we only need to pay attention to 
the fact that he accepts a broader range of individuals under the scope of his account of such 
authority than I do. He, for example, thinks that a grandmother, teaching her grandson to 
understand why a boat floats in water, or why fish can breathe in water, is an epistemic authority 
for that grandson.145 In another example, he describes his sister, who is not an ornithologist, as 
being an epistemic authority on whether or not the bird he indeterminably observes in the 
garden is a red cardinal, merely on the grounds that she has better eyesight than oneself.146 It is 
sufficient, on his account, then, that someone simply is in some broad sense epistemically better off 
than yourself, in order for them to be considered an epistemic authority relative to you. They are 
in some general, non-domain-specific manner, better situated to grasp some epistemic good, 
relative to yourself.  
I think this is incorrect. First, I think this does far too much damage to our concepts of 
expertise (not in his Croce’s sense, but the common evaluative sense) and epistemic authority. 
                                                        
145 Ibid., 488 and 493. 
146 Ibid., 482.  
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Croce’s account dilutes the notion of epistemic authority far too much: if he is right, then I am 
surrounded, all the time, by a variety of epistemic authority: such as every time I take my glasses 
off and ask someone with better eyesight to describe what they see. Or consider this example: I 
ask my dissertation advisor Prof. Sven Bernecker, via email, what the weather is like in Cologne, 
and he informs me that it is cold. Under Croce’s view, so long as Prof. Bernecker is sensitive to 
my needs, he has satisfied the conditions of (AofB)! All I wish to point out here is that I think 
there is a vast difference between the kind of relationship I have with Prof. Bernecker (when asking 
him about the weather, that is) as I do with a meteorologist (who specifically studies conditions in 
Germany). The kinds of individuals I have in mind when thinking of epistemic authority are 
quite far removed from the individuals in Croce’s fish, boat, and red cardinal examples, and I 
think are deservedly considered as different in kind, precisely because they have a specialised 
epistemic superiority: they are practitioners of a certain epistemic practice, constitutive of a 
domain of inquiry. As my discussion this chapter has made clear, this know-how is of 
fundamental import to my account—I refer my reader to the above discussion for consideration.  
Secondly, not only does this kind of account incorrectly track the phenomenon in 
question, I think it fails to describe it correctly. The kind of authority that Zagzebski and I have 
in mind has a strong normative force and is in fact constituted by such power. Broadening the 
account of such authority to include the cases that Croce does flies contrary to the goals of my 
project. Of course, it is up to my reader to decide whether this is a point in favour of my own 
view, or one against my project.  
The second point of contention between our accounts can be seen more clearly by 
considering Croce’s condition that an epistemic authority be sensitive to a novice’s epistemic 
needs, in conjunction with the fact that he thinks that ‘having a personal relationship with 
someone epistemically superior us in some domain is a necessary condition for her to be able to 
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acknowledge our dependence and needs’.147 Our disagreement here is fairly clear: I do not think 
it is a necessary condition that epistemic authority is sensitive to our specific needs, nor, in turn, 
that we have to have a personal relationship with them. However, I think I have to be careful to 
ensure that the nuances of this disagreement are clearly laid out: though these may not be 
necessary conditions on authority, on my account, these factors are nevertheless important 
elements in describing the dynamics of the relationships we may have with an epistemic 
authority, and how that relationship can change, blossom, or perhaps come to an end.  
First, to see why I don’t think it a necessary condition on authority that such an authority 
be sensitive to my epistemic needs, it suffices to consider cases in which the authority is simply not 
aware of my existence. Perhaps this may strike my reader, prima facie, as somewhat peculiar. But 
let us consider a few simple cases: I read a series of books about string theory, and recognise the 
author of these books as an epistemic authority on the matter; I watch a series of documentaries 
and films about the evolution of birds, and understand the writer and presenter of the show (an 
evolutionary biologist) as an epistemic authority on the matter; I observe a mathematician at 
work, and emulate his strategies and methods in solving mathematical problems, even though he 
is not aware that he is being so observed; and so forth. In all these cases, I think it perfectly 
correct to suggest that we are dealing with epistemic authorities, and to suggest that these cases 
should fall under the purview of my account.  
My reader may object here, however: how can the individuals in the cases above satisfy 
condition (7) of my account, viz. the condition that they have the power to give me a preemptive 
reason to behave in a certain epistemic fashion?  On closer inspection, however, this is not at all 
that troubling: having such power, and even employing it, in no way requires that one is aware of 
those upon which the power acts. This can be illustrated quite simply. Consider the 
                                                        
147 Ibid., 479. 
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mathematician in the above example: now imagine that he thinks to himself aloud, chastising 
certain methods, and applauding other uses of reason. If it is the case that the issues he raises 
apply directly to my own chosen methods, or deployed reasons, I think it makes sense to think of 
his utterances as giving me a preemptive reason to adjust my own epistemic behaviour. The same 
can be said of similar cases, I think: imagine that I am reading a book by a famous physicist, in 
which she, step by step, describes the way she went about hypothesising, experimenting, 
compiling data, and finally drawing conclusions, establishing important scientific theories in the 
process. Such a description could surely be authoritative for me in the sense that I have been 
discussing above, giving me the right kind of authoritative reason to behave in a similar fashion 
when conducting my own empirical inquiry. I’ll leave my reader to think of other such examples.  
In case my reader is not convinced of this stronger point against Croce’s view, let me 
make a somewhat weaker one. For the sake of argument, let us assume that it is a necessary 
condition of epistemic authority that the authority be sensitive to the non-authority’s epistemic 
needs, as Croce suggests. I do not think it follows from this that it is necessary that the two have a 
personal relationship. Consider here the example of a pedagogue, in some domain of inquiry or 
other, who writes a series of educational books, or produces educational videos. Such an 
individual may arguably be thought of as being aware of, and sensitive to (at least to a degree), 
the needs of her audience,148 thus satisfying one of Croce’s conditions of epistemic authority 
((AofB) or (AofU)). However, I do not think it the case that such an authority can be considered 
to have a ‘personal’ relationship with her audience, not in any meaningful sense. To suggest that 
such a personal element is a necessary condition to such authority I think is far too restrictive, and 
fails to account for crucially important instances of epistemic authority. Thus, Croce’s account 
                                                        
148 Though even on this point I think the sensitivity may be far too broad and vague to do the work that Croce seems 
to be suggesting.  
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turns out to be, in one sense too inclusive, and, in another, not inclusive enough, ultimately 
failing to properly demarcate the phenomenon in question.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that my view is not completely blind to what Croce is 
alluding to when he talks about novice-oriented abilities, and the importance of an authority’s 
possessing such abilities. Let us revisit condition (6) of my account of epistemic authority:  
6. (From 4 and 5:) S* recognises that S is, by virtue of her ability to partake in the 
relevant EP, a potential source of some kind of epistemic good that S* would 
be epistemically better off in having.  
 
A condition on my account of authority is that the non-authority recognises the authority as the 
source of an epistemic good that she wants. It would follow from this that if a non-authority 
comes to recognise that an identified epistemic authority actually cannot provide these goods, 
because she lacks certain of what Croce refers to as novice-oriented abilities, then it is possible that 
this condition will come to be undermined, and, thus, that the expert will lose her status as 
epistemic authority. If the good that I seek from an epistemic authority is understanding, and it 
turns out that she is completely insensitive to this, instead telling me that I ought to believe p, q, r, 
etc., then I have reason to think that she does not satisfy condition (6), and thus no longer 
consider her as an authority, as such.  
 Notice, however, that my account allows for more subtlety here. Croce thinks it necessary 
that an epistemic authority be sensitive to my needs, and that if she fails to be so sensitive, then 
she is simply not an authority.149 But this can’t be right: if I come to realise that an authority is 
not particularly sensitive to my specific needs in any given case (perhaps because she is in fact 
completely oblivious to my existence, or simply does not care), it does not follow that she is not 
an authority tout court. Perhaps I seek a variety of epistemic goods, some more complicated than 
                                                        
149 Is say this because on Croce’s account, it seems like being an (AoB) is the ‘lowest’ kind of authority one can be—if 
one fails to be an (AoB), one fails to be an authority. This is because Croce suggests that an (AoB) is sensitive to our 
needs—all other kinds of epistemic authorities have are required to have this virtue, and others in addition.  
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others, and, in realising that an authority lacks the novice-oriented abilities that makes it possible 
for me to acquire some of these goods, I cease to treat her as a means to those goods. It does not 
follow from this that she is not an authority in regard to other goods! Here, then, is where I think 
my account has a particularly important advantage over Croce’s. 
 Criticisms aside, however, Croce’s account brings to light important points in regard to 
the kinds of virtues and attitudes that we at least ideally want in our epistemic authorities. The 
task that he has started for us, specifically in identifying the category of ‘novice-oriented abilities’, 
is an important one, and one that I will do my best to contribute to in the next two chapters, but 
particularly in Chapter IV. This is the task of identifying the kinds of intellectual virtues, 
character traits, habits, and general attitudes that we ought to seek and attempt to foster both in 
epistemic authorities themselves, but also in ourselves as non-authorities.  
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III. EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY IN THE FACE OF AUTHORITY 
 
Identification, Reflective Endorsement, and Self-Reliance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To behave in accord with another’s authoritative command—to think a certain way, to  
adopt or disqualify certain reasons over others, or to simply believe that p—stands opposed to the 
Kantian injunction to ‘think for oneself’.150 At least, this is how it may strike some of us at first 
glance. To react obediently to such authority, as some accounts of epistemic authority suggest, 
may intuitively strike us as actions contrary to what it is to be an autonomous person, more 
broadly, and contrary to what it is to be epistemically autonomous, more specifically. If another 
person were to directly bring about a change in one’s own epistemic stance, it would seem that 
one could only be considered epistemically responsible if it involved one’s having one’s own reason 
to adjust such a stance. To change one’s epistemic stance without such a component would 
suggest something lacking in the epistemic agent: they would be, to use Kant’s terminology, 
heteronomous. 
 To be autonomous, very broadly put, is in some sense being one’s own person, directed 
by ‘considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally 
upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self’.151 At a first pass, 
we could consider the notion of epistemic autonomy to concern one’s ability to reason, to adopt 
doxastic states, and to generally cognitively engage with the world in such a way that the relevant 
                                                        
150 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951), 136. 
151 John Christman, ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018).  
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cognitive states are in some sense considered authentically one’s own, and not merely directed by 
some external force. Under this broad conception, it becomes intuitively clear how a notion of 
epistemic authority incorporating some normative, preemptive force may seem contrary to such 
autonomy. To be guided by an authoritative utterance regarding one’s epistemic behaviour 
doesn’t immediately fit with the idea of being governed by one’s own reasons, or epistemic 
methods, i.e. thinking for oneself. This will be particularly obvious and troubling in cases in 
which we are told that the results of our own thinking ought not to be rationally in play at all!  
 To put the point even more plainly, philosophical discussions of autonomy often refer to 
an agent’s ability to act on one’s own authority, as being driven by such authority, rather than 
behaving in accord with the authority of another, or behaving with or by no authority at all—e.g. 
arbitrarily, on a whim, motivated by emotion, etc. There is obviously much vagueness to such 
language, and the sense of authority in play may be quite different to the one that I have 
discussed here. However, I think the intuitive tension between considering one’s autonomous 
authority over one’s own actions, in contrast to that of another’s authority imposed upon one 
from the outside—whether in the practical, moral, political, or epistemic domain—illustrates the 
issue in question here nicely.  
 Given that we may think our autonomy, and thus epistemic autonomy, is a fundamental 
value, one central to what it is to be authentic, responsible, agents more broadly speaking, we 
may want to conclude that there simply is no room for a strong sense of epistemic authority. We 
may strongly object to such a notion on the grounds that to ever defer to such authority (as 
described by Zagzebski’s or my own account) would be epistemically irresponsible, and contrary 
to what it is to be an epistemic agent.  
 Of course, we could here simply resist the idea that such autonomy is important, or 
perhaps at least suggest that it doesn’t carry enough weight to cause any serious worries for an 
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account of epistemic authority. Here there are two things to be said: i.) the import of epistemic 
autonomy (whatever it is) is an open question, and I think it would at least be a benefit to any 
epistemic theory that countenances the existence of epistemic authorities to show how such 
authority can be compatible with such autonomy—this is the more modest task I set myself to 
accomplish in this chapter; ii) I think it is very difficult, as epistemologists, to deny that at least 
something like epistemic autonomy plays a quite fundamental role in our epistemic analyses and 
considerations. We care, I would argue, when formulating our analyses of knowledge, and 
deciding on the conditions of knowledge ascription, whether a given subject S in some sense 
‘owns’ the relevant achievement. This is particularly apparent in discussing virtue epistemology, 
in which we often appeal to the question of whether a cognitive achievement can be properly 
accredited to an agent: here I think we are asking whether such achievements are the result of 
their own epistemic agency. Catherine Elgin, in defending virtue responsibilism, has gone so far 
as to argue that epistemic autonomy—as expressed through what she refers to as the ‘the 
epistemic imperative’ (an epistemically-focused modification of Kant’s Categorical Imperative)—
underwrites all the epistemic virtues, and vindicates them qua virtues.152 I think there is 
something right about all of these considerations, and my reader’s personal philosophical 
commitments aside, I think it is fair to at least suggest that epistemic autonomy is something that 
many, philosophers and otherwise, certainly care about, and confer upon it a sufficiently weighty 
value. Here, I assume that there is something to this claim. Though it is not my primary goal, I 
hope that my analysis of intellectual autonomy, in relation to the phenomenon of epistemic 
authority, can further shed light on what constitutes such autonomy, and, in turn, perhaps 
convince my readers of its merit as a serious desideratum in our epistemological investigations. 
 The perceived value of epistemic autonomy is certainly that which Zagzebski herself 
                                                        
152 Catherine Z. Elgin, ‘Epistemic Agency’, Theory and Research in Education 11:2 (2013), 135-152. 
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identifies as a primary reason for why a strong sense of epistemic authority has been generally 
neglected in epistemology. Zagzebski gives such weight to this apparent conflict that she seems to 
think that no defence or theorisation of epistemic authority can even be started until the relevant 
worries are put to rest.  She argues, however, that it would be rash to think that there is in fact a 
conflict between the notions of autonomy and authority, and suggests that the above concerns 
are merely based on a confusion, viz. the failure to differentiate between the notions of autonomy 
and self-reliance. Though I agree with Zagzebski (and others)153 that thinking of autonomy 
merely in terms of self-reliance or self-sufficiency is wrongheaded, I do not think that the problem 
of epistemic authority vis-à-vis epistemic autonomy simply dissipates when we recognise such 
error. One can make sense of the tension without identifying the notion of epistemic autonomy 
with that of self-reliance. 
 If we are to take seriously the idea that epistemic autonomy in some sense requires that 
my epistemic stance is, to put it loosely, ‘my own’, then even those who accept basic epistemic 
deference—in the sense of believing that p solely from testimony that p—and who recognise the 
ideal of epistemic self-reliance as a bad one, may nevertheless think that there is something amiss 
in cases of agents deferring in the stronger sense suggested by the notion of epistemic authority that 
I have been defending. At least, one can think of cases where this is clearly so. If such authority 
can provide me with a preemptive reason to adjust my epistemic behaviour in some way, there is at 
least a question of how such adjustment can be considered my own, and not heteronomous in the 
sense of being imposed upon me by some external power. What I will argue in this chapter and 
the next, however, is that this incongruity between autonomy and authority is not of conceptual 
necessity but is rather the result of irresponsible social-epistemic behaviour. This is to say that an 
                                                        
153 Jesús Vega Encabo also argues that autonomy should not be considered as being equivalent to self-sufficiency: 
‘Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony’, Theoria 23:1 (2008), 45-56. 
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authority can be irresponsibly deferred to in such a manner as to undermine one’s own epistemic 
position, via an erosion of one’s epistemic autonomy. It is also to say that such authority can be 
wielded inappropriately, in such a way as to do an epistemic harm to another agent (i.e. the non-
authority): our ability to properly exercise our own epistemic autonomy partly rests in the hands 
of those that have such authority over us. It also follows that we cannot be responsible in simply 
blindly deferring to those we identify as epistemic authorities across the board: if it is the case that 
I have the capability to engage with a certain question of epistemic import, and refuse to do so 
without good reason, then I have acted epistemically irresponsibly. I argue that I fail to be 
autonomous not when I adjust my epistemic behaviour in light of authoritative commands, but 
when I fail to supplement my engagement with such epistemic behaviour with an attempt to do 
what I can to involve myself in that practice in a more direct fashion—where such an attempt 
reaches some threshold of reasonable effort, given the limitations of my epistemic and practical 
situation.  
 Some of what I argue for stands opposed to what Benjamin McMyler has referred to as 
‘the epistemic right of deferral’.154 He suggests that in the case that we defer to (what he calls) a 
‘theoretical authority’, we also defer the responsibility to respond to relevant epistemic challenges 
to any epistemic stance we may have as a result of such deference. If, for example, I believe that p 
in deferring to the epistemic work of an authority, McMyler thinks that any challenge that I 
receive for believing that p can be deferred to the relevant epistemic authority.155 I think this is 
wrong, or, at least, it is far too simple a picture. In actuality, the kinds of relationship we have 
with such authorities will vary greatly, in terms of the kinds of epistemic goods we seek to gain, as 
I have discussed in Chapter II, but also in terms of how much or how little of our own intellectual 
                                                        
154 Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 62. 
155 Arnon Keren, though disagreeing on the motivations for such a view, seems to defend a similar conclusion. See 
Keren, ‘Trust and Belief’. 
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abilities we are capable of bringing to the table, and in terms of how relevant our own epistemic 
involvement is to the practice in question. Not all cases of such appeal to authority are simple in 
the sense that they involve an authority who has the capacity for accessing a complicated 
epistemic practice, with which the non-authority has no means of access whatsoever. In many 
cases, the non-authority will have some capacity relevant to the practice; in the more interesting 
cases, the non-authority may even have special access to certain facts relevant to the inquiry that 
the authority does not, and in such cases the two will have to collaborate. I suggest that, though the 
non-authority has a right to defer on matters in which here has no such capacity to involve 
himself in, he is nonetheless responsible for responding to other epistemic challenges related to 
elements of the epistemic practice with which he is capable of engaging with in a more direct 
fashion. 
 To motivate this last point, consider, as a preliminary, the relationship between a doctor 
and a patient, in which the two are attempting to come to a decision on the best course of 
treatment for a life-threatening illness. Though the doctor in this case may be the authority when 
it comes to medical issues, certain components of such decision making can involve (and in many 
cases even require) the engagement of the patient: considerations of quality of life, personal 
preferences between varieties of treatment, first-personal access to one’s own suffering, 
descriptions of an illness’ effect on daily life, etc. In such cases, an authority and/or a non-
authority that fail to recognise both parties’ roles in the relevant investigation hinder the ability 
for such an investigation to proffer the appropriate epistemic fruits. Such a failure, I argue, is 
epistemically blameworthy in that it causes epistemic harm to an individual with which one is 
involved in a social-epistemic relationship with. This will be fairly clear in cases in which the 
epistemic authority and non-authority are joined in an epistemic task for which they are both 
partly responsible for. However, I will further argue that a non-authority can behave 
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epistemically irresponsible in this fashion even when his general epistemic position is not a crucial 
component of the relevant epistemic inquiry. 
 As I understand it, there are two distinct problems to consider when evaluating our ability 
to be epistemically autonomous while deferring to an epistemic authority.  
1. There is the broader question of how we can be considered to be autonomous 
at all, when the very epistemic practices that drive the authority’s conclusions 
are beyond our ken. This is to say: how can we authentically identify with a 
certain course of epistemic behaviour, if we are alienated from its justificatory 
basis in the appropriate epistemic practice?  
2. There is the narrower question of whether a non-authority is failing to be 
autonomous, and thus shirking his epistemic responsibility, when he fails to 
engage with certain epistemic practices that he does have, at least partly, the 
means to engage with. 
 I argue that first question can be dealt with by suggesting that a non-authority is 
epistemically autonomous, all things being equal, so long as he in some sense reflectively endorses 
the broad epistemic principles that govern the relevant epistemic practice in question. It should 
be noted, however, that I will also argue that such reflective endorsement may not necessarily be 
purely epistemic, or intellectually motivated, in nature: it is often the case that a non-authority 
will endorse such principles, and the practices they constitute, on the grounds of various 
pragmatic concerns—certain epistemic principles may bring about desired practical 
consequences. Such pragmatic concerns can put a limit on how much weight certain epistemic 
ends may play. 
 To illustrate the second question, one need only think of cases in which I completely defer 
to an epistemic authority, and the relevant epistemic practice, even though I have the means to 
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at least partly engage with the relevant epistemic task myself. The aim here is to make sense of 
the question of whether or not I have done something epistemically wrong if I fail to ‘play my 
part’, so-to-speak. Consider, for example, a case in which I have the capacity to understand (at 
least in a rough sense) why a doctor has chosen to prescribe a certain course of treatment for me, 
but I choose not to ask any questions about the basis for such a decision. Would I, first, be the 
appropriate target of an epistemic reprimand or criticism? And, if so, on what grounds? If it is the 
case that I have failed to ‘think for myself’, i.e. failed to be epistemically autonomous, what is the 
nature of this failing precisely? My argument here is that we do indeed have an epistemic 
responsibility to involve ourselves in such epistemic practices to the best of our ability, where our 
‘best’ may be tampered by limits in cognitive capacity, intellectual skill, prior knowledge and 
training, but also by pragmatic constraints. Prima facie, this may strike one as too strict, and far 
too arduous a condition to place on responsible behaviour. However, as we will see, given the 
reality of our social-epistemic situations, my view endorses epistemic behaviour quite in line with 
our common intuitions about what is, and is not, responsible. If anything, my conclusion is quite 
weak, and I think this is a good thing: it shows how we can be epistemically autonomous in our 
dealings with authority without establishing onerous conditions for doing so. 
 It should be noted that not all philosophers are as quick to accept that there is a problem 
here at all. John Hardwig, for example, in light of various observations about the practice of 
scientific investigation, responds negatively to Kant’s enlightenment plea, and has concluded that 
it ‘is sometimes irrational to think for oneself’.156 However, my argument here is completely 
compatible with such a view: the question is how to make sense of one’s being autonomous in 
such situations, in spite of the fact that it would be irrational to attempt to (completely) engage 
with an epistemic practice on one’s own terms.  It would be irrational to insist on being entirely 
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self-reliant in this situation, yes, but I will argue that the notion of epistemic autonomy is not 
exhausted by considerations of self-sufficiency or self-reliance. Hardwig’s point, I take it, is that it 
is important for social epistemology to provide us with some way of identifying the conditions 
that determine when it is, and when it is not, appropriate to engage in one’s own thinking per se—
my discussion here is aimed to at least clarify the limits of such activity in the case of our dealing 
with an epistemic authority.  
 I begin in III.1. by very briefly surveying various accounts and notions of autonomy as 
broadly discussed in moral and political philosophy. In III.2 I isolate at least one plausible sense 
of epistemic autonomy applicable to the investigation at hand. My goal will not be to argue for a 
single, complete account of autonomy per se, but to rather identify the sense of autonomy that is 
in play when we consider the threat of epistemic authority vis-à-vis epistemic autonomy. Section 
III.3. will argue that we can make sense of the minimal level of epistemic autonomy a non-
authority has, in the relevant social-epistemic relationship with an epistemic authority, by 
reference to two components: the notion of reflective endorsement, roughly as characterised by 
Catherine Elgin,157 and the idea that a non-authority bears the brunt of the responsibility in 
bringing into existence the social-epistemic relationship that holds between himself and the 
epistemic authority. In III.4. I consider the variety of ways in which a non-authority may or may 
not be able to partake in the relevant epistemic practice when engaging with an epistemic 
authority. On one extreme will be cases in which the non-authority can have no plausible, 
responsible epistemic involvement in the relevant epistemic question or investigation; on the 
other extreme will be cases in which the non-authority can play a very substantial role indeed. 
Having identified these various cases, I move on, in III.5., to discuss what constitutes responsible, 
and epistemically irresponsible, behaviour on the part of the non-authority given such varieties of 
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possible intellectual involvement. My argument will be that, we are indeed responsible for 
engaging where we can, even if this merely means taking steps to acquire some crude, 
rudimentary understanding of the epistemic bases for adopting the epistemic behaviour that an 
authority tells us to, or simply sharing with the authority any evidence of our own we have 
accrued the bears on the questions pursued. Lastly, in III.6., I briefly discuss the ways in which 
an epistemic authority can cause damage to the social-epistemic relationship between authority 
and non-authority, by failing to be properly sensitive to, and respectful of, the latter’s epistemic 
autonomy. Since this last point will be heavily tied into the topic of Chapter IV, viz. epistemic 
humility, the discussion here will primarily act as a precursor of what is to come. 
 In what follows, I will take it for granted that my reader accepts that there is at least a 
prima facie weirdness to the kinds of epistemic behaviour that certain accounts of epistemic 
authority, which include a strong normative power, endorse. Even if my reader does not have 
this intuition, however, I see no reason why he or she would begrudge the attempt to make sense 
of precisely how or why a non-authority could be considered epistemically autonomous (or not) 
in such relationships. Understanding the relevance of epistemic autonomy in this particular 
social-epistemic context will at least move us closer to a broader and fuller account of epistemic 
autonomy in general. 
 
III.1. A BRIEF LOOK AT PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
 As already stated, I have no intention of providing and defending an account of 
autonomy, nor even a detailed and complete account of epistemic autonomy more specifically. 
My aim is instead to try to illuminate the various senses in which, in the specific circumstance 
that a non-authority interacts with an epistemic authority, he may fail to be epistemically or 
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intellectually autonomous. Here then, I will very briefly discuss a few key philosophical accounts 
of moral and personal autonomy. I will not discuss criticisms raised against such views, nor will I 
discuss the variety of subtle differences between various instantiations of the broader categories of 
views I present. My point is only to capture the key components of such views, in hopes that they 
can help us better understand the epistemic sense of autonomy relevant to the discussion of 
epistemic authority specifically, but also to social epistemology more broadly.  
 Though Kant did not invent the notion, I think it quite fair and apt to begin such a 
discussion with him, given that our contemporary conception of autonomy owes much to his 
pioneering work. Famously, Kant discusses the moral or practical autonomy of a rational agent 
whose actions are guided and determined by her own self-imposed law. For Kant, then, 
autonomy is constituted by one’s acting in accord with a rule, or set of rules, that one is 
responsible for establishing (or can envision oneself as establishing), and not behaving in accord 
with a rule that is imposed on one ‘from the outside’, so-to-speak, nor by any other non-rational 
motivation, such as emotion or appetite. Contrary to what more recent notions of autonomy 
entail, however, Kant’s view is not strictly individualistic—the very maxims upon which one 
ought to base one’s actions are those that one can universalise, and that one can imagine as 
establishing as a creator of laws in the Kingdom of Ends, a community whose members are all 
rational agents, treated as ends-in-themselves. Central to this historically significant notion of 
autonomy, then, is the idea that one can endorse, as a rational being, the rational bases for one’s 
actions, qua universalizable and non-individualistically acceptable rational bases, but also that 
one can identify oneself, again qua rational being, as the source of such rational motivations, as the 
legislator of the relevant rules and laws. 
 Hierarchical accounts of personal autonomy also revolve on this notion of identification. But 
rather than suggest that an autonomous agent identifies with the rules governing her actions, 
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such accounts cash out the notion by reference to a harmony between first-order and higher-
order desires. Harry Frankfurt, who I take as my example of such accounts, suggests that an 
action is autonomous so long as the first-order desires that motivate the action are endorsed by 
the agent’s second-order desires.158 To take a trivial example: my action of drinking a third cup 
of coffee this morning would count as autonomous so long as the desire to drink a third cup of 
coffee was endorsed by my second-order desire, i.e. that I desired to be desire to drink another 
cup of coffee. This second-order desire, hierarchical accounts of autonomy suggest, more 
accurately reflect ‘who I am’ as a person. Thus, any first-order desire sanctioned by such higher-
order desires will better serve as an expression of my personhood or identity. The intuitive 
plausibility of this view can be captured by considering the non-autonomous coffee addict: he has 
a very strong desire to consume another cup of coffee, but has a higher-order desire incompatible 
with that: he wishes he were not so physically dependent on caffeine, and in fact desires that he 
be the kind of person that did not drink so much coffee. Again, as with a Kantian conception of 
autonomy, we find the notion of identification playing a central role in an account of autonomy: an 
autonomous act is one driven by a motivation that I have identified with. Here, however, the 
notion takes on a highly individualistic form, given that there is no requirement that my higher-
order desires reflect any objective or universalised value or goal.  
 On reasons-responsive accounts of personal autonomy, an agent can only be considered as 
being autonomous in the case that the motivations that lead the agent to act are themselves 
responsive to ‘a sufficiently wide range of reasons for and against behaving as she does’.159 On 
such an account, someone who does not have the capacity to understand why she does what she 
does cannot be considered to be acting autonomously—she must have the capacity to appreciate 
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159 Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund, ‘Personal Autonomy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018), ed. 
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the reasons that she has, or the lack thereof.160 What matters for such an account then, is not 
necessarily that one can identify with ones motivations in the more personal sense suggested by the 
hierarchical accounts of autonomy above (or coherentist below), but rather that one is able to 
recognise the rational force that gives birth to such motivation through the act of responding to 
reasons present for and against such a motivation. We could consider an agent in this case 
reflectively endorsing a motivation via a process of engaging with reasons for and against it.  
 Coherentist accounts of personal autonomy suggest that an action is autonomous so long as it 
is motivated by a certain preference that coheres with an agent’s ‘true’ character. Such character 
is to be understood in terms of a coherent set of beliefs, desires, preferences, etc., that has been 
endorsed through a process of critical, self-reflection.161 Here we find the ideas of identification and 
reflective endorsement in play: such views suggest that a preference that coheres with my overall set of 
beliefs and preferences is one that properly represents my self, and is thus something I can 
identify with (though this may not require a conscious, reflective act of identification); such views 
also suggest that this set of beliefs and preferences is constituted as it is due to a process of 
reflection and evaluation, where we could consider any surviving belief or preferences as being 
endorsed by that process of reflection. The notion of self-identification here is admittedly far 
more robust than suggested by the types of hierarchical accounts mentioned above, as it comes as 
the result of serious reflection, and a process of critical evaluation, rather than a mere synchrony 
between lower- and higher-order states.  
 Similarly, others have defended what has been referred to as a responsiveness-to-reasoning 
accounts of personal autonomy.162 Here, an act is autonomous so long as it is brought about by a 
motive that has been evaluated by the acting agent in relation to all of the agent’s other beliefs 
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and desires. These motives are thus the kinds of things that can be adjusted by such evaluative 
reasoning, and, given that such evaluation happens on the basis of the total set of beliefs and 
desires that an agent has—a set of beliefs and desires properly central to accounting for ‘who’ the 
agent is—I take it that they can be considered to properly represent the agent. These accounts 
differ to the coherentist accounts in they do not think it is sufficient that a motivating force for the 
action in question merely coheres with one’s other beliefs and desires, but is rather evaluated in 
relation to them.  
 Of course, there are many variations on the broader types of accounts canvased above, 
and many more accounts of personal autonomy beyond that. However, I think that the brief 
survey above suffices to show that there are two components quite common to the general 
discussion of personal autonomy, both of which, unsurprisingly, seem to play a central role in 
Kant’s notion of moral autonomy. I will refer to these as: identification, and reflective endorsement. The 
first is, roughly, the idea that one must be able to identify with the motivations for a certain 
course of action; the second is the idea that one’s motivations must be able to survive a process of 
self-reflection, or rational evaluation. Both suggest that one in some sense ‘owns’ or ‘governs’ 
over the relevant motivation—both identification and reflective endorsement are a means to 
make them ‘my own’ in the relevant sense. Now, of course, I do not mean to claim that there is a 
clear, singular sense of either of these notions that plays an identical role in each of the accounts 
presented, especially given that I have only discussed these types of views in broad strokes. The 
two notions I have made use of here are merely place-holders, and are certainly vague and of 
little use to the current discussion as they stand. However, by highlighting these two broader 
ideas, I hope to provide clarity to any following attempt to map the notion of autonomy onto 
epistemic considerations.  
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III.2. CONSIDERATIONS ON EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY 
 
 Even the briefest of surveys of the literature on personal autonomy, as provided above, 
are enough to bring to light a peculiarity about the intuitive notion of epistemic autonomy one 
might assume to be at work in many epistemological discussions.163 This peculiarity is that 
epistemic autonomy is sometimes equated with the notion of epistemic self-reliance.164 As already 
noted above, it is this assumed synonymy that likely drives many knee-jerk, negative reactions to 
the notion of epistemic authority: to defer to such authority would be to fail to meet the ideal of 
‘doing it for oneself’, to be self-sufficient and self-reliant epistemic agents. The Kantian injunction 
to ‘think for oneself’ can, at least on its surface, be easily equated with the corresponding negative 
injunction: ‘don’t let others do the thinking for you!’. This identification of epistemic autonomy 
with epistemic self-reliance is peculiar in the sense that neither the notion of identification, nor 
reflective endorsement, as mentioned above, necessarily include any sense of self-reliance. In fact, I 
would go so far as to suggest that there is no conceptual connection between these three notions 
at all. One may thus wonder how the epistemic notion of autonomy is in any way related to the 
personal or moral sense—is it a concept related by name only?165  
 The view that epistemic autonomy is constituted by epistemic self-reliance would be, 
roughly, this: 
Epistemic Autonomy as Epistemic Self-Reliance: An epistemic agent S is 
epistemically autonomous, in relation to a certain doxastic attitude or 
epistemic position, so long as she relies solely on her own cognitive faculties 
when coming to hold that attitude or position. 
                                                        
163 That is, so long as we assume that there ought to be some kind of similarity between the notion of personal 
autonomy, and that of epistemic autonomy.  
164 See, for instance: Elizabeth Fricker, ‘Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy’, The Epistemology of Testimony, ed. 
Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 242. 
165 This is, of course, a distinct possibility: perhaps when epistemologists discuss epistemic autonomy, they are merely 
talking about a specifically epistemic notion that does not map on to other notions referred to by the same word. 
However, as I hope my discussion will show, I think there is plenty of room for a notion of epistemic autonomy that 
better relates to autonomy of the personal and moral kind.  
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Why would epistemic (or intellectual) autonomy be thought of in terms of epistemic self-reliance, 
then? Such a position may be attractive to those who are particularly sceptical of the epistemic 
competency of other agents. Upon reflection, we find that our own reasoning, justifications, 
appeals to evidence, etc., are arguably more easily accessible as targets of critical evaluation than 
those of other agents. In the instance that we rely on another agent for epistemic goods, these 
agents’ epistemic doings become key links in a chain that connects our own epistemic positions 
with how the world actually is; the fact that we cannot directly evaluate another agent’s actions in 
epistemic space to the same degree as we can our own presents us with a reasonable sense of 
uncertainty and risk. The more often we have to rely on such deference to others, and the more 
acts of such deference are added to the chain that connects our own epistemic positions with the 
fact of the matter, the more reason we have to think that some error could have been made, or 
that some act of reasoning could have been led astray, by bias or incompetence. The more we 
rely on others, it would seem, the more we have reason to think our connection to the fact of the 
matter is itself faulty.  
 Elizabeth Fricker has put the issue, in terms of knowledge gained via testimony, in the 
following way: ‘this knowledge from trust in testimony is knowledge at second hand (or third, or 
fourth . . .), and as such my epistemic position vis-à-vis what I know is in at least one respect 
inferior to when I know first hand’.166 The suggestion is that first-hand knowledge is far less risky 
than second-, or third-, etc. Fricker suggests that a superior cognitive being, who was not limited 
in the same ways that we are, ‘could be epistemically autonomous in a way that no one of us, 
with our limited research time and processing capabilities, is able to be’.167 Fricker thus suggests 
that this notion of epistemic autonomy as self-reliance is an ideal, one that we should strive to get 
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as close to as possible.  
 Nevertheless, Fricker is quick to point out, as many others have, that aiming to reach this 
ideal of epistemic autonomy (as epistemic self-reliance) at the cost of all other epistemic 
considerations would be highly irrational. As she puts it: a ‘refusal to bow to others’ judgement or 
advice even when they are clearly relatively expert, is pig-headed irrationality, not epistemic 
virtue or strength’.168 The point has been echoed in much of the literature on social 
epistemology. John Hardwig has gone so far as to say that, much of the time, thinking for 
yourself is simply irrational: to not trust in others in many cases would be to deny oneself access 
to the best evidence available to us to answer a wide range of questions, and thus to the broad 
range of truths that such evidence would point us to. If ‘I were to pursue epistemic autonomy [as 
epistemic self-reliance] across the board, I would succeed only in holding relatively uninformed, 
unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore irrational beliefs’.169 Hardwig goes so far as to suggest 
that, in cases in which a non-authority engages with an epistemic authority, the non-authority 
ought to passively and uncritically accept what the authority tells them to believe.170 The necessity 
for such trust in our social-epistemic relationships, claims Hardwig, is simply at odds with our 
valuing of intellectual or epistemic autonomy so highly.  
 This point in regard to the tension between the supposed ideal of epistemic autonomy, 
understood as epistemic self-reliance, and the undeniable facts about our social-epistemic lives, is 
one that I will not belabour, as I take the point to have been made forcefully and clearly through 
the literature. Here I simply assume that any worthwhile social epistemological theory, whether 
pertaining to testimony broadly, or epistemic authority specifically, must accept that any extreme 
adherence to the idea of self-reliance is irrational, and that the best epistemic practice for 
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creatures such as ourselves involves at least a suspension of the pursuit of such an ideal.  
 How far we go in denying the relevance of this ideal of self-reliance, however, is a more 
difficult question to answer. Whereas Hardwig suggests that it is perfectly rational to be entirely 
passive and uncritical in certain social-epistemic relationships, suggesting that we can trust blindly 
in the epistemic work of other agents, Fricker maintains that we should hold on to as much of our 
self-reliance as possible, all others things being equal: ‘[i]t is crucial for the maintenance of 
epistemic self-governance that our trust in the words of others is given not blindly and 
universally, but discriminatingly’.171 This can be done because we are all ‘experts’ in one area: 
that of folk psychology.172 The claim here is that we all have the ability to evaluate the 
trustworthiness and sincerity of any human knower—so, whereas cases of expert deference may 
make it impossible for us to evaluate the nature of the appropriate evidence relevant to the 
question at hand, we can nevertheless evaluate other knowers to some degree.  
 Our ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of other epistemic agents aside, however, it is 
clear that the case of epistemic authority presents us with a particular challenge. It is one thing to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of George, a man on the street who provides us with instructions on 
how to reach the local Post Office, knowing that we at least have the means to evaluate him in a 
more epistemically thorough fashion (by asking for his credentials, testing his knowledge, 
verifying for ourselves, etc.); it is another thing to evaluate the trustworthiness of a supposed 
expert of a domain that we have no means of evaluating, one in which we lack the relevant 
cognitive processing skills, time, knowledge, etc. to access. As Fricker writes: ‘where my reliance 
on others depends on an expertise they possess relative to me which is more deep-seated, and I 
lack the ability to check up for myself if it seems worth it, the existential supposition and 
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dependence on others’ epistemic skills and truthfulness is more troubling’.173 Such reliance is 
troubling in three ways: one, because adjusting our epistemic positions in light of such deference 
multiplies opportunities for deceit, honest error, etc.; second, because with such epistemic 
dependence also comes practical dependence; and, third, because such epistemic dependence, 
‘while it extends one’s knowledge base so enormously, also lessens one’s ability rationally to police 
one’s belief system from falsity’.174  
 I wish to draw attention to this third point mentioned by Fricker—that the kind of 
deference in question, and epistemic reliance on others in general, ‘lessens one’s ability rationally 
to police one’s belief system from falsity’. I think this is right, but it also suggests to me that what 
is at stake here is not self-reliance per se, but rather something that could be considered a potential 
consequence of being self-reliant: namely the ability to be able to critically evaluate and reflectively 
endorse a component of one’s own epistemic position. I think it is this that cuts precisely at the 
heart of the matter: even the threat of introducing more error and deceit (by adding testimony 
into the chain that connects our own epistemic positions with the fact of the matter) is merely a 
component of this broader problem of not being able to adopt the proper position of epistemic 
evaluation from a detached, overseeing standpoint. The fear that those attached to the notion of 
epistemic self-reliance experience is the fear of having blind spots in one’s epistemic economy, 
areas in which some of the constituents of one’s epistemic position present themselves as 
inaccessible black boxes that we merely have to hope and trust house epistemically proper 
mechanisms and rational or evidentiary support. The fear is that I have beliefs, or other doxastic 
states, that play a role in constituting my total epistemic position that I do not directly have 
means for reflectively evaluating and calling ‘my own’ in the same way that I do beliefs that I 
                                                        
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. Emphasis my own.  
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acquire first-hand. 
 Importantly, notice that this fear has no clear, necessary conceptual connection to the 
notion of self-reliance. Self-reliance is not a necessary condition on one’s being able to reflectively 
evaluate and endorse a given epistemic attitude or behaviour. Self-reliance is merely one method for 
alleviating and minimising this fear. What in fact matters is that I able to rationally evaluate and 
endorse the epistemic methods, doxastic attitudes, and other cognitive components, that I 
consider and identify with as constituting my own epistemic position. Self-reliance is one means 
of doing this: if I put in the cognitive work to discover whether or not it is the case that p, rather 
than relying on someone else to do so, it is generally the case that I then have first-person access 
to the reasons, methods, arguments, etc., that lead me to include the consequent doxastic attitude 
(believing that p, for example) as part of my epistemic make-up. With this first-person access I can 
then reflectively evaluate, and re-evaluate, my belief that p, reflectively endorsing it when I am 
generally satisfied with my findings. Epistemic deference threatens our ability to do just this, not 
because we didn’t do the relevant epistemic work, but because we don’t have access to the possibility of 
reflectively evaluating and endorsing that work. 
 My claim then, is that what matters to us when we consider epistemic autonomy (at least 
in the sense of the autonomy we fret about when considering epistemic deference and reliance) is 
that we are able to rationally evaluate and reflectively endorse a certain epistemic position/doxastic 
attitude/etc., and that such an ability allows us to rationally identify with that epistemic position, 
making it, to speak in rather metaphorical terms, ‘our own’, as part of our own total individual 
epistemic position and stance, or viewpoint. Roughly, then, the view would be this:  
Epistemic Autonomy as Reflective Endorsement and Identification: 
An epistemic agent S is epistemically autonomous, in relation to a certain 
doxastic attitude or epistemic position, so long as she is able to critically 
evaluate, and reflectively endorse, that attitude or position, and thus identify it 
as partly constituting her own epistemic viewpoint more broadly.  
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 Such a notion of epistemic autonomy fits comfortably with what other epistemologists 
have said about such autonomy elsewhere. Catherine Elgin, for example, suggests something 
very similar in her own account of epistemic autonomy,175 which she states in the following way:  
In making and reflectively endorsing commitments, the agent exercises her 
autonomy. She considers herself justifiably bound by those commitments because 
she believes that being bound by those commitments will promote her epistemic 
ends.176  
 
Such endorsement is contrasted by Elgin to other epistemic processes or dispositions that may be 
heteronomous to the subject, such that subject ‘cannot reflectively endorse or reflectively 
repudiate his beliefs or dispositions or processes that give rise to them, he is a victim of 
circumstance’.177  
 Unlike Elgin, I have not included any reference to ends in my own account, but I assume 
that any kind of reflective endorsement will be made generally, if not always, relative to some end 
or another—I certainly see no prima facie reason to deny this. I do not however think we should 
limit such an account to merely considering epistemic ends, reasons for which will become clearer 
in III.3. 
 Though she does not provide a clear account of epistemic autonomy, I think that 
Zagzebski’s discussion of epistemic autonomy, again differentiated from the notion of self-
reliance, captures the same general idea as I have presented above. She writes:  
A self-conscious being reflects. It thinks about what to do, what to believe, whom 
to trust. A being conscious of being self-conscious also reflects about the process of 
reflecting about what to do, what to believe, whom to trust, and so on. [. . .] 
Consciousness of self-consciousness adds higher-order norms to the norms of 
acting, believing, and desiring—norms of reflecting about the norms of acting, 
believing, and desiring. ‘Autonomy’ was invented as a name for what we do when 
we are conscious of being self-conscious in this way. Autonomy is the executive 
                                                        
175 Which she seems to equate with epistemic agency.  
176 Elgin, ‘Epistemic Agency’, 144. 
177 Ibid., 141. 
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self’s management of itself, or what is usually called self-governance. In this book I 
have proposed that the basic norm of self-reflection is what I call 
conscientiousness, the property of exercising my faculties in the best way I can to 
make the outputs of those faculties fit their objects—to make my beliefs true, my 
desires of the desirable, my emotions appropriate to their intentional objects. 
Conscientiousness is the higher-order norm of self-reflective beings. It is the norm of autonomy.178 
 
Similarly, in speaking of how one’s autonomy can be potentially be undermined, Zagzebski 
speaks of coercion as a violation of selfhood: ‘[i]t is a violation of my selfhood because it prevents 
me from exercising the reflective control I have over myself’.179 In the epistemic realm we can 
understand this as being unable to reflectively evaluate the components of one’s epistemic 
perspective, and thus losing control over ‘who one is’ as an epistemic agent.  
 What matters to my being epistemically autonomous, then, is that I am able to take a 
higher-order position on my first-order epistemic attitudes or behaviours. This first requires that I 
can take a (somewhat detached) position overseeing these attitudes and behaviours, from which I 
can then evaluate them, and reflect upon whether they are the kinds of epistemic attitudes and 
behaviours that I wish to endorse as a rational, self-conscious creature, aiming for certain 
epistemic (as well as practical and moral) goods and ends. For Zagzebski, that is what is required 
for me to be ‘conscientious’, or to ‘do my best’ as an epistemic agent of the sort I am, so-to-speak. 
Again, nothing about this requires that the all the cognitive and epistemic work that takes place 
to reach this end is mine, in the sense suggested by the notion of self-reliance. Why would it be? If 
we take a moment to bracket out the potential consequences of being self-reliant or not (avoiding 
error, other people’s biases or deceit, etc.) and focus solely on the idea of self-reliance in itself, we 
are quickly confronted with a question that strikes at the core of the issue: what does it matter that 
the epistemic work is ‘mine’ in this sense, how does that fact confer any epistemic value to it? I 
                                                        
178 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 230. Emphasis my own.  
179 Ibid., 234. 
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think it is quite clear that the answer to that question is that it does not.180  
 Of course, this in no way means that the notion of self-reliance, or the fact that a certain 
epistemic stance is the result of one’s own doing, has no relevance to our epistemic judgements of 
an agent’s cognitive behaviour. My only claim is that there is room for a notion of epistemic 
autonomy that does not require self-reliance, and that this notion better matches our other 
notions of personal and moral autonomy; importantly for my purposes here, this notion can also 
make sense of our intuitions in regard to our epistemic autonomy in relation to our interactions 
with epistemic authority, and other social-epistemic relationships besides. The notion of self-
reliance most certainly has a role to play in epistemology (whether someone deserves merit for 
the epistemic positions, for example, is a question that can be partly answered by reference to 
such facts).181 However, I hope to have shown that we should at least be wary of wedding these 
considerations with the notion of epistemic autonomy.  
 Given this conception of epistemic autonomy as reflective endorsement and 
identification, I will now move on to a discussion of how such a notion of autonomy relates to our 
epistemic responsibility when establishing a relationship with an epistemic authority, and when 
acting as non-authorities deferring to such authorities.  
 
 
                                                        
180 To give one more example, Foley seems to provide further credence to the view I am defending here when he 
writes that he conceives of ‘autonomy as being grounded in our ability to use our existing methods and opinions to 
examine these very same methods and opinions, the very same ability, not coincidentally, which makes epistemology 
possible’. See: Foley, Intellectual Trust, 128. Here I further stipulate that it also includes the ability to use our existing 
methods and opinions to examine other methods and opinions, and to endorse them, even if one is not ‘making use’ 
of them in exactly the same fashion.  
181 It should be noted here that self-reliance may not even be relevant to this task, however. Jesús Vega Encabo, for 
example, has argued that there is room for another notion of epistemic autonomy, once again distinguished from 
that of self-reliance, that can make sense of how we can attribute an epistemic success to an agent even when they do 
not rely on their own faculties (specifically in the case of testimony). See: Jesús Vega Encabo, ‘Epistemic Merit, 
Autonomy, and Testimony’, Theoria 61 (2008).  
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III.3 AUTHORITY AND MINIMAL EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 With a clearer sense of epistemic autonomy in mind, we can now move on to evaluate the 
case of epistemic authority vis-à-vis such autonomy. Recall that I began this chapter by reference 
to what I take to be a fairly intuitive worry about accounts of epistemic authority that include 
some strong normative power (of the sort found in either Zagzebski’s, or my own, conditions of 
Preemption). In this section I will argue for two things:  
1. That an agent deferring to these kinds of epistemic authorities can meet a 
minimal level of epistemic responsibility by meeting a certain condition of 
epistemic autonomy: namely that they have reflectively endorsed the epistemic 
practice with which they identify the authority as being an exemplar of. 
2. That an agent deferring to these kinds of epistemic authorities can be held 
epistemically responsible, and thus blameworthy or praiseworthy, for the 
consequences of such deferral due to the fact that it is that agent’s reflective 
endorsement of both the epistemic practice, and the individual identified as an 
epistemic authority, that precisely establishes the very relationship between 
non-authority and authority in the first place.  
The purpose for accounting for a minimal sense of epistemic autonomy and responsibility in (i.) is 
to assuage worries that involving oneself in a relationship with an epistemic authority is in 
principle irresponsible or epistemically inappropriate. In III.3.A., I show that, given that 
epistemic autonomy is not epistemic self-reliance, there is a straightforward way to account for 
how an agent is not irresponsibly forsaking their own epistemic autonomy or agency in 
establishing a relationship with an epistemic authority. Point (ii) is pursued for the sake of making 
sense how we can blame or praise someone for deferring to an authority—this is argued for in 
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III.3.B. Both of these provide an account of how one can have a minimal form of epistemic 
autonomy and responsibility in dealing with an epistemic authority. Later, in sections III.4 and 
III.5, I will argue that the diversity of the forms that a relationship with an epistemic authority 
can take (as seen in Chapter II) add further complexity to the discussion of epistemic autonomy 
and responsibility beyond this minimal sense. The upshot of this will be that epistemic 
responsibility does in fact require, in some cases, that a non-authority do more than satisfy the 
minimal sense of epistemic autonomy presented in this section. I will argue that not to do more 
than what is minimally require for epistemic autonomy in such cases is akin to being epistemically 
lazy, and thus epistemically irresponsible. I further suggest that not only are we epistemically 
autonomous in establishing these relationships with epistemic authorities, such relationships, 
when responsibly pursued, improve our epistemic autonomy. 
 
III.3.A. AUTONOMY IN ENDORSING AN EPISTEMIC PRACTICE 
 
 Before I provide an account for a minimal sense of epistemic autonomy in an agent’s 
identifying  another agent as an epistemic authority and consequently adopting a relationship 
with such an authority, I should make it clear that I take the notion of epistemic autonomy to be 
strongly related to that of epistemic responsibility, and that being epistemically autonomous is 
necessary condition of being responsible. Though I think there are numerous ways in which 
epistemologists have understood epistemic responsibility, I mean something like the following:  
Epistemic Responsibility: An agent is epistemically responsible in relation to 
some epistemic attitude, behaviour, or position, iff she is an appropriate target 
of praise or blame for that epistemic attitude or position on the grounds that 
she is behaving as an autonomous epistemic agent in relation to that attitude, 
behaviour, position, where being ‘appropriate’ takes into account not only 
epistemic considerations, but also pragmatic.  
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To be judged ‘epistemically responsible’ in believing that p, would just to be the appropriate 
target of praise as outlined; to be judged ‘epistemically irresponsible’ would be to be the 
appropriate target of blame as outlined.  
 Judging an agent’s epistemic stance as being epistemic responsible is thus not the same as 
attributing rationality or irrationality. It may be the case that an agent’s believing that p, for 
instance, is irrational because it fails to be properly responsive to all the evidence on hand. 
However, consideration of the fact that the agent was under duress, and was pragmatically 
constrained by the fact that she had to make a quick decision to adopt a certain doxastic stance, 
may entail that we would not want to consider her blameworthy for believing that p. In this sense 
she is not epistemically responsible for believing that p. This distinction between epistemic 
rationality and responsibility has been made by Richard Foley, who refers to an agent who holds 
a belief that is not rational, in the sense that, upon reflection, she ‘would be critical of them, 
insofar as her goal is to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs, but they may nonetheless be 
responsible beliefs for her to have, given that it was reasonable, relative to all of her goals, for her 
not to engage in this reflection’.182 Assuming that the other goals in questions may be pragmatic, 
I take it that Foley’s account of epistemic responsibility generally echoes my own. 
 Whether an agent is epistemically autonomous relative to a certain epistemic position is a 
central question in making sense of such judgements of blame and praise. If, for example, an 
agent is not able to reflectively evaluate and endorse a certain epistemic position, and thus 
identify it as her own, but instead has such a position thrust on her by some coercive means, then 
it would seem inappropriate to blame her for it. An agent finds a certain doxastic attitude 
‘implanted’ into her general cognitive make-up would be such an example, or an individual 
                                                        
182 Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 33. 
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brainwashed into believing a certain doctrine.183  
 This connection between epistemic autonomy and responsibility should come as no 
surprise, given that the broader notions of autonomy and responsibility outside of the epistemic 
domain so clearly come hand-in-hand. Paul Benson refers to autonomous agents as those that 
treat themselves as ‘sufficiently competent and worthy to speak for their actions’, i.e. as being 
responsible for them.184 Andrea C. Westlund argues that an agent is autonomous in relation to 
some action so long as she holds herself interpersonally accountable, in that she can speak ‘on her 
own behalf’ apropos these actions, and that she sees herself as having endorsed certain ‘values 
and desires [treating them] as justifying reasons for her actions’.185 My claim is simply that this is 
the same in the epistemic domain: an agent who reflectively endorses and identifies with a certain 
epistemic attitude, behaviour, or position can be held responsible for it. In broader terms, 
Lorraine Code echoes this connection between epistemic autonomy and responsibility when she 
states that a ‘person can be held [epistemically] responsible or irresponsible only if she/he is 
clearly regarded as an agent (in this case a cognitive agent) in the circumstances in question’.186  
 Before I continue, however, I should make two small points clear:  
                                                        
183 Note that an interesting consequence of my view of epistemic autonomy is that such individuals could be 
blameworthy for such epistemic positions at a later time, so long as they were provided with the opportunity to 
reflectively evaluate such positions in the meantime. There would be a point in which they would have to be held 
responsible for such beliefs, attitudes, etc. This is of course a complicated matter: subjects of constant brainwashing 
and external pressure will likely never have the opportunity to reflect on such beliefs for prolonged periods of time, 
and there is also the question of how such coercion, brainwashing, etc., could impair the ability to reflectively 
evaluate and endorse epistemic attitudes and positions, i.e. how they could undermine the possibility of epistemic 
agency completely. I do not want to make a definitive stance here, but there is certainly a question to be asked here 
in regard to our responsibility for what we may call our ‘basic’ epistemic methods and practices. It seems to me that 
there is at least room to criticise even those who have been raised in such manipulative environments, as the ones 
mentioned above, on the grounds that they have not properly evaluated the very basic means by which they acquire 
and sustain their beliefs. Such individuals, it would seem, give authority to others, even though those others are their peers 
when it comes to matters of epistemic method. Though I do not fully agree with his view, I am at least sympathetic to 
Michele Palmira’s related argument—see Michele Palmira, ‘Expert Deference and the Objectivity of Epistemology’, 
unpublished manuscript.   
184 Paul Benson, ‘Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency’, Autonomy and the Challenges of 
Liberalism: New Essays, ed. J. Christman and J. Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 117. 
185 Andrea C. Westlund, ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy’, Hypatia 24:4 (2009), 35. 
186 Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1987), 51. 
 
 
142 
i. Being held responsible for an epistemic attitude, behaviour, or position, does 
not necessarily have to be a total affair, in the sense that the agent in question is 
held solely and completely responsible for that attitude, behaviour, or position. 
This is especially relevant in the context of this discussion of epistemic 
authority, given that I will later argue that the authority is responsible for 
much besides (see III.6, and Chapter IV).  
ii. An agent can be held epistemically responsible for an epistemic attitude, 
behaviour, or position that she seemingly does not take steps to reflectively 
endorse, given that she had the opportunity to reflectively evaluate and endorse 
said attitude, behaviour, or position, but chose not to.187 In the context of our 
current discussion on epistemic authority, for example, an agent could be held 
responsible for willingly not adopting a relevantly reflective position in 
adopting a position of deference relative to the authority. This point will 
become clearer in III.3.B., however.  
 Now that we have a clearer sense of what is meant by epistemic autonomy and epistemic 
responsibility, my first claim here is a simple one:  
Minimal Epistemic Autonomy and Responsibility: An agent is considered 
minimally epistemically autonomous, and thus epistemically responsible, as a 
non-authority in a social-epistemic relationship with an epistemic authority, so 
long as she reflectively endorses the epistemic practice with which she 
identifies the epistemic authority as being a successful practitioner of.  
 
The point here is that an agent can manifest her epistemic autonomy by endorsing, upon 
reflective consideration, the very practice that she, via identification of an epistemic authority, 
defers to. Although, due to the nature of the epistemic authority to non-authority relationship, it 
                                                        
187 I say seemingly due to the fact that an agent, on my account, that did not endorse a certain epistemic attitude, 
behaviour, or position, would not be counted as autonomous. I would argue that such an agent in fact did endorse a 
certain position, but did so lazily and incompletely. This will become clearer in the next section, however.  
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may not be possible for her to reflect on the minutiae of the epistemic practice that lead to a 
certain doxastic attitude or epistemic position (which, in deferring to the authority, she ends up 
adopting herself), there is nothing stopping her from consideration of the relevant epistemic 
practice as a whole. In fact, it is epistemically mandatory that she do just that: any agent who fails to 
do so before deferring to an authority would be aptly criticised for being epistemically 
irresponsible. Such deference would constitute a severe violation of one’s epistemic autonomy, 
albeit a self-imposed one, because such an agent would then be at the mercy of an authority who 
would impose a certain epistemic practice, constituted by a certain methodology and set of rules 
of which the non-authority would have no means of reflectively evaluating. The act of endorsing 
the practice as a whole, as a constitutive step towards adopting a position of deference to an 
authority, is a crucial component to doing so in an epistemically responsible manner.  
 Such endorsement could be extremely crude, as it will often be in cases in which the 
disparity between an epistemic authority and non-authority’s knowledge and skill level is severe. 
Consider the case of my own deferral to an expert in sub-atomic physics: I have very little, if any, 
ability to rationally evaluate the details of the methodology that drives the relevant epistemic 
practices of that domain. However, I reflectively endorse these practices as a whole: I believe that 
they have an empirically adequate track record, as exemplified by their successful application to 
technological advancement, for instance. Though I do not understand most of the answers that 
such epistemic practices provide, I may see that the answers have been successfully used in 
application to other domains, or other problems, in which I see that the answers have played a 
sufficiently important and successful role. If I did not have reason to endorse the practice even in 
this crude manner, I think it would be perfectly appropriate for me to strongly criticised for 
adopting a position of deference to the relevant authority identified as a practitioner of that 
epistemic practice.  
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 This is an important point that I think is often overlooked or passed over. Hardwig, for 
example, in suggesting that deference to an epistemic expert (either by a layman or another 
expert) is necessarily ‘blind’, fails to acknowledge the components of such relationships that are 
necessarily reflective and appropriately epistemically perceptive. Yes, we are blind to the 
particular processes that govern some components of a certain epistemic practice with which we 
wish to defer to—but this in no way suggests that our choice to defer to such practice lacks the 
appropriate reflectively evaluation and endorsement. Surely, for some individuals, such 
evaluation will be very crude (as described above), given their inability to even evaluate an 
epistemic practice in the simplest of terms, but for others such evaluation and endorsement will 
be quite sophisticated and intellectually virtuous indeed.  
 My reader may rightly raise an objection at this point: surely the act of endorsing an 
epistemic practice overall necessarily involves the act of endorsing the particular methods, rules, 
and so forth that constitute that practice. Given that part of what gives rise to the epistemic 
authority to non-authority relationship is precisely the latter agent’s inability to directly engage 
with these methods, it becomes questionable that the kind of reflective evaluation and 
endorsement I am suggesting would generally be possible. However, I think this criticism fails to 
mark the crucial distinction between a non-authority’s inability to make direct use of these 
methods, and his ability to evaluate them on a variety of grounds nonetheless. Surely, I can 
recognise that it would be epistemically good, in a general sense, to follow a certain method even 
though I do not have the means to practice it myself, or to evaluate its application in particular 
instances. I think this still holds even for methods that I cannot even make sense of or 
comprehend in clear terms: it suffices that I can recognise that there is a method in place and 
that it has a good track record, for instance, or that it benefits the epistemic practice in a more 
indirect fashion.  Nor do I think it necessary that a non-authority has to be able to reflectively 
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evaluate all the various methods and rules that practitioners of a certain epistemic practice adopt. 
I can endorse key, constitutive elements of a certain practice, while remaining unable to do much 
cognitive work in evaluating others due to their being difficult to understand, opaque, etc., but 
perhaps seeing that they work in tandem with those that I do.  
 Furthermore, as mentioned above, I do not think that the kind of reflective endorsement I 
have in mind here has to be the kind that solely takes into accounts epistemic considerations. 
Sometimes we endorse an epistemic practice, and follow through with it, because we consider the 
practice, in a given situation, as being our best bet when trying to solve a practical problem, or 
reach a practical end. Much as with any attribution of epistemic responsibility, here pragmatic 
considerations have a role to play. The practical benefits of an epistemic practice surely play 
some weight in my decision to reflectively endorse said practice. This does not mean that one can 
simply endorse any position solely on non-epistemic grounds and be considered epistemically 
autonomous in the relevant sense. If I find myself in a position in which pragmatic grounds force 
me to follow an epistemic course of action that I reflectively realise is epistemically bad, then I 
think I can be considered as being epistemically heteronomous in relation to that course of 
action. Here I am ‘a victim of circumstance’, as Elgin put it.188 Given these pragmatic 
considerations, I am not epistemically responsible either, given that I am not an appropriate 
target of blame for adopting such epistemically bad courses of action.  
 It may be wondered why I have suggested that the minimal condition for epistemic 
autonomy in one’s relationship with an epistemic authority is a reflective endorsement of the 
practice, rather than the individual that is identified as the authority. The reason for this is that I 
think it is precisely the practice that we defer to, not the individual: the individual only has power 
to be authority given that he or she is a practitioner of this epistemic practice that we find value 
                                                        
188 Elgin, ‘Epistemic Agency’, 141. 
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in. We defer to the authority qua practitioner, as an instantiation of that practice in action, and as 
an agency that is in some sense constitutive of that practice (at least in a social sense). Elgin notes 
just this: deference is not ‘primarily to a person: the expert is taken to embody the epistemic 
commitments of his area of expertise’,189 and it is these commitments that I endorse and defer 
to.190  
 By endorsing a certain epistemic practice, an agent opens herself up to certain criticisms. 
She could be asked, for example, why she thinks that such a practice is worth deferring to. If I am 
asked why I defer to the practice of astrology in adopting certain doxastic attitudes towards 
propositions describing future states of affairs relevant to my life, for instance, and I cannot 
provide any reflectively good reasons for thinking that the methods that constitute that practice 
are good ones (for whatever ends I have)—assuming that I have in no way been withheld the 
opportunity to reflect on the matter—I am surely an appropriate target of criticism. This would 
seem to be especially clear in the case that my critic asks us to compare my chosen epistemic 
practice with one that she, my critic, can provide good reasons for deferring to.  
 
III.3.B. ENDORSEMENT AS CONSTITUTING THE AUTHORITATIVE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
 Our epistemic responsibility vis-à-vis epistemic authority does not end there, however. Not 
only does our reflective endorsement of a given epistemic practice, i.e. our autonomous deference 
to the practice, make us epistemically responsible in the sense that we can be the appropriate 
target of criticism if we have bad reasons for endorsing the relevant methods that constitute that 
                                                        
189 Ibid., 148.  
190 It should be noted, however, that Elgin and I disagree on whether or not we can reflectively endorse these 
commitments themselves. I have already stated that I think it is so. Elgin, however, assumes that given that the 
practice depends on certain ‘fine-grained commitments that we are not privy to and would not understand even if 
we were’, we cannot endorse them. Instead we have to place trust in the relevant epistemic authority that they 
themselves endorse good epistemic commitments. 
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practice—such endorsement is also fundamentally central to, at least on my account of epistemic 
authority, the establishing of the relevant relationship between epistemic authority and non-
authority in the first place.  
 Recall my account of epistemic authority:  
Epistemic Authority: An agent S is an epistemic authority relative to another 
agent S* iff: 
1. S has the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to successfully partake in 
a certain kind of epistemic practice, EP, relevant to some domain of 
inquiry d. 
2. S has sufficient access to the evidence and resources required for her to 
properly partake in the EP relevant to d. 
3. S* does not have the skills, abilities, and know-how required to partake in 
the EP relevant to d, or at least has them to a (significantly) lesser extent 
than S.  
4. S* recognises that d and the relevant EP is epistemically valuable for S*, 
i.e. it pertains to questions that would be epistemically valuable to have 
answers to. 
5. S* recognises S as having a sufficient level of the requisite skills, abilities, 
and know-how to successfully partake in EP. 
6. (From 4 and 5:) S* recognises that S is, by virtue of her ability to partake in 
the relevant EP, a potential source of some kind of epistemic good that 
S* would be better off in having.  
7. S has the power to give S* a preemptive reason to behave in a certain 
epistemic fashion, perhaps by providing higher-order reasons and 
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beliefs about methodological issues relevant to the kind of EP that is 
pertinent to d, or alternatively by commanding S* to behave in a 
certain sort of epistemic fashion. In short, S is able to authoritatively 
tell S* how she, S*, should epistemically behave in order to partake in 
the EP relevant to d. 
Though it is not the sole condition, on such an account, the act of recognising the epistemic 
practice as beneficial, and of recognising the identified authority as a sufficiently talented 
practitioner of that practice, is precisely what gives the authority her authoritative standing. It is 
precisely for this reason that a non-authority cannot simply shirk responsibility when things go 
wrong. 
 It may be tempting to think that, given that the authority in such a social-epistemic 
relationship has the means to deceive and misguide the non-authority, and that the non-authority 
does not have the means to directly and reflectively evaluate certain parts of the relevant 
epistemic practice, that the non-authority cannot be responsible for the end results: she is 
completely at the mercy of the authority. But this is clearly wrong: it makes perfect sense that we 
could ask such an agent ‘Why did you treat her as an authority in the first place, then?’. On my 
account, this criticism is provided with the appropriate force: my identifying someone as an 
authority (by meeting a variety of conditions) is a necessary part of their attaining the position of 
epistemic authority in the first place. The strength of this criticism will of course vary, depending 
on the reasons that a non-authority has for both identifying the epistemic practice as a good one, 
and for identifying the authority as a sufficiently skilled practitioner of said practice. But the point 
remains: she is clearly responsible to some degree, partly because she was epistemically 
autonomous, in the sense that I have outlined here, in bringing it about that the authority was 
treated as such, and had the relevant normative power over her, the non-authority. As Elgin puts 
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it, an epistemic agent ‘confers epistemic authority on those that she counts as experts’, and thus 
remains responsible for doing so—furthermore, she always ‘retains the power to revoke’ the 
conferral of authority. The non-authority remains epistemically autonomous and epistemically 
responsible precisely because of the fact that she has the power to establish and revoke such 
relationships, and this power comes prior to the authority’s power to determine the non-
authority’s epistemic behaviour in relation to the epistemic practice in question.  
 Discussing testimony more broadly, Jesús Vega Encabo suggests something similar when 
he argues that the hearer in the testimonial relationship is responsible, and deserving of merit (in 
a successful case of testimony) given that the hearer plays a role in constituting that relationship, 
by recognising his own epistemic position in the exchange.191  
Both the speaker and hearer declare, at least in an implicit way, the standings they 
occupy in the epistemic space. And both of them contribute to generate a 
situation under which they are obliged to acknowledge certain epistemological 
requirements [ . . . As such,] success is due to the exercise of relevant epistemic 
competences of both participants. And merit attribution depends on how each 
participant puts into play his own epistemic agency.192 
 
When it comes to my account of epistemic authority, things are somewhat different, given that it 
is not necessarily the case that the authority will recognise the contours of the social-epistemic 
relationship.193 It may be the case the authority does not contribute to the epistemic situation in 
the way that Vega Encabo suggests happens in the case of basic testimony. However, Vega 
Encabo’s views about the hearer’s role are what interest me here, and I think they echo my own 
                                                        
191 For empirical research on how human beings, qua listeners, can be considered as active, and vigilant participants 
in testimonial exchanges, see Dan Sperber, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, 
Gloria Origgi, and Deirde Wilson. ‘Epistemic Vigilance’. Mind and Language 25:4 (2010). 359-393. 
192 Vega Encabo, ‘Epistemic Merit’, 52. 
193 For instance, as mentioned in Chapter II, my account makes it possible that I treat someone as an epistemic 
authority even though they have no idea who I am. Perhaps I treat the author of a book as epistemically 
authoritative, and allow their expressed views in said book to determine my own epistemic behaviour. Such an 
author would have little reason to recognise me, in particular, as being part of the social-epistemic relationship. (One 
could argue that in writing the book, the authority would have accepted and recognised the possibility of being 
placed in such a position, and thus could be considered as adopting it—however, we can avoid this by simply 
stipulating instead that the book was never intended for publication or circulation.) 
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thoughts. It is the non-authority’s adopting a position of self-aware and reflectively endorsed 
epistemic inferiority, and of attributing authority to another, that plays a fundamentally 
important contribution to the establishment of the authoritative relationship. I agree with Vega 
Encabo in his claim that the non-authority (or ‘hearer’) deserves credit for such an act—this is 
just to say that he is epistemically autonomous and responsible in the situation. In being a 
necessary part of establishing the epistemic authority to non-authority relationship, my 
reflectively endorsing the epistemic practice, and identifying the authority as a practitioner of that 
practice, makes me epistemically responsible for the fact that I am in a position of deferring to 
such authority, and under their normative, epistemic guidance.  
 
III.4. COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS, AND THE VARYING DEGREES OF EPISTEMIC 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
 Much of what I have argued for above has already been said by others, as we have seen, 
in one way or another. What I would like to do now, however, is suggest that in the context of 
the expert-to-layman relationship, or more specifically in the case of an epistemically 
authoritative relationship (as identified by my account), there are further complexities pertaining 
to questions of epistemic autonomy and responsibility that have not been properly addressed in 
the literature.  
 The basic point is this: in the relationship between an epistemic authority and a non-
authority, there can be varying degrees of possibility for epistemic involvement, on the non-
authority’s part, in the relevant epistemic practice. This is a simple consequence of what I argued 
for in Chapter II: that the relationship between epistemic authorities and non-authorities can 
take on a variety of different forms, depending on the epistemic practice in questions, and the 
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relationship the non-authority has with that practice on various epistemic dimensions, including 
consideration of the kind of epistemic good that the non-authority is seeking in establishing said 
relationship.  
Some of the relevant differences to keep in mind, are the following, which I will refer to as 
Possibly Significant Differences: 
i. The kinds of epistemic goods that the non-authority seeks in identifying the 
authority as a source of such goods can vary, and can be quite different in 
kind/complexity.  
ii. The disparity between authority and the non-authority’s level of skill, ability, 
and know-how required to partake in the relevant epistemic practice, can 
range from wide to narrow.  
iii. The kinds of evidence that a non-authority has access to may be more or less 
accessible for the authority.  
iv. The kinds of evidence that a non-authority has access to may be more or less 
relevant to the epistemic practice in question. 
v. The nature of the questions that the epistemic practice aims to answer may be 
more or less objective, in the sense that some answers to such questions may 
be more or less dependent on the subjective perspective of the non-authority 
who seeks the answers.  
vi. The nature of the questions that the epistemic practice aims to answer may 
have more or less practical import, meaning that the non-authority may have 
more or less to practically risk in accepting the outputs of said practice.  
There are likely a wide range of other factors that can play a significant role in altering the 
contours of the social-epistemic relationship, and, in turn, the epistemic role and responsibilities 
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of both parties involved. Points (i) - (vi), however, should sufficiently illustrate the kinds of 
differences that I have in mind. These differences suggest that there are varying degrees of 
possible involvement a non-authority can have in the relevant practice.  
 In many cases, none of these possible differences will play a significant role in altering the 
non-authority’s epistemic responsibilities beyond that of merely deferring to the authority.194 For 
instance, if I were to identify Peter Higgs as my epistemic authority in the domain of physics (or 
at least in some sufficiently narrow sub-domain pertaining to questions regarding the nature of 
sub-atomic particles), it is fairly plausible to assume the following application of Possibly 
Significant Differences holds. 
 The Epistemic Authority of Peter Higgs (EAPH):   
i. I am merely seeking true beliefs pertaining to the nature of sub-atomic 
particles, given that I doubt that I could reach any higher epistemic position in 
the domain in question (i.e. I don’t think I could understand the relevant 
physics, specifically given the differences stated below).  
ii. The disparity between my level of skill, ability, and know-how relevant to 
partaking in the epistemic practice in question, and his, is significantly wide.  
iii. The kinds of evidence I have access to about sub-atomic particles and physics 
more broadly is the kind of evidence that Higgs has access to as well (along 
with a broad range of evidence that I do not have access to).  
iv. The kinds of evidence that I have access to are likely completely irrelevant to 
the epistemic practice that Higgs is a skilful practitioner of.  
v. The kinds of questions that the epistemic practice in question is aimed to 
answer are independent of my subjective perspective, and the answers to these 
                                                        
194 I will return to the responsibility of the epistemic authority in the next chapter. 
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questions would reasonably be thought to be completely unaffected by my 
own subjectivity.  
vi. The answers to these questions serve very little practical import to me, at least 
in a direct sense.195  
This is the kind of cases that epistemologists typically target when they discuss expertise or 
epistemic authority. The deference in question is simple: I have no plausible epistemic role to 
play in the epistemic practice, and all I can responsibly do is simply defer to Higgs’ authority, 
where any interjection on my part would likely be irrational.  
 Note, however, that if I were to seek understanding rather than mere true belief (just as 
Jäger has suggested we often do in interacting with an epistemic authority) then things would be 
slightly different—I would, given my epistemic aims, seek some explanation from Higgs, rather 
than simply deferring to his belief. However, given (EAPH) (b) - (f) it would be very difficult to see 
how I could gain such understanding, at least beyond a merely metaphorical or highly abstract 
sense, and I would argue that it would be highly irresponsible of me to aim for such a high 
epistemic position if it were at the cost of deferring to Higgs at the level of belief, and thus losing 
access to such true beliefs. As will be discussed further below, this suggests that an awareness of 
my own cognitive limitations is crucially important in my establishing the right kind of 
relationship with an epistemic authority. 
 Now, in contrast to the Higgs case, consider the following kind of case, briefly alluded to 
above. Here I am a medical patient interacting with a medical practitioner, trying to decide the 
best course of action to take in treating a serious, possibly fatal, illness. 
 The Epistemic Authority of the Medical Practitioner (EAMP):  
                                                        
195 They of course play a significant role in the sense that other agents can use the answers to questions about 
quantum mechanics to invent technologies that significantly alter my life, for instance. However, the point here is 
that my having the answers to these questions is practically irrelevant to my life.  
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i. I am not merely seeking true beliefs pertaining to the answers to basic medical 
practice—i.e. ‘What disease do I have?’, ‘What is most likely to cure the 
disease?’, ‘What is the best course of action I can take?’, etc.—but rather 
seeking a broader, stronger epistemic foundation from which I (in 
collaboration with my doctor) can make good decisions (epistemically and 
pragmatically) about my medical future. Arguably I am looking for some 
understanding of my epistemic position, and how it relates to certain practical 
considerations.  
ii. The disparity between my level of skill, ability, and know-how relevant to 
partaking in the epistemic practice in question, and my doctor’s, is 
significantly wide.  
iii. However, the kinds of evidence I have access to about my medical situation, at 
least from at a first-personal level, are not directly accessible to my doctor. 
Though, of course, she also has access to a wide array of evidence that I do 
not (third-personal facts about my physical condition, what my reports of first-
personal experience generally indicate about a condition, etc.).  
iv. The kinds of evidence I have special access to are significantly relevant to the 
epistemic practice in question, and specifically to my goal of acquiring the 
epistemic goods that I seek.  
v. The answers I am seeking, and that the epistemic practice (at least in part) 
aims to provide, are arguably highly dependent on my subjective perspective: 
if, for example, I value a high quality of life over the longevity of my life, 
certain courses of medical action may be more preferable to me than they 
would be to someone who had the opposite preferences.  
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vi. And, of course, the answers to the questions the epistemic practice aims to 
answer are clearly of grave practical import for me. In this specific situation 
they may pertain to my continuing to live, or not.  
Here we have a case that is significantly different from the situation outlined in the Peter Higgs 
case (EAPH). The medical practitioner case suggests that there is room for my own epistemic 
involvement in the relevant epistemic practice, in order to get to the epistemic goods I seek. In 
fact, I think this case is close to the other end of the spectrum, in contrast to the Higgs situation: it 
would seem epistemically imprudent for me to not involve myself as much as possible. To be 
epistemically responsible here, I would seek out and share as much of the kinds of evidence that I 
have special access to; I would ask questions about the authority’s statements, the results and 
evidence that she shares with me, in order to better understand my own situation, both 
epistemically and practically; I would reflect on the practical import of the epistemic practice, 
and the role my own subjectivity (in the form of certain preferences) had to play in clarifying an 
answer to the question of what was best to do. This all suggests that it would not be enough that I 
had been epistemically autonomous in establishing the epistemic authority to non-authority 
relationship: more is required of me beyond this to be epistemically responsible.196  
 The nature of the epistemic practice, the kinds of questions it aims to answers, and the 
significant differences or similarities between the epistemic positions of authority and non-
authority, to name a few, all play a role in structuring the role and responsibilities that I have in 
the face of the individual that identify as my epistemic authority. In the Medical Practitioner 
case, unlike the Higgs case, we find illustrated a complicated social-epistemic relationship, the 
contours of which are not so easily captured by a discussion of pure, basic deference. In the next 
                                                        
196 It should be pointed out, however, that none of these actions suggested go against the idea that the authority has a 
preemptive power over me. Asking questions of an authority is not the same as submitting answers to an authority, 
contrary to their own answers.  
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section, I will argue that such cases present the non-authority with further epistemic 
responsibilities, above and beyond the minimal sense argued for above in III.2. This suggests 
that, in such cases, I can succeed or fail to be epistemically responsible, in a more robust sense 
above and beyond the minimal sense.  
 
 
III.5. DOING WHAT ONE CAN: EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND EPISTEMIC 
LAZINESS IN DEFERRING TO AN AUTHORITY 
 
 In the last section, I suggested that the kinds of relationships that can fall under the 
category of epistemic authority can vary on a variety of important epistemic dimensions. These 
variations on certain dimensions amount to the following: 
Varying Degrees of Involvement: In the epistemic authority to non-authority 
relationship, there are varying degrees of (possible) involvement that a non-
authority can take in the relevant epistemic practice.  
 
 I have suggested that in cases in which there is more opportunity for a non-authority to 
be involved, he has an epistemic responsibility to do so, all things being equal. In this section, I 
will explain, and expand on this point by arguing for the following:  
Epistemic Laziness: It is epistemically lazy to completely defer a certain epistemic 
practice to an epistemic authority when there is a possible level of significant 
involvement that the non-authority can take in that practice.  
 
I will then show that being epistemically lazy in this sense is detrimental to one’s epistemic 
autonomy. From this, it will be argued that it is epistemically irresponsible to be epistemically 
lazy in this fashion.  
 In III.1. and III.2. I articulated a minimal sense of epistemic autonomy, and 
responsibility, that I think one maintains when establishing a relationship with an epistemic 
authority. This sense of autonomy and responsibility was intended to illuminate how I, as a non-
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authority, can behave epistemically appropriately in such deference to authority. This suggests 
that in satisfying the conditions of such autonomy and responsibility, I can be attributed merit for 
the success of the social-epistemic exchange, given that I have manifested my epistemic 
autonomy in that exchange, reflectively endorsing the relevant epistemic practice, and in 
establishing the epistemically authoritative relationship in the first place, through such reflective 
endorsement. This might suggest that, given that one has met the conditions for minimal 
epistemic autonomy and responsibility, one can simply ‘sit back’ and rake in the fruits of the 
epistemic authority’s epistemic labours. Accounts such as Zagzebski’s, for instance, seem to 
suggest just this: so long as I think deferring to an epistemic authority will provide me with better 
access to true beliefs, or beliefs that will survive my future self-conscious critical reflection, I 
should simply defer.197 But, this is too simple a picture: Jäger is more on point when he suggests 
that we seek much more, i.e. understanding, from our authorities, and that seeking such 
understanding would require more epistemic labour on our part, even if this merely involved our 
asking more clarificatory questions of the authority, seeking deeper explanatory understanding. 
Once again, I am in favour of Jäger’s view. The various dimensions that I have identified, upon 
which we can measure the varying degrees of a non-authority’s possible involvement in an 
epistemic practice, are intended to clarify just how this is so.  
 It would be facile to think that, given that the epistemically authoritative relationship is a 
direct consequence of the non-authority’s cognitive limitations, and, more broadly, the fact of our 
limitations as human beings more generally, it is sufficiently responsible for us to accept our 
                                                        
197 I think Zagzebski would balk at this characterisation of her view: as we saw in Chapter I, some of her replies to 
Jäger’s and Dormandy’s criticisms suggested that a non-authority can simply choose (on good grounds) when and 
where to defer to an authority. As I noted in Chapter I, however, I do not think that this response tracks the kind of 
account that she is attempting to formulate. If the kind of Preemption she is endorsing is to be taken seriously, I don’t 
think a non-authority can simply pick and choose when it comes into effect. That being said, I do not wish to 
unfairly characterise Zagzebski’s view: what I refer to here is merely one formulation of a view in her vicinity, and 
my point in mentioning it is not to criticise her directly, but to illustrate my own account.  
 
 
158 
limitations and allow others to do the work for us when necessary. Certainly, I agree with this in 
the abstract—this is what responsible division of cognitive labour amounts to. In the Peter Higgs 
case discussed above, this is precisely what I would do if I were being epistemically responsible. 
However, as already shown, this is not how things always are.  
 Let us return to the case of the Medical Practitioner4. Here, I think it fairly easy to accept 
that a patient, qua non-authority, who did not take certain steps to involve themselves in the 
epistemic practice would be the appropriate target of certain epistemic criticisms. If the patient 
were told to take a certain course of medicine, or to submit to a certain medical procedure, and 
he failed to ask certain questions, it would be perfectly reasonable to think that he had failed to 
fulfil certain epistemic responsibilities. Such questions could be of the following kind: ‘Why is this 
medicine the best option for me?’, ‘What are the other options?’, ‘Will this medicine have side-
effects that I should know about?’, ‘Will it improve my quality of life?’. Some of these questions 
could only be answered with further involvement on the patient’s part, by reference to: his 
preferences in regard to which side-effects he would consider worth the cost, or not; his own ideas 
of what makes for a good quality of life, and what makes for a bad quality of life; and so forth.  
 As another example, consider the case in which a doctor tells you that you are suffering 
from some medical condition x, based on a series of complicated medical tests which you are in 
no position to directly evaluate. The condition x is such a condition that is known to cause 
distress in a certain part of one’s body. You, however, feel no such distress in that part of your 
body. It seems to me that you would be doing something epistemically wrong if you were not to 
mention this fact to your doctor—not because you should think yourself as having a defeater for 
the doctor’s claim, but rather because, in the context of the relevant epistemic practice, you have 
access to a kind of evidence that is both relevant to the practice, and that the doctor does not 
have the same access to. It may turn out that your specific evidence in this case is not in fact 
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relevant, or at least not substantial enough to change the authority’s judgement—nevertheless, 
you are still responsible for proffering it for evaluation. It would seem to me that, in establishing 
the relevant authoritative relationship through reflective endorsement of the relevant epistemic 
practice, one is then responsible for continuing to reflect on the possible involvement one may 
have with the epistemic processes, and playing one’s part in such processes when appropriate. 
One way to say this is in the following way: my reflectively endorsing the epistemic practice 
involves my committing to behave in such a way as to maximise the success of such practice, 
especially given that the practice is one that you seek to benefit from, in the form of receiving 
certain epistemic goods. The collection and presentation of evidence that one has special access 
to is certainly an important part of playing one’s part. Given the nature of the authoritative 
relationship, it will be up to the authority to attribute that evidence with the correct level of 
relevance, and to integrate that into any following epistemic calculation or decision-making 
process.198 Unless the authority has already told one that such evidence is irrelevant, I see no way to escape 
the fact that one is responsible for playing one’s evidence-collecting role in such an exchange.  
 There are of course many factors that can make it reasonable for a non-authority to shirk 
some of these responsibilities. There may be pragmatic limitations: in the medical context, it is 
often the case that decisions have to simply be made quickly, and not all of the relevant evidence 
can be collected or accounted for. Perhaps more importantly, there is the issue of the non-
authority’s awareness of both his own cognitive abilities and limitations vis-à-vis the epistemic 
authority and practice, but also the methodology and ‘rules of the game’ of the epistemic practice 
with which he is attempting to gain access to. Just because he has reflectively endorsed that 
practice, it does not follow (in fact, given the nature of the authoritative relationship, it will most 
likely not follow) that he is aware of all the ways in which he could involve himself in the practice. 
                                                        
198 This is, roughly, what is behind the Preemption condition of my own account of epistemic authority 
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However, it seems to me that such ignorance cannot justify one’s failure to involve oneself when 
possible.  
 Let me explain: ignorance of one’s ability to be in any way involved with an epistemic 
practice cannot reasonably be equated with a firm belief that one is not able to be involved. These 
are two completely different things. Ignorance in this case is tantamount to not knowing either 
way. To conclude that my evidence is not relevant, or that I have no epistemic role to play in the 
epistemically authoritative exchange, would in fact be anathema to my identifying someone as 
my epistemic authority: it would be to suggests that I know better than they do as to whether or not I have 
a role to play. To conclude as such would be to go against the autonomous decision one has made 
to treat someone as an authority in the first place. On the face of it, the assumption that one 
makes when one says that ‘I have no role to play here’ may seem like a humble one—however, in 
the context of the epistemic-authority to non-authority relationship, it is actually the opposite: it 
suggests an arrogance that goes against the very epistemic grounds of that relationship. 
 This suggests the following: the default position in such relationships ought to be one in 
which one attempts to involve oneself, and withholds judgements as to what is or is not relevant 
to the practice. This means that the default position as a non-authority, reflectively aware of his 
epistemic position in the context of the relationship, is actually one of epistemic effort—it is not 
an epistemically lazy one. To refuse to involve oneself in the practice is to make an ungrounded 
assumption about one’s epistemic situation, an assumption one makes to justify one’s not doing 
further epistemic work beyond the establishment of the relationship, and telling oneself that this 
labour is for another to do. This is to be epistemically lazy.  
 I take it that such laziness is opposed to what it is to be a good epistemic agent more 
generally—it is an epistemic vice. In the specific case of epistemic authority, however, I think it is 
especially an issue because it undermines our epistemic autonomy severely, both in that it 
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undermines the minimal sense of autonomy, discussed above, but also because it hinders our 
ability to be epistemically autonomous in a more robust sense beyond that.  
 How does such laziness undermine the minimal sense of epistemic autonomy outlined 
above? It does so simply because a non-authority acting epistemically lazy in such a fashion 
behaves in a way that is incongruent with what they reflectively endorsed in establishing the 
epistemically authoritative relationship. Recall that to recognise someone as an epistemic 
authority is to recognise them as a more skilful practitioner of a certain epistemic practice, an 
epistemic practice which one reflectively endorses. Moreover, it is the case one only establishes the 
authoritative relationship on the grounds that one wishes to partake in the epistemic practice, 
even if such participants is in the minimal sense of acquiring access to its epistemic outputs. Part 
of establishing this relationships is taking the authority as having authoritative sway over 
questions of how one should behave in relation to the epistemic practice in order to partake in it 
(on my view such authority actually has the preemptive power to command us how to act, relative 
to the practice). As already noted, it seems to me that one can only justify one’s epistemic laziness 
on the grounds that one is not able to be epistemically involved in the practice in the sense 
outlined in III.4.  But to assume that this is the case on grounds other than that the authority tells 
you so is to think of oneself as having the authority to make such judgements, completely 
contrary to one’s identifying the epistemic authority as having such authority. To behave 
epistemically lazy in the way that I have identified, then, is to behave in a way that is contrary to 
what one reflectively endorses—it is to behave in a way that is not in tune with one’s autonomous 
self. At base, it is to be inconsistent, and to hold incoherent epistemic attitudes.  
 Above and beyond this, however, such epistemically lazy behaviour undermines our 
ability to be epistemically autonomous in a far richer and more robust sense than the minimal 
sense outlined in III.3. It seems to me that engaging in a relationship with an epistemic authority, 
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i.e. establishing such a relationship, is a means to improve one’s epistemic position. Part of the 
value in this epistemic endeavour comes in the fact that such relationships can provide us with 
the opportunity to be ‘more’ epistemically autonomous in that we can be more self-aware and 
conscientious of our own position in the epistemic space we find ourselves in. Being aware of my 
own cognitive abilities and limitations, I can better position myself to reflectively evaluate and 
endorse certain epistemic behaviours: of my own, and of others. Self-awareness provides me with 
the opportunity to generate new, and modify my current, higher-order epistemic attitudes, 
allowing for me to regulate myself as an epistemic agent. Being aware of the fact that I cannot 
complete certain epistemic tasks on my own is precisely the epistemic attitude that drives me to 
endorse and participate in crucial social-epistemic practices, most obviously in the case of 
testimony, and in the specific case of epistemic authority discussed here. Shirking the opportunity 
to gain a better sense of my abilities and limitations is thus antithetical to my autonomy in that it 
involves obstructing myself from being able to critically evaluate and reflectively endorse the 
epistemic activities that I participate in. 
 All this is to say that dependence on others, in particular an epistemic authority, is, rather 
than a means to limit our epistemic autonomy, in fact the opposite: it is a means to improve 
ourselves as epistemic agents, and to clarify and to enrich our own autonomy in the epistemic 
realm. Zagzebski indirectly suggests something in the vicinity when she writes:  
[B]ut our self-reflective dependence on others also means that other persons can 
often help us do what we cannot do on our own. They can help us resolve 
dissonance in many ways—by helping us form higher-order judgment about what 
ought to change, by influencing us to acquire the proper motivating emotion, by 
showing us exemplars of harmonious selves.199 
 
None of this can be done without our doing the necessary epistemic labour where necessary, and 
only the authority can provide us with good reason to think certain epistemic effort is necessary 
                                                        
199 Zagzesbki, Epistemic Authority, 236. 
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or not.  
 
 
 
III.6. EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY IS NOT ENOUGH:  EPISTEMIC HELPLESSNESS IN 
DEFERENCE 
 
 I have argued that I am epistemically autonomous, and thus epistemically responsible, at 
least in a minimal sense, when I identity another agent as an epistemic authority. This is because 
I reflectively endorse the epistemic practice of which I identify the authority as being a sufficiently 
skilled practitioner of, but also because I am primarily responsible for establishing the 
authoritative relationship in the first place—again, by my own volition, and reflective 
endorsement.  
 Above and beyond this, I have also argued that, in some cases of epistemic authority to 
non-authority relationships, the non-authority has further conditions to meet to be considered 
epistemically responsible. These are cases in which, on some dimension or another, the non-
authority can possibly be more involved in the relevant epistemic practice. I have suggested that 
when this is the case, and a non-authority unreasonable refuses to involve himself in the right 
way, he is an appropriate target of the criticism of epistemic laziness, which I have understood as 
pertaining to a diminishing of one’s epistemic autonomy, and thus weakening one’s epistemic 
position. A crucial component for identifying the possibility of such involvement, and responding 
appropriately, is one’s having the self-awareness to be aware of one’s own cognitive abilities and 
limitations. 
 These considerations are intended to provide at least the outline of an account of the non-
authority’s epistemic responsibilities in the epistemically authoritative relationship. Such 
considerations, however, only tell half of the story. It is, of course, possible for a non-authority to 
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do all that is required of them to be epistemically responsible, and yet for them to be 
epistemically worse off because of it. This is the case when the epistemic authority behaves 
epistemically inappropriately, and causes epistemic harm to the non-authority. As is no surprise, 
being epistemically responsible, and epistemically autonomous (in the sense I have outlined here), 
is no guarantee of success. The epistemically authoritative relationship can come with great 
rewards, at the cost of great risk.  
 In the next chapter I argue that, much akin to the non-authority, the epistemic authority 
has a responsibility to be aware of her own cognitive abilities and limitations, as well as the 
varying degrees of involvement that a non-authority may have in an epistemic practice. This 
suggests that a certain level of epistemic humility is required of such authority, and that a lack of 
such humility can cause great epistemic harm.  
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IV. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY: TOWARDS VIRTUOUS EPISTEMIC 
AUTHORITY 
 
The Significance of our Epistemic Limits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As epistemic agents who identify and interact with epistemic authorities on a regular 
basis, there is much that we can do to ensure that we do so in a responsible fashion. On my 
account, roughly, a non-authority is epistemically responsible so long as he, on good grounds, 
reflectively endorses the epistemic principles that regulate the domain of inquiry of which the 
relevant authority is an authority of, identifies an epistemic authority as such on good evidence, 
and so long as he does not fail to engage with the relevant epistemic inquiry where epistemically 
and pragmatically reasonable for him to do so (see Chapter III). Unsurprisingly, however, it is 
clear that even the most responsible of non-authorities in such authoritative relationships run the 
risk of being led far astray if the epistemic authority herself does not behave in an appropriate 
fashion. This is even true for those of us with the practical means to invest much time and energy 
into the relevant kind of epistemic safe-guarding. To some, this might suggest that reliance on, or 
deference to, such authority is inherently epistemically dangerous and irresponsible. Such a 
response, however, fails to account for the epistemic limitations of our real-life situation: we rely 
on such authorities for much of our epistemic standing, for a wide range of our beliefs, as sources 
of justification for those beliefs, and so forth. To suggest that we should not rely on such 
authorities, due to the risk that such reliance engenders, is to suggest that we cannot have the 
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kinds of epistemic goods that we generally take ourselves to possess. In such a direction lies 
scepticism: a kind that, although not as radical as external world scepticism, nevertheless severely 
undermines and limits our position as epistemic agents with any basic grasp of the world around 
us. 
 What is to be done, then, about our situation? I suggest that we have to simply accept this 
fact about our epistemic situation—a contingent one, yes, but practically inescapable. This 
means that we ought to refuse the illusory comfort of hiding behind epistemic individualism. We 
can certainly, however, take steps to ensure that we are better equipped to identify when another 
epistemic agent is or is not worthy of being considered as an epistemic authority. Some have 
suggested methods for such discernment, at least when considering expertise if not epistemic 
authority per se.200 Such methods, however, focus on an individualistic dimension: they pertain 
to what we can, as individual epistemic agents situated in the world at large, do to protect 
ourselves and our own epistemic interests. Here I would like to instead focus on the epistemic 
authority herself, and the characteristics that such authorities should have in order to make the 
relationship between non-authority and authority as successful as it can be—which is partly to 
say what one agent can do to improve the epistemic lives of others. Here, then, is the place to 
discuss the kinds of virtues than an epistemic authority of a certain calibre ought to have. My 
suggestion will be that such authorities ought to be epistemically humble, where such humility is 
constituted by an awareness of one’s own cognitive limitations, specifically in relation to the 
cognitive abilities of other agents that one engages with, but also in relation to the broader 
epistemic practice that provides crucial content for both the authority and non-authority’s 
epistemic positions—the practice that one is immediately engaged with when conducting inquiry, 
                                                        
200 See, for instance: Goldman, ‘Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?’, and David Matheson, ‘Conflicting 
Experts and Dialectical Performance: Adjudication Heuristics for the Layperson’, Argumentation 19 (2005), 145-158.  
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or any other relevant epistemic task.   
 In discussing such virtue, I aim to contribute to a fuller account of the kinds of 
characteristics that make engagement with an epistemic authority an epistemically fruitful 
practice. There are two reasons for doing this: first, such an account will take us one step closer to 
being able to more richly articulate a set of principles that we can all use to better discern when 
(and when not) to identify someone as an epistemic authority, and thusly treat them as such; 
secondly, such an account of virtuous epistemic authority can also provide those that are treated 
as epistemic authorities with the guidance required for them to be the kinds of epistemic 
authorities that our epistemic situation require. Of course, there would be nothing new in making 
the claim that our epistemic success, as individuals and as a species, rests on the epistemic actions 
of multiple parties engaged in our community’s epistemic practices—however, I hope to at least 
add to the broader social-epistemic project by providing further detail to one fundamental 
component of a successful social-epistemic structure. I think my account, in application, can 
provide a fruitful basis from which to better structure certain relationships of epistemic authority 
as well as a means to organise the very institutions that give birth to such relationships, and the 
particular interactions between non-authorities and authorities.  
 Michel Croce (see II.4) has suggested that a virtue-theoretic approach to accounting for 
epistemic authority can make better sense of the phenomena. Though I disagree with his claim 
that certain virtues are necessary for one to satisfy the conditions of being an epistemic authority per 
se, my thought is that the account I provide here closely matches Croce’s own views on how the 
presence of certain virtues can make an authority a more appropriate source of certain epistemic 
goods, and that there is, beyond this, room to theorise about a most excellent, virtuous type of 
epistemic authority (such as what Croce refers to as a Supreme Epistemic Authority, who, for one, 
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possess the virtue of being wise).201 This chapter is partly intended to take us one step closer to 
understanding what such an authority would look like.  
 In IV.1, I briefly discuss the role of epistemic humility on the part of the non-authority, to 
suggest that the virtue has an important role to play in all relevant parties. The choice to defer to 
an epistemic authority certainly requires an element of humility, and lack of intellectual 
arrogance. Given that, on my account, it is a condition on my establishing a relationship with an 
epistemic authority that I recognise her as having a superior level of skill, ability, or know-how, 
relevant to the epistemic practice at hand, it requires little argument to show that the possibility 
of my ever benefiting from such relationships requires that I am, minimally, humble enough to 
recognise such a fact about other agents. However, given my goals in discussing humility here, 
which are more squarely pointed towards the epistemic authority herself, my discussion on this 
topic is rather brief. In IV.2 I survey various accounts of epistemic humility, and defend the need 
to endorse an inter-personal account of such humility, as has been suggested by Maura Priest,202 
who’s account I use as a basis for articulating the kind of virtue that I suggest an epistemic 
authority ought to have. Though it is not my primary goal, I hope my discussion in this chapter 
can lend further credence to, if not Priest’s view specifically, some version of an inter-personal 
account of such humility. In IV.3 I articulate how such humility can be epistemically beneficial in 
one or more of the following ways: i) it is sometimes required to ensure that a non-authority can 
acquire the epistemic goods he seeks in identifying an epistemic authority, ii) in cases in which 
certain evidence or reasons that an epistemic non-authority has is relevant, such humility is 
sometimes required to ensure that the relevant epistemic practice is fruitful, and iii) it is required 
to safeguard the non-authority’s epistemic autonomy. In IV.4 I finish by drawing lessons from 
                                                        
201 Croce, ‘Expert-Oriented Abilities’, 21. 
202 Maura Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Account’, Ergo 4:16 (2017). 
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my observation on epistemic humility and authority, and suggest further avenues of research, in 
the hope that we can move further towards articulating a full account of virtuous epistemic 
authority.  
 
IV.1. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY IN DEFERENCE 
 
 At first glance, one may wonder why I am discussing the humility of epistemic authorities, 
when the humility of any non-authority may be intuitively thought to be a more apt a target for 
evaluation. Many of us, I’m sure, have observed how a certain lack of humility can manifest itself 
as a hinderance towards the kinds of epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationships that I 
have discussed here. We all know of arrogant individuals who refuse to accept the testimony of 
those who know better—those who can overwhelm the strength of any evidence proffered to 
them by the appropriate experts with their own overly-confident evaluations and reasoning. 
These individuals tend to be epistemic individualists par excellence, and refuse to believe that others 
may have better reasons for belief, better access to the relevant evidence, better suited to 
understand the intricacies of some domain of inquiry, or be epistemically better off in any sense 
at all. Their arrogance in the face of any sort of cognitive expertise, many of us would think, 
speaks of a severe lack of the kind of epistemic humility we may think is required of us in being 
good epistemic agents. We hear of such individuals frequently. We perhaps find them in the 
ranks of climate change deniers, refusing to accept the alleged authority of both the majority of 
climate scientists themselves, but also supposed ‘meta-experts’, i.e. those who explain the 
workings of the scientific process itself, why its results should be trusted, and the value of scientific 
expert testimony. We find them debating against the truth of evolutionary theories, providing 
their own conclusions drawn from the physical evidence at hand, but also providing their own 
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interpretation of various higher-order issues: such as the meaning of scientific notions—e.g. what 
a ‘theory’ is—and the evidential merit of certain scientific processes and methods. We may find 
them in political and economic debates, placing more weight on their (likely morally driven) 
intuitions rather than the conclusions of careful analysis and evidentially-based research.  
 Such cases, however, by my own account, are not instances of a relationship holding 
between epistemic authorities and non-authorities at all. In such cases, the layman either 
considers himself the epistemic peer of the supposed authority, or perhaps even refuses to 
recognise the relevant domain of inquiry, or epistemic practice, as a legitimate enterprise. Such 
an individual does not even take the steps necessary to constitute the non-authority-to-authority 
relationship. Such individuals may be particularly arrogant in their decision to trust their own 
judgement more generally, rather than those of a broad epistemic community—choosing to trust 
their own reasons and the limited evidence that they have access to, over the broader swathe of 
community-sourced evidence, peer-reviewed analyses, and conclusions that a more humble 
approach would provide. They take their own epistemic methods to be superior to many, if not 
all, alternatives presented to them. Such arrogance clearly hinders the possibility of there ever 
being an epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship in the first place. It would seem that a 
condition on being able to benefit from relations with such authority is that I am sufficiently 
intellectually humble enough to recognise the limitations of my own cognitive abilities, access to 
evidence, background knowledge, etc.  
 To elaborate, let us see how a lack of epistemic humility on the part of a purported non-
authority could hinder the functioning of any relationship with an epistemic authority. As I see it, 
there are three possible ways in which an individual S could, in the face of some potential 
epistemic authority S*, fail to act in accordance with the role of non-authority that they 
(supposedly) should adopt, due to a lack of epistemic humility:  
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i. S may refuse to recognise the relevant epistemic practice (EP) as a good 
epistemic practice, but nevertheless recognise that S* has (relative to S) more 
of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in it. 
ii. S may recognise EP as a good epistemic practice, but may refuse to recognise 
S* as having (relative to S) more of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how 
to partake in it.  
iii. S may recognise both that EP is a good epistemic practice, and that S* has 
(relative to S) more of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in 
it, and yet refuse S*’s epistemic conclusions.  
By my account, neither (i) nor (ii) count as cases in which S and S* have established the relevant 
kind of relationship in which S* is an epistemic authority. In these cases, S simply does not 
recognise as S* as an epistemic authority. Notice also that the descriptions in (i) and (ii) are 
completely compatible with the idea that S has behaved epistemically appropriately: many 
epistemic practices are bad ones, and there are many individuals that do not have the requisite 
skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in various epistemic practices, good or bad.  
 Nevertheless, we are here concerned with epistemic humility, or the lack thereof. What I 
have in mind specifically here are cases in which (i) or (ii) obtain due to S’s epistemic arrogance. From 
the outside, so to speak, we would criticise S for not recognising the EP a good one, or for refusing 
to think that S* is better suited for engaging with it. These are the kinds of cases already discussed 
above: cases in which S arrogantly assumes that well-established epistemic practices, that have a 
vast amount of evidence in their favour, are not valuable, or at least less valuable than S’s own 
practices and methods; or, cases in which S, though believing the relevant epistemic practice as a 
good one, nevertheless arrogantly assumes that he is better-equipped to make use of it than S* 
(who, as a matter of fact is actually better-equipped). These may be cases in which the individual 
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in question endorses a strong kind of epistemic individualism, or are ‘epistemic egotists’, to use 
Richard Foley’s term.203 Such individuals may be an apt target for the charge of intellectual 
arrogance, and may be prescribed a dose of intellectual humility. Alternatively, we may simply 
think these individuals are basically irrational, for not properly endorsing either the relevant 
practice, or the relevant individual qua epistemic authority, based on the evidence that they have 
access to. Perhaps they ignore the plethora of evidence in support of evolutionary biology, for 
instance.  
 Cases that fall under (i) and (ii) suggest two things to me:  
a) That a degree of humility is required for us to be able to engage with 
experts/epistemic authorities qua experts/epistemic authorities in the 
first place. 
b) That we ought to be epistemically humble, and aware of our own 
epistemic standing relative to the epistemic standing of other agents in 
our societies.  
I assume (a) is quite uncontroversial. I think that (b) clearly follows for anyone who thinks 
that epistemically engaging with an epistemic authority, or anyone for that matter, and deferring 
to such agents, is a good thing, all things considered. Really, the claim here is that we ought to 
simply be humble enough to accept that we are better off under certain structures of the division 
of cognitive labour. I don’t think it necessary to exert too much effort defending such a claim 
here. 
 The more interesting cases, when considered in relation to epistemic authority, may be 
the kind identified in (iii), above. These are cases in which the epistemic-authority-to-non-
authority relationship is established, and yet the non-authority involved acts arrogantly in the 
                                                        
203  Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself, 87. 
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face of authoritative utterances. It is somewhat difficult to imagine what such a case would really 
look like, however, without immediately painting the imagine non-authority as plainly irrational 
from the start. But something like the following may do the trick.  
 Consider: there is an individual, let’s call him Samuel, who values the results of 
psychological research, and who recognises that others have a privileged position in conducting 
such research and in deriving the appropriate conclusions from it. Specifically, consider the 
broad body of psychological research that suggests the humans are generally flawed epistemic 
agents: we fall foul to various biases and errors of reasoning; we allow our moral intuitions to 
interfere with our ability to properly and rationally evaluate the non-moral facts of various 
situations;204 we are motivated and influenced by factors that we are often not even consciously 
aware of;205 perhaps we even present arguments to others, not as a means to reach the truth, or 
to find the best-supported view, but rather to simply be on the ‘winning’ side of any debate.206 
Our arrogant individual, Samuel, who establishes a relationship with an epistemic authority—
let’s call her Samantha—recognises her as having the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to 
participate in the domain of inquiry in question, which, again, Samuel recognises as a source of 
some epistemic good or goods.207 Nevertheless, in the case that Samantha applies these results to 
Samuel himself, by suggesting that his own reasoning falls prey to the same biases and issues, 
Samuel refuses to accept the results. If we stipulate that Samuel’s denial of the results is 
selective—i.e. he accepts many, if not most of Samantha’s conclusions, just not those pertaining 
to himself, and Samantha gives him no reason to think of himself as an exception—the case 
                                                        
204 See, for example: Joshua Knobe, ‘Person as scientist, person as moralist’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2010), 
315-365.  
205 Anyone sceptical of this claim should consider the depth of psychological research that goes in to consumer 
behaviour, from the layout of your local supermarket, to the presence of ads on the sides of your internet browser.  
206 Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, ‘Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory’, Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences 34 (2011), 57-111. 
207 See my account of epistemic authority, as provided in Chapter II. 
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presents itself at least as a plausible example.208 I think it quite accurate to call Samuel 
intellectually arrogant in this case. However, I think that there is something far worse here than 
Samuel’s lack of humility: I would argue that he is being straightforwardly irrational. Why? 
Because his selectively choosing between Samantha’s conclusions is not consistent with the fact 
that he both recognises her expertise209 in relation to the relevant epistemic practice (where such 
expertise is one that he lacks) and the value of the epistemic practice itself. To decide to disregard 
certain conclusions, but not others, would be to wilfully disregard his own beliefs about 
Samantha’s abilities and superior epistemic position in certain situations, while accepting it in 
others. If one establishes the appropriate relationship with an epistemic authority, then one 
cannot reasonably cherry-pick which conclusions to accept, and which not: part of recognising 
someone as having such authority is realising that they are better off than you in evaluating 
which claims ought to be accepted, and which not. 
 This is all to say that there is clearly a role for epistemic humility on the non-authority’s 
side of things. However, I do not think that such humility, or the opposing trait of arrogance, can 
be interestingly illuminated by discussing epistemic authority, merely beyond stating that an 
epistemic arrogance that obstructs an individual from recognising another as an authority (where 
appropriate) is an epistemic detriment to them, given that we acquire so many of our epistemic 
goods by engaging with such authorities qua authorities. Though intellectual humility is certainly 
an important component to any epistemically responsible behaviour in this regard, my 
                                                        
208 Consider the real-life example of Donald J. Trump, who, as President of the United States on more than one 
occasion publicly declared that he disagreed with various conclusions made by US intelligence agencies (such as the 
F.B.I., C.I.A., N.S.A., etc.) when such conclusions contradicted his own beliefs. When asked whether he had lost 
faith in these agencies, Trump had nothing but praise for them and their work. See: ‘Trump insists he is on the same 
page as intel chiefs after insulting them’, CNN, January 31st, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/ 
2019/01/31/politics/trump-intelligence-agencies-coats-haspel/index.html. Of course, this case is likely a far cry 
from the actual kind of case I am considering, given that I doubt that Trump himself accepts the epistemic authority 
the relevant individuals—however, the case can at least illustrate the kind of selective acceptance that one may 
identify with the kind of epistemic arrogance in question.   
209 i.e. having more of the requisite skills, abilities, and know-how to partake in the relevant epistemic practice.  
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observations here are not likely to add much to what has already been said about the issue. The 
question of epistemic humility on the side of the (supposed) non-authority is part of a much 
broader question that has to do with epistemic individualism, and the value of making use of 
social-epistemic relationships in general, rather than one specific to cases of epistemic authority. I 
leave this question for now, though it should be quite obvious to my reader where I, as a social 
epistemologist, stand.  
 That being said, consideration of the non-authority and his epistemic humility, or lack 
thereof, does suggest something of relevance for what is to follow: the kind of humility I suggest a 
non-authority is required to have, in order to benefit from a relationship with an epistemic 
authority, is one that is not solely concerned with an evaluation of one’s own epistemic 
competence. Rather, epistemic humility in this sense is outwardly directed, at least in part, in that 
it is concerned with the epistemic competence of other epistemic agents. As we will see, I, in 
agreement with a certain account of humility, think this is crucial to the notion.  
For the rest of this chapter, however, given my overall aims, I will primarily focus on the 
role intellectual humility may play in defining the behaviour of the epistemic authority, rather 
than the non-authority. Here I think far more interesting results await. 
 
IV.2. ACCOUNTS OF HUMILITY 
  
Before we can begin to discuss epistemic humility’s role in epistemic authority, it is 
necessary to articulate an account of what such a virtue would look like. It should be noted, 
however, that this chapter is not intended as a defence of any one account of such humility. I do 
think that an analysis of epistemic authority can provide us with insight into what an account 
epistemic humility ought to include, and in fact argue that such analysis provides us with reason 
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to modify the other accounts here discussed. However, my primary aim is to identify an 
intellectual virtue that I think central to making an epistemic authority a good epistemic 
authority, a virtue that should be nurtured in society at large in order to improve our collective 
epistemic position. For this purpose, I choose an account of epistemic humility that best suits the 
kind of phenomenon I have in mind—namely Maura Priest’s inter-personal account of 
intellectual humility—and both argue that consideration of the notion of epistemic authority 
provides further support for this account. 
 At first glance, I think of this virtue as entailing an awareness of one’s own intellectual or 
epistemic limitations, a recognition which leaves room open to recognise others as being able to 
fill the space beyond our own limits. As my earlier discussion probably made clear, I also think 
that this virtue stands opposite a parallel vice: epistemic arrogance, which I think of as an 
excessive confidence in one’s own cognitive abilities, but also as a involving some kind of disregard 
for the epistemic competencies of other agents. As the brief discussion in IV.1 illustrated, for 
example, the intellectually arrogant individual who refuses to recognise another as an epistemic 
authority, does so partly because they refuse to acknowledge that other agent’s particular 
epistemic skill set.  
 Given that I will ultimately endorse Priest’s interpersonal account of epistemic humility, I 
start here by categorising accounts of epistemic humility into two broad categories, following her 
terminology:  
A. Self-assessment accounts of epistemic humility 
B. Interpersonal assessment accounts of epistemic humility 
A self-assessment account of epistemic humility explains the virtue in question by identifying the 
manner in which the intellectually humble evaluate certain aspects of their own cognitive and 
intellectual lives. These views suggest that epistemic humility is a kind of ‘Personal Virtue’, which 
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Priest defines in the following way: ‘If virtue V is a personal virtue, then V can be adequately 
described while referencing the virtue holder alone’. Such virtue is contrasted to the kind 
suggested by accounts falling in (B), which speak of an ‘Interpersonal Virtue’: a virtue that can 
‘only be adequately described with reference to agents other than the virtue holder’.210  
 I suggest that we need to endorse some kind of view that falls under (B) in order to make 
sense of the role of (virtuous) epistemic authority. Roughly, this is because the humility I have in 
mind is specifically concerned with the epistemic role and position of both the epistemic authority 
and the non-authority from the perspective of the epistemic authority, as well as the authority’s 
relationship with a shared epistemic practice, or an epistemic community as a whole. If epistemic 
humility is merely a virtue concerned with one’s self-assessment, without reference to anything or 
anyone else, then it is not obviously clear how an epistemic authority’s intellectual humility can 
be of direct relevance to a non-authority.211 Those strongly wedded to a self-assessment view of 
humility may simply think this is reason to deny that the virtue I have in mind is epistemic 
humility. I think, however, that an interpersonal account of humility can both make sense of the 
phenomena I have in mind, while matching our intuitions about humility more broadly. 
Furthermore, as Priest argues, such an account seems to have the added benefit of avoiding the 
problems that affect self-assessment accounts. 
 Let us begin by taking a look at the kinds of views that fall under category (A): self-
assessment accounts of epistemic humility. Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and 
Daniel Howard-Snyder, discuss three other kinds of views that would fall under the same 
                                                        
210 Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility’, 468. 
211 Though this is no to suggest that it cannot be relevant at all. Clearly, recognising an expert as humble, in the 
‘personal virtue’ sense, may help us identify them as more epistemically conscientious and capable over all. My point 
is just that this kind of humility doesn’t necessarily say anything about the relationship such authority has to non-
authority. As I will argue, this is an important element to consider.  
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category, before presenting their own fourth alternative:212  
i. Proper belief views 
ii. Underestimation of strength views 
iii. Low concern views 
iv. Limitations-owning view (Whitcomb et al.) 
 Proper belief views suggest that to be epistemically humble is to either: a) have a ‘proper’ 
belief, where to have a proper belief is to have a belief with the ‘firmness the given belief 
merits’,213 or b) have a proper higher-order belief or attitude about one’s beliefs or other doxastic 
attitudes, and not to ‘overestimate the epistemic status of [one’s] doxastic attitudes’.214 Such 
views, I assume, are intended to capture the way in which an epistemically humble individual 
fails to hold beliefs (or higher-order attitudes about those beliefs) that go beyond what is 
reasonable. To have an improper belief in this way would be to arrogant, in the sense that one 
would hold especially strong opinions beyond what is warranted, or to have beliefs about one’s 
doxastic attitudes being of more epistemic merit, than is appropriate. Though these are certainly 
consequences of epistemic humility, I’m not sure that focusing on these elements really gets at the 
heart of what it is to be humble per se. Someone who holds ‘proper’ beliefs in this way strikes me 
as someone who simply manifests the virtue of holding beliefs in accordance with the evidence 
(including higher-order evidence).  
 More importantly, proper belief views of epistemic humility do not have much to say about 
the kind of humility I suggest that we ought to seek in our choice of epistemic authority. 
Certainly, we want our epistemic authorities to have ‘proper’ beliefs, in both of the senses 
                                                        
212 Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, ‘Intellectual Humility: Owning 
Our Limitations’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94:3 (2017), 514. 
213 Peter L. Samuelson, Ian M. Church, Matthew Jarvinen, Thomas Paulus, ‘The Science of Intellectual Humility 
White Paper’, unpublished manuscript, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.370.6006&rep 
=rep1&type=pdf.  
214 Allan Hazlett, ‘Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility’, Episteme 9:3 (2012), 220. 
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discussed above, but this, it seems to me, is simply a consequence of their being skilled and able 
to partake in the relevant epistemic practice in question. If we found out that an identified 
authority does not hold proper beliefs, we have reason to reverse the decision of identifying them 
as such. Furthermore, I am concerned here with epistemic authorities who can provide us with a 
vast array of epistemic goods, many of which are not merely true beliefs. If an authority is to 
provide me with understanding, to teach me a certain methodology, or, in some cases, 
collaborate with me in some joint epistemic project, their having ‘proper’ beliefs in no way 
guarantees that they will have the right kinds of attitudes towards my epistemic position to 
guarantee that this relationship goes smoothly. It would seem that the kind of humility we seek in 
these relationships pertains more so to the authority’s attitude towards a consideration of my 
doxastic states, my abilities, my epistemic needs and goals, etc. 
 Underestimation of strength views suggest that to epistemically humble is to have a low 
estimation of one’s own epistemic abilities.215 Julia Driver, for instance, argues that a humble 
person may be one who is disposed to underestimate her own self-worth, going so far as to suggest 
that the humble person even does this in the face of evidence to the contrary.216 My problem 
here is simple: I consider epistemic humility as a virtue, something desirable in an epistemic 
agent, a trait to be sought out by all of us in seeking the epistemic ideal; yet, the view here 
suggests something defective about the agent in question—they get things wrong when it comes to 
holding doxastic attitudes about their own epistemic status. In identifying an epistemic authority, 
I identify her as an individual epistemically superior to myself, and rely on her to properly 
conduct herself in certain inquiries, in guiding my epistemic hand, etc. This requires that I trust 
her to have an appropriate level of confidence in her own epistemic position. If she were to 
                                                        
215 Ibid., 512. 
216 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 114. 
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instead underestimate herself, this would make her less desirable in comparison to an alternative 
choice of authority: namely one who correctly evaluates her own epistemic strengths, skills, etc.217 
In this way the proper belief views of epistemic humility at least seems relatively more promising. 
 Furthermore, even if such a fault could be paired with other conditions to result in a 
favourable epistemic end,218 it seems that such underestimation is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for humility, as Whitcomb et al. have pointed out:  
First, consider someone who is consistently motivated to get epistemic goods and, 
as a result, is both aware of her intellectual limitations and disposed to respond 
appropriately to them, e.g. caring how they affect her beliefs and inquiries, 
admitting them to herself and others when appropriate, regretting them, doing 
something to change them if she can and when appropriate, etc. She strikes us as 
an exemplar of [intellectual humility] even if she also accurately estimates her 
intellectual strengths. Underestimation is not necessary. Second, imagine someone 
who is disposed to underestimate his strengths, and so on while also being clueless 
about his intellectual limitations, or being disposed to respond to them 
inappropriately, e.g. to not care about them, or to be hostile or defensive about 
criticism of them, etc. Underestimation is not sufficient.219 
  
 How about Low concern views? As summarised by Whitcomb et al., these views suggest that 
to be epistemically humble is to have an ‘unusually low concern for one’s own intellectual status 
and entitlements’.220 Here, though the relevant kind of assessment is still self-directed, we can see 
the first hints of an interpersonal element sneaking in to an account of humility. Robert C. 
Roberts and W. Jay Wood state that humility involves ‘an unusually low dispositional concern for 
the kind of self-importance that accrues to persons who are viewed by their intellectual 
                                                        
217 Perhaps some underestimation is healthy, but this is just to say that some doubt, when it comes to fallible modes of 
inquiry, is desirable.  
218 Perhaps being wrong about your own epistemic worthiness can lead you to more epistemic goods than being right 
about it. . . .  
219 Whitcomb et al., ‘Intellectual Humility’, 514-515. 
220 Whitcomb et al., ‘Intellectual Humility’, 514. Here the authors refer to the views espoused in: Robert C. Roberts 
and W. Jay Wood, ‘Humility and Epistemic Goods’, Intellectual Virtues: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology, ed. 
Linda Zagzebski and Michael DePaul (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 257-279. 
 
 
181 
communities as talented, accomplished, and skilled’.221 I think there is something right in this: 
intellectual humility ought to be understood in relation to the intellectual community that the 
individual in question is situated within. However, it is not obvious to me that such a lack of 
concern for status is sufficient for intellectual humility. As a starting point, let us consider 
Whitcomb et al.’s counter-example case of Professor P: 
[He] is an extremely talented philosopher who knows he’s extremely talented. He 
genuinely loves epistemic goods; indeed, his obsession with them drowns out any 
concern he might have otherwise had for status or entitlement. He simply doesn’t 
care about impressing others, nor does he take himself to be entitled to special 
treatment or to disrespecting others. Status entitlement aren’t even on his radar. 
While extremely talented, Professor P is not perfect. When confronted with his 
intellectual imperfections or mistakes, his default response is to try to justify, cover 
up, or explain them away. He is notoriously bad at admitting when he has made a 
mistake or when one of his argument is vulnerable to serious criticism. Professor P 
seems to be lacking in [intellectual humility] even though he is disposed to an 
unusually low concern for status and entitlement.222 
 
I think this is somewhat right: though such individuals may be rare indeed, one can imagine 
individuals who are motivated purely by the goal of acquiring various epistemic goods while 
having no interest in their own personal status, and yet continue to both show an overestimation 
of their own strengths, and underestimation of their weaknesses, while also (and I think 
importantly) showing a lack of respect for others.223 Such cases show that epistemic arrogance can be 
aimed at some other goal than mere status and personal gain—even noble goals. Furthermore, it 
would seem that such arrogance need not be goal-oriented at all: I think it not hard to imagine 
that one could simply be intellectual arrogant, cock-sure, dismissive of others, without care for 
status, epistemic ends, or any other end. That is not to say that status cannot play a central role in 
                                                        
221 Roberts and Wood, ‘Humility and Epistemic Goods’, 250. 
222 Whitcomb et al., ‘Intellectual Humility’, 515. 
223 Priest thinks that Whitcomb et al.’s counter-example is implausible, but her criticism seems to be based on an 
element of the counter-example that is not part of the final, published paper: ‘Professor P, while having no concerns 
for his intellectual status, nonetheless “constantly references his own strengths, accomplishments, and 
publications . . . seizes every opportunity to relate what others say to his own projects and theories . . . [and] is 
oblivious to his intellectual limitations’. See: Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility’, 466. 
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making sense of such arrogance, but I shall return to this point shortly.  
 Lastly, let us consider Whitcomb et al.’s own version of a self-assessment account of 
epistemic humility.  
Limitations-Owning View of Intellectual Humility: ‘[Intellectual 
Humility] consists in proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s intellectual 
limitations.224  
 
This account clearly lands close to the crude definition of intellectual humility I began with. Here 
we have an account of such humility that focuses specifically on the idea that the epistemically 
humble pay special attention to the limits of their epistemic reach. This is certainly on the right 
track to make sense of the kind of humility I have in mind: we want our epistemic authorities to 
know where their epistemic reach ends, what they can speak of assuredly, and what they cannot. 
Specifically, however, we want our authorities in many cases to be aware of the limitations of 
their own epistemic role while relatively being aware of our own. As such, this view fails to 
account for the properly interpersonal element that I think crucial.  
 Priest has also criticised the view on the following grounds: intellectual humility ‘seems to 
demand much more than just limitation owning’.225 Consider Priest’s own counter-example for 
illustration:  
[L]et us imagine a professor who is acutely aware of his own limitations. He also 
justifiably believes that he is better than most of his students in physics. With this 
realization in mind, he looks down on them with contempt as his intellectual 
inferiors. Even when they understand, he lectures patronizingly making sure they 
recognize his superiority. He acts this way not only toward his students but to all 
whom he justifiably believes to have less intellectual acumen. Additionally, he 
jumps at every opportunity to mention his success and prominently displays his 
awards and accomplishments where and whenever he can. [. . .] It is 
counterintuitive to think that such a professor is intellectually humble (to say the 
least).226 
 
                                                        
224 Whitcomb et al., ‘Intellectual Humility’, 520. 
225 Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility’, 467. 
226 Ibid. 
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Now, it could be argued that Priest’s example confuses the issue by incorporating elements that 
may speak of a general arrogance, or lack of humility more broadly speaking, rather than 
epistemic arrogance or humility specifically (though it is not absurd to think that one goes with 
the other more often than not!). The display of awards and accomplishments, for instance, does 
not strike me as specifically epistemic in any way, though the awards and accomplishments 
themselves may pertain to activities with a strongly epistemic component.227 Perhaps this 
behaviour may be explained by reference to personal pride, and, to return to a view previously 
mentioned, an excessive concern with status. That being said, I think the case points to an 
important component: the unnecessarily negative evaluation of, and disdain for, those the 
arrogant individual considers to be epistemically inferior. As will not surprise my reader, this is 
the component that I think is of fundamental import in the context of epistemic authority. I now 
turn to this, through the lens of Priest’s own account of intellectual humility.  
 Priest suggests the following view better explains the above case of the professor: 
Interpersonal Assessment Intellectual Humility: Agents are intellectually humble 
just in case interactions with members of their epistemic community creates a 
tendency to reflect on their own epistemic limitations.228  
 
At the core, I think this view is correct: at the very least, it identifies key components of the 
phenomenon I have in mind when discussing epistemic authority. Let us take a closer look. 
 Priest argues that her view can make sense of the various intuitions that drive self-
assessment views of intellectual humility, while avoiding the problems these views come with. 
Priest believes that the epistemically humble lack ‘abrasive overconfidence’, for instance, but that 
                                                        
227 I do not mean this as a criticism. My own discussion of epistemic humility in relation to authority does not clearly 
remain within the scope of purely epistemic considerations. I do not think this is a bad thing: clearly, the boundary 
between epistemology and ethics will get fuzzy here, as we are dealing with interpersonal relationships, and the 
question of what we can do for each other. My point is simply that it may not be particularly fair to criticise a view of 
intellectual or epistemic humility on these moral grounds. 
228 Ibid., 475. 
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‘they lack this overconfidence specifically because it is incompatible with other-directed respect’;229 
they also own their own limitations, as Whitcomb et al. suggest, but ‘this is because they take 
advice and criticism seriously, not the other way around’;230 they do not feel a sense of 
entitlement to accept certain intellectual advantages over those that they deem as being 
epistemically inferior.231  
 Priest’s views here map nicely on to the kind of other-directed respect that I think we 
desire in an epistemic authority. If I seek the help of a medical practitioner, whom I identify as 
my epistemic authority on medical issues, I may desire that she is epistemically humble in the 
sense that she respects my own epistemic position: as someone who is trying to make sense of my 
own autonomous choice on some medical matter based on both the medical facts of the case, but 
also on practical considerations and preferences that I express; as someone trying to make sense 
of how certain first-personal evidence (e.g. my experience of the symptoms, medicinal side-
effects, etc.) relates to the epistemic practice of medical inquiry; as someone seeking guidance on 
various higher-order issues, such as the question of how much evidential weight I should place on 
the results of certain tests, my own feelings, future-directed preferences; etc. If I adopt the 
position of a pupil, identifying an advisor or teacher as my epistemic authority in relation to some 
domain of inquiry, I may seek similar humility: in learning how to navigate and partake in a 
certain epistemic practice myself, I desire that an authority both tells me how to do so, 
authoritatively correcting my epistemic behaviour when necessary, but always with a level of 
respect for my own epistemic position—my own skills, abilities, and know-how, even with a sense 
of respect for my future epistemic position, i.e. not feeling entitled to abuse my intellectual 
inferiority in the present, for the sake of improving my position in the future.  
                                                        
229 Ibid., 470. Emphasis my own.  
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid., 469. 
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 Central to these considerations, I suggest, is the authority’s awareness of the fact that she 
is a practitioner of an epistemic practice, a practice that is ultimately responsible for the 
production of various epistemic goods, that she is merely fortunate enough to be a participant of. 
Though the skills, abilities, and know-how required to participate in this practice are ones that 
not everyone may have, this does not mean that she is the ultimate source of the produced 
epistemic goods—the practice itself is the root such valuable results—and thus these skills, 
abilities, and know-how do not provide her with a sense of arrogant entitlement to behave as if 
the goods were solely her product.  
 This means that the humble epistemic authority is aware that she is a member of an 
epistemic community, the division of cognitive labour it involves, and the fact that other epistemic 
agents have contributed to the relevant inquiry that she participates in. This is precisely what 
Priest identifies in her account of epistemic humility. Importantly, the notion of epistemic 
community in question here is not a narrow one—it is not limited to other similarly able 
practitioners of the same practice for instance: Priest specifically points out that the intellectually 
humble take the ideas and criticism of their epistemic inferiors ‘seriously’, respect other epistemic 
agents of various levels ability, and refuse special intellectual treatment in relation to their 
inferiors.232  
 We should be careful, however, in understanding precisely some of the key notions 
referred to above. What do we mean when we say that an authority ‘respects’ her epistemic 
inferiors, or that an authority takes their ideas and criticisms ‘seriously’? To unpack these ideas, 
let us take a closer look at what Priest says about the intellectually humble:  
[A] person is intellectually humble just in case he:  
• Respects the intellect of others as his own, and so rarely feels immune to 
their complaints and criticisms.  
                                                        
232 Ibid., 469-470. 
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• Systematically declines intellectual advantages in interpersonal relations 
because he feels no sense of entitlement.  
 
Persons who meet these criteria tend to behave in ways that signify their 
intellectual humility. For instance, the intellectually humble:  
• Rarely demand special intellectual treatment, even when deserving. 
• Often refuse special intellectual treatment, even when deserving.  
• Tend to take complaints and criticisms seriously, even when the criticizers 
are not authority figures and even when the criticism is rude.  
• Tend to take the ideas (which are not always complaints) of others seriously, 
even the ideas of intellectual inferiors.233  
 
These interpersonal conditions give way to the kinds of behaviour that the self-assessment views 
of epistemic humility focus on: ‘[k]nowing that others disagree with her, she can rarely in good 
faith overestimate the epistemic appeal of her own views’,234 even ‘in instances when the humble 
agent is quite sure of her beliefs, she does not flaunt this assurance’.235  
 When considering epistemic authority specifically, some of these statements may raise 
concerns: one may worry that Priest’s account is suggesting that an authority underestimate her 
epistemic position because of the beliefs or criticisms of a non-authority (or other epistemically 
inferior agent). However, this is precisely why we have to be careful in understanding what is 
entitled by saying that a humble agent takes others’ views ‘seriously’. Priest is not defending the 
view that a humble agent, or epistemic authority specifically, should doubt herself due to such 
views, criticisms, etc. She clarifies her view in the following terms:  
Thoughts like this are not examples of the humble agent doubting her beliefs, but 
rather examples of the humble agent doubting that her own intellectual brilliance 
made arriving at those beliefs inevitable. The humble agent’s respect for 
reasonable and intelligent others tempers not her enthusiasm in p, but rather her 
enthusiasm in ‘look how special I am to believe p’.236  
 
Here again we can make reference to the notion of an intellectual community: the humble agent 
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234 Ibid., 470.  
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236 Ibid. 
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does not consider herself entitled to distinguish herself from the community as a whole, she is not 
special in the sense that she somehow sits outside of the broader community’s overall epistemic 
workings and history. She recognises herself as part of it, and the epistemic goods that she is privy 
to as goods that are a result of a broader process and history, and, furthermore, recognises that 
these goods are goods for all members of the community. What is special, what matters, is the 
epistemic result (in Priest’s case, a belief in p), which is derived from a certain epistemic practice, 
not the fact that I accessed or discovered it.237 
 Thinking of the humble in such a manner can also help us best read Priest’s suggestion 
that the humble ‘respect the intellect of others as [their] own’.238 At first glance such a suggestion 
may seem puzzling, particularly when considering the epistemic authority: surely, we may ask, 
the authority recognises that she is intellectually better in some important sense?239 I think the two 
thoughts are compatible, however: the epistemically humble respect others’ intellects as their own 
qua members of the same community broadly aimed at the same goals, both epistemic and non-. 
To respect another’s intellect as one’s own is not to literally identify the two intellects in question 
as having the same skills, as both being on par in regard to having a certain kind of expertise in a 
certain domain of inquiry, as both sharing in the same level of intelligence or epistemic rigour, or 
anything of the like. Rather, the sense of respect in question entails recognising that others too 
are of a similar kind: we are epistemic agents, with similar practical needs, seeking out certain 
epistemic goods, and members of the same, broad epistemic community. Perhaps it is to go so far 
                                                        
237 Of course, this is surely something worthy of praise, and it is quite right that we generally honour and credit those 
that do such work. The point, however, is that these values are secondary, derivative of the value that is attached to 
the epistemic good itself. 
238 Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility’, 469. 
239 Recall that I disagree with Zagzebski, who thinks that epistemic authorities are simply agents who are like us in 
most important respects, but simply are more conscientious about a certain domain of inquiry (because they have 
more time, more means, etc., to do so). I think in many cases authorities may have a special skillset that is a result of 
substantial intellectual differences, whether by nature or nurture, that cannot be merely reduced to having the means 
to being more conscientious about certain kinds of inquiry. Thus, I think we need to leave room for the idea that 
(some) epistemic authorities are simply epistemically better than us in more absolute terms. See Chapter I and II for 
more.  
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as to suggest that others deserve to also partake in the epistemic fruits of one’s own labour, or at 
least to be given the opportunity to autonomously choose to reach for such fruit. To repeat 
Priest’s point somewhat differently, the suggestion here is that the epistemically humble resist a 
certain kind of egotistical thought: they remove the ‘I’ from the equation, focused on epistemic 
community, a certain epistemic practice, and the epistemic goods that result. Here, the epistemic 
community may arguably be something that the epistemically humble value for its own sake.240 
 My hope is that the above discussion provides at least an illustration of the kind of 
epistemically virtuous behaviour that I think beneficial in the epistemic-authority-to-non-
authority relationship. This was my primary goal. Though it is not of fundamental important to 
the project of this chapter (or this dissertation), I also hope that my discussion here has provided 
further support for Priest’s account of epistemic humility, or, at least further support for the idea 
that epistemic humility should be considered in interpersonal rather than personal terms. I will 
leave it to my reader to decide if I have succeeded in doing just that.  
 
IV.3. AGAINST ARROGANCE: THE BENEFITS OF EPISTEMIC HUMILITY 
  
 With an account of epistemic humility in view, we are now in position to further discuss 
the use of such virtue in the epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship. Though it is 
probably fairly clear to my reader, I will begin by further elaborating on why such a virtue can 
play an important role in this relationship, and why, given its benefit to the consequences of such 
a relationship, it ought to be sought out—both in the sense that a non-authority ought to seek out 
                                                        
240 Though it is beside the point here, I think thinking of humility in such a fashion makes sense of a certain common 
kind of action that we tend to describe as being humble, such as when the recipient of some prize or honour takes 
the time to thank all those in their community that have directly or indirectly helped them. The humblest of 
individuals go so far as to publicly declare that they do not think themselves as special, but rather lucky enough to be 
the individuals that were in the right position to do the work for the community at large. 
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virtuous authorities, but also that authorities should foster such a virtue. Furthermore, I suggest 
that a lack of epistemic humility on the part of the epistemic authority can undermine the 
epistemic autonomy of the relative non-authority. As previously noted, I do this for the following 
two reasons: first, doing so will take us one step closer to being able to more richly articulate a set 
of principles with which we can all better discern when (and when not) to identify someone as an 
epistemic authority, and thusly treat them as such; secondly, doing so will also provide those that 
are treated as epistemic authorities with an, albeit incomplete, set of guidelines for what is 
required of them in order to be the best kinds of epistemic authorities that our epistemic situation 
requires (both in the sense of the epistemic situation that we individually find ourselves in, but 
also in the sense of the epistemic situation our epistemic community finds itself at large).  
 To restate my views on epistemic authority (as discussed in Chapter II), recall that I 
consider an epistemic authority broadly as an individual that, other conditions being met, can 
provide us, as relative non-authorities, with certain epistemic goods. These epistemic goods can 
range from beliefs, to other propositional attitudes such as acceptance and hypothesis, to more 
complex states such as understanding, and even more complicated goods, such as the possibility 
of collaborating in an epistemic project, and the goods that we could think of as being born of the 
pedagogical context: where the epistemic authority can act as a guide, facilitating the non-
authority’s development to the status of an epistemic peer. As I see it, this incomplete list of 
epistemic results can be placed on a continuum, a scale with certain goods that require little extra 
work on the side of the epistemic authority on the one end, and far more demanding results that 
require much more of the epistemic authority on the other end (at least if the relationship is to 
bear the best fruit it can). Here my view echoes the hierarchy of epistemic authority that I 
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understand Michel Croce to be suggesting,241 with what he calls an epistemic authority of belief 
on the one end, an epistemic authority of understanding somewhere above this, with the final, 
ultimate position going to what he refers to as a Supreme Epistemic Authority.242 Though we disagree 
on precisely what is required of such authority figures, when speaking in terms of their virtues,243 
I generally agree with his assessment of this growing complexity. Those of us who simply wish to 
find out what to believe about a given matter in a domain of inquiry (one opaque to use due to a 
lack of expertise) need not be too concerned about the various virtues that an identified epistemic 
authority may possess, beyond those required for her (the authority) to have the requisite skills, 
abilities, and know-how to partake in the epistemic practice in question. When we seek 
understanding about a certain issue, however, things are clearly more complicated: we are best 
served in this instance by an authority that does not arrogantly ignore or disqualify our own 
epistemic standing, our views, beliefs, intuitions, etc. The same can be said in the case that I seek 
to understand why my own beliefs, or the evidence that I have at hand, does or does not justify a 
certain conclusion in a certain domain of inquiry. In the pedagogical context, it is difficult to 
escape the intuition that a lack of the aforementioned intellectual arrogance is a necessary 
requirement for the epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship being epistemically 
valuable, and fruitful. I do not think, for instance, that it is an accident that Priest ended up using 
the example of the professor to illustrate her interpersonal account of epistemic humility.  
 And here is the crux of the matter: to gain these more complicated epistemic results from 
a relationship with an epistemic authority in these cases, we need the authority to be epistemically 
humble in her dealings with us. A lack of such humility can, at best, leave us with fewer of the 
                                                        
241 See Chapter II.  
242 Michel Croce, ‘Expert-Oriented Abilities’, 21. 
243 Most importantly in that I do not think that an epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship in which the 
non-authority is seeking mere beliefs requires that the authority in question possesses what Croce refers to as a 
sensitivity to the non-authority’s epistemic needs. See Chapter II.  
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epistemic goods than we could ideally acquire from a relationship with such an authority, and, at 
worse, could leave us worse off than if we were to have not identified her as our epistemic 
authority, and not treated her as such.  
 How could we be worse off? I think this could happen in a number of ways. Consider the 
case that I seek understanding of the relationship between my own reasons, the beliefs they 
suggest, and the actual fact of the matter in some domain of inquiry. I do this because I not only 
want to know the answers to certain questions I currently have, that a part of the domain of 
inquiry in question, but also want to be able to better evaluate my own epistemic position with 
regard to future questions I may come across. Alternatively, I may seek such understanding 
simply because I have a hard time accepting the results of the relevant epistemic inquiry— 
because they are counter-intuitive, for example, or clash with the results of a different domain of 
inquiry that I take seriously. One can imagine that a bad choice of epistemic authority in such a 
situation—viz. in which we choose an epistemically arrogant individual—could leave me worse 
off. The arrogant authority in this case may authoritatively tell me that my reasons are bad 
reasons, insensitively telling me that I should completely drop the idea of thinking of a particular 
question in a certain way, but without providing me with any guidance or further explanation: as 
to how and why my reasons ought to be discarded, why they don’t hold weight in the relevant 
epistemic practice, or what kind of reasons I should entertain instead. On his authority, I may 
adjust my epistemic behaviour in the relevant way, and thus leave myself, at least diachronically 
speaking, in an epistemically worse off position. 
 Let me illustrate with the following tale:  
Dr. Hoggs: I, knowing no better, am relying on my intuitions about every-day 
sized objects to make sense of various claims about sub-atomic particles. I 
already have a vague sense that my reasoning has gone off-course, but, being a 
complete novice in the relevant domain of inquiry, I have no idea how to 
rectify this. Given that I would like to avoid making too many mistakes in in 
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the same way in the future, I seek out an epistemic authority, not just to 
acquire the right answers to the questions that I am considering, but to also 
get a sense of where I stand—in regard to my reasons, reasoning, and 
intuitions—in relation to the relevant epistemic practice. For this reason, I find 
a famous physicist at my local university. His research is focused on various 
sub-atomic issues, he is credentialed, he has received more awards than one 
would care to count, and he seems to be well-respected by other physicists. His 
name is Dr. Hoggs. When I meet him, however, explaining my position, he 
agrees to correct my errors. However, when I ask my questions, illustrate my 
line of reasoning, and generally share with him my epistemic perspective on 
various physics-related questions, he quickly begins to grow irritated. He 
arrogantly scoffs at my thoughts and concerns, growing tired of considering 
my queries. He promptly tells me that I am completely wrong, that I should 
cease and desist in thinking about the questions in the way I have, and, finally, 
that the answer to the questions I have been considering are p, q, and r, 
respectively. With a look disdain and contempt, he wishes me adieu, and 
leaves. 
 
Now, presumably, not everything has gone wrong: I can adopt a belief in p, q, and r, simply on 
the authority of Hoggs’ testimony. However, there are clearly epistemic goods that I have not 
acquired, goods that I was specifically seeking when I sought out Hoggs’ input. It seems to me 
that I have, if we are to look at the issue diachronically, been left in a worse position overall: I 
have not learnt how to properly manage my reasons and reasoning about certain physics-related 
questions, and, specifically, do not know whether any of my reasons were good ones or not. 
Because of Hoggs’ arrogance, I am left completely sceptical about my ability to consider certain 
questions, and thus potentially worse off in the future: having been authoritatively told that I 
should no longer think in the way that I have been, I may now be left in the position of only 
being able to accept authoritative decrees on the matter, resisting any desire to engage with the 
relevant inquiry using my own epistemic powers, because of the authoritative judgements that I 
ought not to. I cease to have any faith in my reasoning on the subject matter at all.  
 Perhaps my reader does not find the previous case convincing. One might potentially 
argue that it is actually better that I not try to understand certain complicated questions in the 
domain of physics without further training. Perhaps one might argue that Hoggs has  
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(albeit inadvertently) helped me by stopping me from engaging in erroneous and naive reasoning. 
The following case may be more persuasive, of a kind often discussed in relation to issues of 
epistemic injustice, and medical epistemology:  
Jane: Jane seeks out a medical professional for advice on a series of symptoms she 
has been experiencing. She has been suffering from a level of pain during 
menstruation that she has never experienced before, and often feels nauseous. 
She makes an appointment with her doctor, and tells him about these 
symptoms, emphasising the severity of the pain compared to all her previous 
menstruations. The doctor does not seem to pay much heed to her first-
personal descriptions of pain, and after briefly checking her over, tells her that 
it is ‘just her period’, concluding that the pain could be heightened by stress, 
lack of sleep, or one of any other wide range of possible causes. Jane is sent 
home without further medical attention. A week later Jane ends up in the 
emergency room, where it is finally discovered that she has a serious ovarian 
cyst.  
 
Stories like these are unfortunately far too common, and the tendency for medical professionals 
to take women’s pain less seriously than men’s is well documented.244 Here we have a case in 
which someone who may be identified as an epistemic authority displays an arrogance that leaves 
the non-authority in an epistemically unfavourable position (and, here this is compounded by the 
fact that she is also left in a severely diminished position in practical terms, as a direct result of her 
impoverished epistemic position). Worse still, the arrogance of the doctor in this case not only 
diminishes Jane’s epistemic position going forward, it also hinders the doctor’s ability to epistemically 
function as well as he could.  Jane has ended up with a false belief about her current medical state, 
and further false beliefs about what she ought to do to ensure her health into the future. The 
doctor in the case also has false beliefs about Jane’s case, but, more importantly, he has stopped 
the relevant epistemic practice from being able to correctly function, or provide the results it has. 
The doctor’s arrogance in this case is heavily consequential.  
                                                        
244 See, for instance: Laura Kiesel, ‘Women and pain: Disparities in experience and treatment’, Harvard Medical 
Publishing (October 9th, 2017), Harvard Medical School, https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/women-and-pain-
disparities-in-experience-and-treatment-2017100912562, and: Joe Fassler, ‘How Doctor’s Take Women’s Pain Less 
Seriously’, The Atlantic (October 15th, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-
room-wait-times-sexism/410515/. 
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 As I see it, there are at least two ways in which an epistemic authority’s arrogance, or lack 
of epistemic humility, could diminish the potential value of an established relationship with a 
non-authority. First, such arrogance could hinder the non-authority’s ability to acquire certain 
epistemic goods, specifically when the non-authority does not merely seek true beliefs relative to 
the relevant domain of inquiry, and could undermine the non-authority’s ability to either properly 
function, or function to her full potential as an epistemic agent; secondly, in cases in which the non-
authority’s own evidence (or perspective more broadly) is relevant to the inquiry, or in cases in 
which the relevant inquiry involves a collaboration between epistemic authority and non-
authority, it is possible that arrogance on the authority’s part could even undermine the success 
of the inquiry itself, as suggested by the Jane case above.  
 In relation to the first point, let me say this: I think there is an important way in which a 
lack of epistemic humility on the part of the epistemic authority can do the non-authority harm. 
Such a lack of humility can undermine the epistemic autonomy of the non-authority, of the kind 
I have discussed in Chapter III. I do not think this is entirely surprising, as the idea that epistemic 
humility entails a certain level of respect for other epistemic agents, even those deemed 
epistemically inferior, and it need not be much of a stretch to think that this would include a level 
of respect for these agents’ epistemic autonomy. A respect for another individual qua epistemic 
agent seems to require a respect for them as epistemically autonomous. And if having a 
relationship with an epistemic authority, in the way I have described it here, involves being 
epistemically dependent on them, it isn’t at all surprising that a lack of such respect can undermine 
that autonomy. 
 This fits nicely with what I have argued for as being required of the non-authority, in 
relationship with an epistemic authority, in order for him to retain his epistemic autonomy to the 
highest degree possible. Recall that I suggested the two following conditions, roughly stated:  
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i. A non-authority is minimally autonomous so long as he reflectively endorses the 
principles that govern the relevant epistemic practice, and that he has 
identified an epistemic authority as such on the basis of good evidence.  
ii. A non-authority is further required (conditional on the nature of the specific 
details of the epistemic-authority-to-non-authority relationship in question) to 
involve himself in the relevant epistemic practice and inquiry where 
appropriate, and where practically reasonable to do so, in order to be 
considered fully autonomous. To fail to do this, when possible, is to be 
epistemically lazy, and to diminish one’s own autonomy.245   
Though an arrogant epistemic authority may undermine a non-authority’s ability to do (i) to a 
certain extent (by, for example, obscuring certain facts about the methodology of the relevant 
epistemic practice on the basis of an arrogant assumption that the non-authority could not 
understand), I think it more clearly the case that a lack of epistemic humility on the authority’s 
part could undermine the non-authority’s ability to satisfy (ii) in certain cases.  
 Consider a modified version of the Jane story above. 
Janette: Janette, like Jane, goes to her doctor to discuss her symptoms—she is 
suffering from an unusual level of pain during menstruation, and frequently 
feels nauseous. Her doctor looks her over, and tells that her worries are 
unfounded: she is probably stressed, and the symptoms will pass. Her feelings 
of pain and discomfort, she is told, are not reliable indicators of any serious, 
underlying cause. Luckily for Jannette, her pains eventually pass. However, 
because of the strength of her doctor’s conviction in regard to the evidence of 
her first-hand experience, she comes to believe that such evidence is irrelevant 
to medical practice. In her later interactions with medical professionals, she 
either minimises the severity of her first-personal observations of various 
symptoms, or, worse, even fails to mention them at all. When she is given 
various diagnoses, based on signs rather than symptoms, and offered medical 
treatment, she accepts these conclusions, even if they do not fit with her first-personal 
experience of her illness or symptoms.  
 
                                                        
245 Refer to Chapter III for further detail.  
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Now we can conclude this story tragically, pointing to the practical consequences to Jane’s 
health. But we need not do so in order to drive home the crucial point here: like in Jane’s case, 
the process of inquiry into Janette’s health has been undermined, but it is also the case that 
Janette’s epistemic autonomy, at least in terms of its potential, has been undermined. Janette no 
longer attempts to involve herself in the epistemic practice where relevant and appropriate, she 
no longer trusts herself as a competent epistemic agent in relation to certain questions, and 
certain forms of inquiry. She no longer reflectively endorses and identifies with certain of her 
prior reasons and claims to evidence. Something certainly seems to have gone wrong for Jannette 
in this case. If we care about a non-authority’s ability to be epistemically autonomous (to the 
highest degree possible), then we ought to care about whether or not our epistemic authorities 
are epistemically humble, i.e. that they are not epistemically arrogant. Arrogant authorities can 
do harm to our status as epistemic agents, in a variety of ways; such authorities can also do harm 
to epistemic communities more broadly, the practices they are involved in, and its store and 
supply of epistemic goods.   
 The connection between one agent’s epistemic humility, and another’s autonomy, should 
come as no surprise. Priest’s view of epistemic humility already suggests something similar to 
what I have in mind. In further describing her case of the humble professor, she suggests that 
such an individual might often act in the following ways:  
1. He recognizes his own intellectual superiority.  
2. In spite of (1) he listens to each opinion carefully.  
3. He is motivated to do (2) because he respects the intellectual autonomy and 
ability of his students, even in spite of (1).  
4. He occasionally revises his own opinion in light of his students’ thoughts.  
I am sceptical that (4) applies in general across cases of epistemic authority, though I can 
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certainly see it being more likely in the more collaborative context of education, or in cases in 
which the disparity between the authority and non-authority’s relative level of skill (in regard to 
partaking in a certain epistemic practice) is not substantially large. I shall leave this aside for now, 
however. What matters for my purposes is that Priest identifies the intellectually humble as being 
motivated by a respect for the epistemic autonomy of his inferiors. This seems right, as 
consideration of cases of epistemic authority specifically seem to show.   
 Before finishing, let us briefly consider here the value of epistemic humility in terms of its 
benefits to the epistemic authority qua inquirer, without reference to the non-authority.246 The 
point here is a simple one: research suggests that those we generally consider experts tend to 
show a diminishing level of skill or ability over time, especially when they are less willing to listen to 
the criticism of their peers, continue to partake in some form of education, etc. If we understand 
epistemic humility in the terms that Priest has suggested, then it is easy to see how a lack of such 
humility can be detrimental to an epistemic authority, since humility is characterised by the 
tendency to reflect on one’s epistemic limitations when interacting with members of one’s 
epistemic community.247 In being epistemically humble, then, an authority is provided with 
opportunity to hone, test, and fine-tune her skillset: she openly receives criticism from her peers; 
she acknowledges the need to re-educate herself in some areas, where appropriate, and to learn 
new, updated skills and methods; she becomes aware of important changes in the epistemic 
practice of which she is a practitioner, rather than being erroneously tied to an ancient form of 
the practice; and so forth. At minimum, the humble epistemic authority is far more likely to 
simply practice her abilities, improving upon them or keeping them ‘up to par’; she is more likely 
to reflect upon the justificatory basis for her methods, and to remind herself of the broader 
                                                        
246 Though even here there will be second-hand benefits for any who choose to identify such individuals as epistemic 
authorities. 
247 Priest, ‘Intellectual Humility’, 475. 
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theoretical framework that motivates her epistemic practice. The point, I imagine, is not a very 
surprising one: being intellectual humble is a virtue with epistemic benefit, in that plays a role in 
fostering one’s epistemic agency, and, in turn, improving our odds of epistemic success. It should 
be no less of a surprise that this applies to epistemic authorities, just as much as it does to others. 
Even if an authority is solely interested in the fruits of their own research, for their own benefit, 
they would be better served by being epistemically humble. As a social epistemologist, however, I 
would like to point out the more important consequence here: an epistemic authority who 
humbly services her own cognitive abilities is of far more benefit to us as a society, and epistemic 
community.  
 
IV.4. TOWARDS VIRTUOUS EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY 
 
 What are we to conclude from these observations? It seems to me that, besides in the 
somewhat rarer cases in which the input of a non-authority is an important component of the 
epistemic practice in question, there isn’t much we can say in terms of what is epistemically required 
of an epistemic authority. I would not contest this: without recourse to the idea that people in a 
position of authority are morally obligated to help their inferiors, or stipulating that an authority 
has made a promise248 to the non-authority to serve him well, it would be hard to suggest that 
there is any strong normative force pressuring her to do just that (and, of course, even then it 
would not be an epistemically normative pressure). My account, then, suggests that there are 
certain normative forces acting on the non-authority, pressuring him to, at minimum, behave in 
an epistemically autonomous fashion;249 it does not by itself, however, suggest that there are 
similar forces behaving on the epistemic authority, leaving us with the asymmetry that concerned 
                                                        
248 Or signed a contract to, vowed to . . . etc. 
249 See Chapter III.  
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us at the start. This is in no way surprising, however, and I think it implausible to think that it 
could be otherwise: dependence, reliance, trust, and other related phenomena, all involve this 
asymmetry. It seems to me that social epistemology is concerned with making sense of our 
epistemic lives given that it is rooted in such asymmetric practices and phenomena, rather than 
being concentred with trying to avoid such things.   
 Nevertheless, I take myself to have defend this claim: if we care about the epistemic status 
of non-authorities, and all members of our epistemic communities more broadly, then we ought to 
take steps to ensure that our epistemic authorities are intellectually humble. This suggests two 
things:  
i. As non-authorities seeking out certain epistemic goods, we can better evaluate 
certain individuals when choosing between candidates for the position of 
epistemic authority, and considerations of epistemic humility ought to play a part 
in this. This means that having a clear sense of what epistemic humility entails, 
and being able to discern various signs of such humility, can help us improve 
our epistemic situations. To speak idealistically: I would argue that our 
epistemic educations should include such training, as part of a broader 
training in identifying experts and epistemic authorities.  
ii. As potential epistemic authorities motivated by the ‘greater epistemic good’250 
we ought to take steps to cultivate this virtue within ourselves. This is 
especially the case if we are already aware of the fact that others have 
identified us as epistemic authorities, and are treating us as such. To speak 
idealistically once more: perhaps the types of education that often churn out 
plausible candidates for being treated as epistemic authorities should be 
                                                        
250 Perhaps it could be argued that one has a duty to care for such a thing, but I will leave this point aside for now.  
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required to teach certain epistemic virtues (including epistemic humility). This 
would certainly be prudent in at least some domains, in which it is often the 
case that epistemic authorities have a more nuanced and complicated 
relationship with relative non-authorities: such as in medical and pedagogical 
contexts.  
 The possibility of such practical implications, as well as the possibility of improving our 
epistemic community’s standing broadly speaking, motivates the following suggestion: we ought 
to seek out a fuller account of all the epistemic virtues that an epistemic authority ideally ought to 
have. The above has focused on but one epistemic virtue relevant to epistemic authority, but 
there are likely many more. Michel Croce has suggested the virtue of being sensitive to others’ 
epistemic needs as crucial for certain forms of epistemic authority, as well as arguing that the virtue 
of wisdom characterises the highest form of epistemic authority.251 Perhaps we could look at 
epistemic fairness, or epistemic altruism for further insight.  
 Beyond identifying these virtues, however, I would argue that there are two other tasks at 
hand, two that perhaps epistemologists are best suited to accomplish: the task of discovering the 
most successful methods for identifying these various epistemic virtues in others, as well as how to 
teach others to use these methods; and the task of discovering the best pedagogical methods for 
teaching these virtues to  those that are like to be treated as epistemic authorities. Only then will 
we be able to identify the most excellent of individuals to act as our intellectual superiors, and 
hopefully train our epistemic authorities to be virtuous in a manner that is beneficial to our 
community at large. 
 
  
                                                        
251 Croce, ‘Expert-Oriented Abilities’, 20. 
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